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1. INTRODUCTION
The invention of agriculture that occurred around
10,000 years ago heralded a shift from nomadic
hunting and gathering to more managed forms of
food, feed and fibre production. The domestication
of crops initially involved the saving of seed from
one season for planting in subsequent years. Later,
farmers purposefully selected crop varieties and
so in practice began matching and, by repeated
selection over many years, adapting crop genetics
to the environment in which the crop was grown.
From its inception, enhancing G x E (i.e., gene by
environment) interactions was an intrinsic, if not
defining, feature of agriculture.
However, just as the G-part of agriculture changed
over time because of human activity, so too did
the E-element. Farmers first began altering their
local environments by clearing and levelling
fields, weeding, and engaging in various forms of
irrigation. Then, as people began to migrate they
carried their crops with them, found new ones
along the way, and, eventually, sent expeditions
abroad scouring the world for new cropping
material. Viewed from this historical perspective,
the geographical footprint of agriculture has been
ever changing; even more so when looking at the

spatial extent of particular crops that get moved
around both between countries as well as among
regions and agroecologies within countries. Figure
1 shows the changing spatial extent of land in
agriculture, beginning in 1700 when agriculture
occupied just 9 percent of the world’s land area.
We see the spread of agriculture to the New
Worlds and an expansion of land in Africa, Latin
America and parts of South-East Asia. By 1992,
agriculture was being practiced on 40 percent of
the world’s land area. Sizable additional land areas
have agroecological attributes that make them
amenable to agriculture, but urban, infrastructural,
economic and environmental factors circumscribe
this potential.1
Despite this long sweep of agriculture, scientifically
bred crop varieties (and livestock breeds) and their
associated agricultural management practices
have a history of barely one hundred years. At

1 Contrary to popular belief there remains significant room to
expand agricultural areas, at least from a biological perspective.
Using only agroecological attributes to determine the suitability
of land for agriculture, Bruinsma (2003) estimated that at the turn
of the 21st century only 34 percent of the potential agricultural
area in the developing world was being farmed (with much of the
additional areas located in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and,
to a lesser extent, South Asia). About 44 percent of the potential
agricultural land in the developed countries was being farmed in
1997-99.

Figure 1: Land in Agriculture, 1700-1992
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Source: Ramankutty, Foley and Olejnickzak (2002).
Notes: Agricultural area estimates developed using the methodology described in Ramankutty and Foley (1999).
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the beginning of the 20th century a number of
important things changed. For example, the laws
of heredity were rediscovered and there were
substantive improvements in our understanding
of the role soil fertility plays in plant growth.
There also emerged an appreciation of how to
better manage agricultural production systems
and deal with crop and livestock diseases as the
bacteriology, virology and related microbiological
sciences began to develop. Introducing the
results of scientific research into agriculture
accelerated the growth in agricultural productivity
and production in significant parts of the world,
particularly beginning in the mid-1900s.
These improvements in agricultural productivity
have alleviated much poverty and starvation and
fuelled economic progress. However, as this report
will show, comparatively little agricultural R&D
and “technology tailoring” has been done for the
conditions confronting African agriculture.2 Thus
it should not be surprising that comparatively
little progress has been made on the agricultural
productivity front in this part of the world.
Innovation in African agriculture and other
regions of the developing world will be critical to
solving the scourge of hunger and lifting the lot
of the billions of the world’s people who rely on
agriculture for a living, and all the world’s poor
who rely on agriculture for their sustenance.3 How
does this all square with the recent and pervasive
declines in the growth of spending for agricultural
R&D that this report will reveal?
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Relying on home-grown technologies is one source
of growth in agriculture. Tapping technologies
developed in other places—especially in the
rich countries where the preponderance of the
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2 See DeVries and Toenniessen (2001) for much more
elaboration on this point.
3 Cassman and Wood (2006, p. 781) observed that “Cultivated
systems play a vital role in global economic wellbeing, especially
in poorer countries. In 2000, agriculture (including forestry and
fishing) represented 24 percent of total GDP [Gross Domestic
Product] on average in countries with per capita incomes less the
$765 (the World Bank 2003 threshold designating low-income
countries). About 2.6 billion people depend on agriculture for their
livelihoods, either as actively engaged workers or as dependents
(FAOSTAT 2004). In 2000, just over half (52 percent) of the world’s
population were living in rural areas and, of these, about 2.5
billion people were estimated to be living in agriculturally based
households (World Bank 2003). The global agricultural labor force
includes approximately 1.3 billion people, about a fourth (22
percent) of the world’s population and half (46 percent) of the
total labor force (Deen 2000).”

agricultural R&D has been done—has also been a
feature of agricultural progress the world over. Big
changes are afoot, especially in the past 25 years,
in the ways in which many (rich) countries fund
and organise their public agricultural R&D, the
incentives affecting private R&D, the orientation of
rich-country research, and the intellectual property
and regulatory restrictions that affect the sharing
and use of the results of research. Taken together,
these changes raise serious, and yet unresolved,
questions about the prospects for sustaining
productivity growth over the next 25 years and
beyond.

1.1 GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTIVITY
Crop Yields
For thousands of years, farmers eked out yield
gains by collecting and selecting the best
and most productive seeds and by improving
cultivation and organic fertilization techniques.
The rate of increase in yields was small, and so
expansion of cultivated areas accounted for most
of the increases in total production. A century ago,
Gregor Mendel’s research describing the pattern of
genetic inheritance, first published by the Austrian
botanist and monk in 1865, was rediscovered and
reconfirmed. Thus the modern era of scientific
breeding began.
Starting in the late 19th century, average yields of
major crops in North America, Europe, and Japan
began to increase at rates well beyond historical
precedent. For example, beginning with an average
wheat yield of 15 bushels per acre in 1866 (the
earliest year for which reliable data are available), it
took 103 years, until 1969, for U.S. yields to double
(Figure 2). Yield growth accelerated in the second
half of the 20th century; it took only 48 years from
1957 for U.S. wheat yields to double and reach the
42 bushels per acre reaped in 2005. Similar yield
accelerations occurred in many other crops in the
United States.
It would be a mistake to interpret the
comparatively slow growth in average U.S. wheat
yields during the 19th century as an indication
that productivity growth was largely absent and

Figure 2: Wheat Yields, 1800-2004
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lower absent changes in the biological basis of U.S.
wheat production.
Many crops in many developed countries saw a
sharp up-turn in their average yield performance
in the middle of the 20th century as an increasing
number of genetically improved varieties, targeted
to particular agroecological zones, became
available. Beginning in the 1950s and continuing
at an accelerated pace in the 1960s and 1970s,
improved varieties also became available to
many more farmers in developing countries from
international and national agricultural research
centers, and average yields took off in many, but by
no means all, of those countries as well.
A key to these widespread yield gains was the
rapid spread of modern (often short-statured,
so-called semi-dwarf ) rice and wheat varieties
throughout the developing world; initially
through the adoption of cultivars developed in
international research centers over wide areas with
favorable environments, and then via adaptation
of this germplasm to local ecologies and consumer
preferences. Asia was quickest to embrace these
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that few mechanical, biological (e.g., new crop
varieties) and crop management innovations
were forthcoming. In the early 1800s, U.S. wheat
production was confined almost exclusively to
the eastern part of the country; mainly Ohio and
upstate New York. By 1909, areas west of the
Appalachian Mountains accounted for 92 percent
of U.S. wheat production compared with less
than one half of output in 1839 (Olmstead and
Rhode 2002). Similar spatial and temporal effects
have been evident elsewhere in the world, and so
reported changes in average crop yields may be a
misleading indicator of the rate and extent of the
technical changes in agriculture; be these changes
attributable to the innovative efforts of farmers
or more formal forms of R&D. Massive changes in
varietal use facilitated this spatial relocation of U.S.
wheat production into new locations—specifically
the Northern Prairies and the Great Plains—and
new agroecologies, where the varieties suitable for
locations on the eastern seaboard faltered or failed.
Moreover, staving off the effects of ever-evolving
pests and diseases through the use of resistant
varieties and management practices means that
reported average yields would have been much
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new varieties, while varietal change lagged in subSaharan Africa, partly because of the great diversity
in agroecologies (Figure 3).
Globally, average yields have climbed steadily for all
major cereals, at least since the 1960s. Since 1961,
around 78 percent of the increase in production
has come from increases in yields, except in Africa
where about 60 percent of the gains have come
from expanding the area of cultivation.4 Achieving
future yield increases is one thing, maintaining
past yields is another. Indeed “maintenance
research,” research directed at maintaining yields
and profitability in the face of pressures that
would lead them to fall otherwise, is a major
component of agricultural R&D (perhaps especially
in relation to crop and livestock disease prevention
and eradication programs). Such maintenance
research has become more important in recent
years as a result of environmental and healthrelated laws and regulations. Some pesticides have

been deregistered or have become progressively
ineffective, but the cost of registering new
agricultural chemicals has grown so much that
many companies are abandoning the development
of pesticides for crops that are relatively minor in a
global setting but, perhaps, are still important for
some farmers in some countries (Kalaitzandoakes,
Alston and Bradford 2007; Service 2007). A part
of the response has been increased efforts in
integrated pest management, breeding, and
biotechnology, to develop genetic resistance or
environmentally friendly pest-control systems.

Partial Productivity Trends
In Figure 4, the graphical technique of Hayami
and Ruttan (1985) is used to plot logged ratios
of agricultural output per hectare and output
per worker for nine regions of the world as well
as the Former Soviet Union and Japan (together
representing 231 countries) for each of the years
1961 to 2003.

4 Pardey and Wood’s calculations based on growth
decomposition of the production identity (yield x harvested area
= output) and using FAO data.

Figure 3: Uptake of Modern Crop Varieties by Decade and by Region
100
Percent Area Planted
to Modern Varieties

Percent Area Planted
to Modern Varieties

100
80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

1960s

1970s

1990s

1980s

1990s

100
Percent Area Planted
to Modern Varieties

Percent Area Planted
to Modern Varieties

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

100

12

1980s
Asia

Latin America

80
60
40
20
0

80
60
40
20
0

1960s

1970s

1980s

1990s

1960s

Middle East – North Africa
Protein
Crops

Source: Evenson and Gollin (2003).

Root
Crops

1970s

Sub-Saharan Africa
Other
Cereals

Maize

Rice

Wheat

Agricultural Output per Hectare (1999-2001 International Dollars - logscale)

Figure 4: Agricultural land and labor productivity, 1961-2003
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All of the productivity paths move in a
northeasterly direction starting in 1961 and
ending in 2003, indicating increasing productivity.
A longer productivity locus means a greater
percentage change in productivity. China, and the
Asia & Pacific region experienced the fastest rate of
growth of land productivity (respectively, 3.4 and
2.8 percent per year), the Former Soviet Union the
slowest (0.08 percent). With a rapid exodus of labor
from agriculture, Japan’s labor productivity grew
the fastest (5.15 percent per year) and sub-Saharan
Africa (including South Africa) the slowest (0.35
percent).
The diagonal lines in Figure 4 indicate constant
factor (specifically, land to labor) ratios. When
a region’s productivity locus is flatter than

these diagonal lines (e.g., Japan in more recent
decades), it indicates an increase in the number
of agricultural hectares per agricultural worker
in that country as we move from left to right: in
Japan’s case from 0.59 hectares per worker in 1961
to 1.57 in 2003. Land-labor ratios in Australia and
New Zealand have changed little, whereas they
have risen by some 73 percent in North America.
They also rose, albeit very slowly, for the Latin
America and Caribbean region, consistent with the
region’s labor productivity growing slightly faster
than its land productivity. Sub-Saharan Africa has
become much more labor intensive so land-labor
ratios have declined. In 1961 the region had 10.5
hectares per agricultural worker, but by 2003 the

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Notes: Workers are economically active in agriculture. Land is the sum of area harvested and permanently pastured. Output is
value of agricultural production formed by weighting a time series of commodity quantities for each country by a 1999-2001
average of commodity-specific international prices. All productivity trajectories start in 1961 on left/bottom and end in 2003 on
right/top, unless indicated. Diagonal lines indicate constant factor (land to labor) ratios.
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land-labor ratio had nearly halved to 5.4 hectares
per worker.5

1.2 CROP YIELD VARIABILITY
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While raising average crop yields is an essential
element in improving land and labor productivity,
reducing year-to-year yield variability is also
critically important, especially for smallholder
agriculture. The more uncertain is the likely
harvest outcome the more cautious subsistence
farmers may be in the selection of crops, seeds
and management practices to be sure they can
meet minimum food subsistence. This means,
for example, persevering with tried and tested
landraces (i.e., farmer-bred crop varieties) and
traditional varieties whose average yields are low
but more assured, even when rains are erratic. The
greater the chance that crops will fail because of
uncontrolled weather or other effects, the less likely
it is that farmers will purchase and use improved
seeds or other inputs such as fertilizers. The poorer
the household, the more extreme this type of
risk-averse behavior may be. Such conditions
limit incentives for smallholder adoption of new
technologies—whose higher attainable yields
often depend on more stable (and typically more
favorable) production environments.
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Crop yields are highly susceptible to a number
of factors farmers cannot control, including 1)
weather patterns and unexpected or extreme
weather events, 2) the incidence and severity of
pest and disease outbreaks and weed infestations,
3) costly and erratic access to labor and purchased
inputs because of inadequate transport,
communication and physical infrastructure, for
instance, and 4) variability in seed quality. Weatherrelated production risks include those of unreliable
rainfall, unexpected frosts, high winds, hail, and
flooding. Among these, drought is perhaps the
most ubiquitous source of yield variability in
developing-country agriculture. Figure 5 depicts
the spatial pattern of variability over time in the
length of the annual growing period as a measure
of the susceptibility of each location to drought.

5 These substantive differences in productivity paths and
factor use ratios highlight the need to tailor and adapt agricultural
technologies to local production realities, a theme to which we
return below in the context of R&D spillovers.

One of the most common risk-management
strategies in drought-prone areas is varying
planting dates with variation in the timing of the
opening rains. Another is investment in irrigation
capacity (Figure 6). Irrigation provides the double
benefits of both increasing and stabilizing yields,
thereby providing greater incentives for farmers
to invest in complementary inputs. However, not
all governments nor all farmers have the means
to invest, and not all locations are amenable
to irrigation. Areas of high moisture variability
(depicted in Figure 5) that are not matched by
mitigating investments in irrigation capacity
(depicted in Figure 6, for example the Sahel) might
be considered prime target areas for other forms of
mitigating technologies, such as the introduction
of crops and crop varieties with greater drought
tolerance.
The countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
and West Asia and North Africa (WANA) contain the
greatest share—more than 40 percent—of their
cultivated land in drier areas (length of growing
periods less than 120 days per year). High-income
regions such as Australia and North America also
have a high share of low rainfall croplands (36
percent and 27 percent respectively). These data
indicate that about a quarter of the cropland in
South Asia (and a fifth of sub-Saharan Africa’s
cropland) is located in low rainfall areas.6 The year
to-year variability of moisture availability follows
broadly similar patterns. Australia, the FSU and
North America have around 60 percent, 45 percent
and 37 percent respectively of their cropland in
higher variability areas (i.e., where the coefficient
of variability of moisture availability exceeds 20
percent). Only some 24 percent and 15 percent

6 Substantial and systemic weaknesses in the satellite-based
estimates of cropland in sub-Saharan Africa, however, indicate
large degrees of uncertainty in these area estimates (Wood et
al. 2000). A simple pixel-to-pixel comparison of “cropland” and
“cropland mosaic” classes for two independent satellite-based,
global estimates of land cover for 2000 illustrate the problem.
Only 60 percent of the pixels considered to be cropland in one
dataset (MODIS) were recognized as cropland in the other (GLC
2000). In the case of cropland mosaics—the predominant type of
land cover in smallholder subsistence farming in the tropics and
sub-tropics—the degree of spatial coincidence between the two
datasets falls to only 13 percent (Giri, Zhu and Reed 2005). The
degree of spatial disparity between these datasets is even more
pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa where, in total, GLC-2000
detects some 9.8 percent and 7.1 percent respectively of cropland
and cropland mosaic as a share of total land area. The MODIS
data, however, based on similar resolution observations for the
same year only detects 1.9 percent and 0.8 percent respectively of
cropland and cropland mosaic in the region (IFPRI 2006).

Figure 5: Variability in Moisture Availability for Rainfed Cultivated Land, 1960-1990
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Source: Adapted from Wood, Sebastian and Scherr (2000).
Note: The length of growing period (LGP) is the number of days per year in which moisture and temperature conditions will
support plant growth. It is used here as an indicator of moisture availability for rainfed production. The map shows year-to
year variability in LGP calculated over a 30 year period (1960-90). This index serves as a measure of farmers’ likely exposure to
climatological risk. Areas with higher variability are expected to experience greater impacts from changes in climate.

Figure 6: Area Equipped for Irrigation, circa 2000
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spatial data at a resolution of 5 minutes (10x10 km).’ These data have been calibrated at the country level to FAO irrigated area
statistics and help improve our knowledge of the location and extent of irrigated areas (for further information see http://www.
fao.org/ag/agl/aglw/aquastat/irrigationmap/index10.stm).
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respectively of cropland in WANA and Sub-Saharan
Africa exhibit these more variable growing seasons.
The major difference between regions, however, is
the extent to which irrigation investments have
been made. In WANA, irrigated area represents
around 37 percent of total harvested area
(although a much higher percentage of physical
cropland must be irrigated since multiple harvests
are made annually from some cropland areas). In
North America, irrigated area represents around 17
percent of the total harvested area, while in SubSaharan Africa it is just 4 percent (Wood et al. 2000).
Sub-Saharan African farmers, therefore, are more
vulnerable to drought than their counterparts in
other parts of the world, even though the areas
of agriculture that are susceptible to drought are
smaller than other regions of the world.
The discussion leads to two key implications for
research strategy. First, crop technology packages
targeted to the poor in areas prone to yield
variability must be designed to help mitigate
rather than exacerbate such variability if they are
to find acceptance. Second, it is important to take
account of post and prospective infrastructural
investments such as irrigation and roads, as well
as agro-ecological factors, when considering the
suitability of technologies targeted to specific agro
ecological and production system complexes.

2. THE CHANGING CONTEXT
FOR AGRICULTURAL R&D
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2.1 ECONOMIC REALITIES OF
AGRICULTURAL R&D
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Market failure in agricultural R&D arises primarily
from incomplete or ineffective property rights
over inventions, which mean that inventors are
unable to fully appropriate the returns to their
research investments. Market failures in research
can happen at the level of farms or firms within a
state or country, among states within a country,
or among countries—in any context where the
distribution of benefits from adopting the results
does not closely match the distribution of the costs
incurred in doing the research.

Evidence on Returns to Agricultural R&D
Market failure leads to private-sector underinvestment in agricultural R&D, a phenomenon
that can account for the major result from the
empirical literature across different commodities
and different countries, that agricultural R&D has
been, on average, a highly profitable investment
from society’s point of view.
Alston et al. (2000) reviewed the published
evidence on rates of return to agricultural R&D. A
total of 287 benefit-cost studies of agricultural R&D
(including extension) were compiled and these
studies provide 1,789 separate estimates of rates
of return. This includes some extreme values which
are implausible. When the lowest and highest 5
percent were set aside, the estimated annual rates
of return averaged 58 percent for research only, and
44 percent for research and extension combined.
But these averages conceal a lot, and reveal little
meaningful information from a large and diverse
body of literature that provides rate-of-return
estimates that are often not directly comparable.

Policies to Address Underinvestment
in Agricultural R&D
Evidence of high rates of return to agricultural
R&D suggests that research has been under
funded, and that current government intervention
has been inadequate. However, this does not
necessarily imply that the amount of government
spending should increase. Changes in government
intervention to address the market failure can
take many forms. Some commentators focus
on increased funding of R&D from general
government revenues, but this is only a part of the
picture. Government can also act to change the
incentives for others to increase their investments
in private or public R&D (as well as what research is
done, by whom, and how effectively).
A premise that government intervention is
inadequate implies simply that the nature of the
intervention ought to change so as to stimulate
either more private investment or more public
investment. Policy options available to the
government for stimulating private funding
or performance of agricultural R&D include:
improving intellectual property protection;

Changes over time in economic circumstances
imply changes in R&D institutions. Some research
activities that were once clearly perceived as the
province of the government have become part
of the private domain. Examples include much
applied work into the production and evaluation
of agricultural chemicals and new plant varieties.

Distinctive Features of LessDeveloped Countries
These general notions about market failure and
options for government action apply generally,
but with different specific implications as cases
change. In particular, for a number of reasons,
we can predict that the phenomenon of privatesector neglect and national under-investment in
agricultural R&D is likely to be more pronounced in
less-developed countries than in developed ones,
and this prediction is borne out by the facts. Why is
this so, and what does it imply?
First, less-developed countries are commonly
characterized as having a comparatively high
incidence of incomplete markets, resulting from
high transaction costs and inadequate property
rights, which in turn may be attributable to
inadequate infrastructure and defective institutions,
among other things. To the extent that they exist,
information problems, high costs of transport and
communication, ill-functioning credit markets, and
the like, combined with less-educated farmers,
are likely to make it harder to capitalize on new
inventions. In rich countries, we might discount
the issues of risk and capital costs as factors that
discourage investment in invention, but in lessdeveloped countries these factors might take on a
different meaning, especially if capital markets do
not function well—for whatever reason.

Second, the types of technologies suited to much
of less-developed country agriculture have hitherto
been of the sort for which appropriability problems
are more pronounced—types of technology that
have been comparatively neglected by the private
sector even in the richest countries. In particular,
until recently, private research has tended to
emphasize mechanical and chemical technologies,
which are comparatively well protected by patents,
trade secrecy and other intellectual property rights;
and the private sector has generally neglected
varietal technologies except where the returns are
appropriable, such as for hybrid seed (see Knudson
and Ruttan 1988). In less-developed countries
the emphasis in innovation has often been on
self-pollinating crop varieties and disembodied
farm management practices, which are the least
appropriable of all. The recent innovations in richcountry institutions mean that private firms are
now finding it more profitable to invest in plant
varieties, and the same may be true in some lessdeveloped countries, but not all countries have
made comparable institutional changes. Only
when we achieve a reasonable rate of inventor
appropriability of the returns to the technologies
that are applicable in less-developed countries,
combined with an economic infrastructure that
facilitates adoption of those technologies, can we
expect a significant private-sector role to emerge.
A third factor is that in many less-developed
countries, prices have been distorted by policies
in ways that meant incentives and opportunities
for farmers to adopt new technologies were
diminished (see Schultz 1978, Alston and Pardey
1993, and Sunding and Zilberman 2002).
Fourth,
government
revenues
may
be
comparatively expensive, or have a comparatively
high opportunity cost in less-developed countries.
This can be so because it is comparatively expensive
to raise government revenues through general
taxation measures. And it can be seen to be so when
we consider that many less-developed countries
are characterized by under-investment in a host
of other public goods, such as transportation and
communications infrastructure, schools, hospitals,
and the like, as well as agricultural science (Runge
et al. 2003). These other activities, like agricultural
science, might also have high social rates of return.
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changing institutional arrangements to facilitate
collective action by producers, such as establishing
levy arrangements; and encouraging individual or
collective action through the provision of subsidies
(or tax concessions) or grants in conjunction
with levies. In addition to efficiency gains from
increasing the total R&D investment, governments
can also intervene with a view to improving the
efficiency with which resources are used within the
R&D system.
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Fifth, there are political factors to consider. In
rich countries, agriculture is a small share of
the economy, and any individual citizen bears a
negligible burden from financing a comparatively
high rate of public investment in agricultural R&D.
The factors that account for high rates of general
support for agriculture in the industrialized
countries can also help account for their
comparatively high public agricultural research
intensities. In many less-developed countries,
where agriculture represents a much greater share
of the total economic activity, and where per capita
incomes are much lower, a meaningful investment
in public agricultural research might have a much
more appreciable impact on individual citizens—
and the problem is that this burden is felt now,
while the payoff it promises may take a long time
to come, and will be much less visible when it
does.
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Finally, even among the rich countries of the
world, most have not had very substantial private
or public agricultural science industries; so why
should we expect the poorest countries of the
world to be more like the richest of the rich in
this regard? The lion’s share of the investment in
agricultural science has been undertaken by a small
number of countries, and these have also been the
countries that have undertaken the lion’s share
of scientific research, more generally (see Pardey
et al. 2006). Typically, these have been the larger,
economic power-houses, especially the United
States. Differences in per capita income, the total
size of the economy, and comparative advantage
in science (reflecting not just wealth but also the
nature of the society), may all be factors that have
determined the international distribution of the
burden of agricultural R&D investments.
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Economies of Size, Scale, and
Scope in Agricultural R&D
It might not make much economic sense for small,
poor, agrarian nations to spend their comparatively
scarce intellectual and other capital resources in
agricultural science, on their own behalf, in a world
in which other countries can do it so much more
effectively, and are doing so. And, in the past it has
been an effective strategy for many nations to freeride on the efforts of a few others in agricultural

R&D. Both inadvertent technology spillovers and
international initiatives such as the Consultative
Group on Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and
bilateral agricultural R&D development aid might
have crowded out some national investments in
agricultural R&D in less-developed countries.
An important consideration is economies of size,
scale, and scope in research, which influence the
optimal size and portfolio of a given research
institution. In some cases the “optimal” institution
may efficiently provide research for a state or
region within a nation, but for some kinds of
research the efficient scale of institutions may be
too great for an individual nation (see, for example,
Byerlee and Traxler 2001). Many nations may be
too small to achieve an efficient scale in much if
any of the relevant elements of their agricultural
R&D interests, except perhaps in certain types of
adaptive research. Table 1, for example, shows that
40 percent of the agricultural research agencies in
sub-Saharan Africa employed fewer than five fulltime-equivalent researchers in 2000; 93 percent of
the region’s agricultural R&D agencies employed
fewer than 50 researchers.
A particular problem for global efficiency in
agricultural science, and for many smaller
countries, is that we do not have effective
institutions for financing and organizing research
on a multinational basis for those instances where
the research is applicable across multiple countries
and where individual countries are too small to
achieve efficient scale.7 R&D clusters or other forms
of collective action in R&D could be developed as
a means of achieving an efficient scale of research
operation and the application of the results of
research, but against that must be offset the added
costs of collaboration across research agencies,
perhaps operating in different countries (see
section 2.3 below and Pardey, Wood and Hertford
2007).

2.2 CHANGING INCENTIVES
TO INNOVATE
The output of innovation activities can often be
easily copied and then used by others who had no
7 Jin, Rozelle, Alston and Huang (2005) provide evidence on
scale and scope effects of R&D in China.

Table 1: Size Distribution of Agricultural Research Agencies in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000
Number of fte researchers

Government
Principal

Higher education

Nonprofit

Private

Total

Other

Less than 5
5–9
10 – 19
20 – 49
50 – 99
100 – 200
Greater than 200

7
7
15
29
11
10
5

34
27
14
16
3
–
–

Total

84

94

(number of agencies)
103
42
32
23
–
–
–
200

7
4
5
3
1
–
–

24
5
–
–
–
–
–

175
85
66
71
15
10
5

20

29

427

Source: Beintema and Stads (2004).

role in its production in ways that do not diminish
the availability of the innovation to other users.
These characteristics of non-excludability and
non-rivalry help enhance the social value of an
innovation by increasing the speed and reducing
the cost of diffusion to potential users and
reducing the price of the products of innovation
to consumers, if the innovation has already been
made. However, lack of excludability often means
there is insufficient incentive for the private sector
to produce the innovation in the first place. Absent
some form of public intervention, it is often argued,
the extent of innovation is limited because the
appropriable returns to innovators are far less than
the social benefits.

sui generis system specifically geared to protect
plant varieties, though the scope of protection is
much weaker than that of patents (Table 2).8

Intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents,
trademarks, plant breeders’ rights and copyrights
are among the more prominent public policy
responses intended to stimulate the creation and
dissemination of inventions. The scope, economic
costs and administrative processes of these types of
IPR vary, such that policy choices concerning which
IPR to offer and practical decisions about which IPR
to seek are governed by the nature of innovations.
The patent system, which provides the innovator
a monopoly right for a limited period in return
for the disclosure of the innovation, has attracted
much attention, partly because of its economic
and political implications. In recent years, many
countries have strengthened their patent systems
as part of domestic initiatives to upgrade their
national innovation systems (Mowery 1998), or
to comply with post-TRIPS bilateral or multilateral
agreements. Plant breeders’ rights are a form of a

Mechanisms such as research contracts and prizes
may also be effective in generating new innovations
in certain circumstances (Wright et al. 2007). One
way to avoid monopoly pricing, which distorts the
innovative incentive, is for governments to collect
research funds using an efficient tax system then
distribute them to researchers through an efficient
system of research contracts and make the final
research output freely available. Alternatively,
a government may award a prize to the first to
invent and pass the innovation immediately into
the public domain. While these types of innovation

8 Sui generis in Latin means “of its own kind,” and in TRIPS—
the multilateral Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights agreement among the members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) developed during the 1986-1994 Uruguay
Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)—the phrase is used to indicate a flexibility whereby
WTO member countries can individually design a system of plant
variety protection tailored to their country circumstances.
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The incentive effects of patents have long been
recognized, as have the costs of restricting the use
of the patented product or process for the duration
of the patent monopoly. In spite of generally
wide support—at least among private innovators
and policy makers—for government-sanctioned
systems of intellectual property rights as part of
a modern system of innovation and economic
development, a substantial minority holds a
different view (see, for example, Boldrin and Levine
2002).
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Table 2: Illustrative Sui Generis Legislation
Name of System

Key Features

UPOV Convention

Plant Breeders’ Rights

• confers right to exclude others from
• producing, reproducing, or propagating
• selling, offering for sale or other marketing
• exporting or importing; and
• stocking the variety for any of the above
• rights extend to ‘essentially derived varieties’a
• breeder’s exemption from infringement (optional in 1991 Act)
• farmer’s privilege to save seed (optional in 1991 Act)

United States

Plant Variety Protection

• covers sexually reproduced plants, including first generation hybrids and
tuber propagated plant varieties
• rights same as 1991 UPOV Convention
• limited farmer’s exemption: seed may be saved for replanting only on farmer’s
own land, but if not used, saved seed may be sold
• breeder’s exemption available

Plant Patents

•
•
•
•

Utility Patents

• patentable subject matter includes plant varieties, parts of plants, genetically
engineered organisms, processes of transforming cells and expressing
proteins, gene or methodology
• can have multiple claims for different aspects of inventions
• no breeder’s or farmer’s exemptions, but has a very narrow experimental
exemption
• more expensive to seek and sustain, but has stronger and broader protection

European Union

CPVRb

• rights same as 1991 UPOV Convention
• farmer’s privilege only for a limited number of fodder plants, cereals, potatoes,
and oil and fiber plants and only available to farmers with small holdings
• breeder’s exemption available
• protection is alternative to that given individually by member countries

India

PPVFRc

• protectable plant varieties include
• new varieties
• extant varieties
• essentially derived varieties
• farmers’ varieties
• farmers may save, use, sow, re-sow, exchange, share or sell her farm produce
• exemptions for research
• compulsory licensing provided for

only covers asexually reproduced plant varieties
plants may be newly found or cultivated
protection is for a single plant or genome
no experimental use or breeders’ exceptions to infringement

Source: Compiled by Koo and Pardey based on the respective legislation obtained from various on-line sources.
a

Plants that require the protected variety for their production
Community Plant Variety Right
c
Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act
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processes avoid monopoly pricing behavior and
thereby increase consumer benefits, the problem
remains of setting the right prize or contract
support according to the value of the innovation.
More recently, “open source” approaches to
developing software products using, for example,
Apache and Linux have attracted much attention
as a collaborative approach to innovation
development (Benkler 2004). Explanations for the
incentive to reveal one’s innovations in an open
source context include the “career concerns” of
participants who expect to gain indirectly from

the reputational effects of involvement in open
source (Lerner and Tirole 2002), the efficiency of
a decentralized approach to debugging a system
with millions of potential configurations (Bessen
2004), the intrinsic motivation of delight in
solving an intellectual challenge, and the reward
of recognition by one’s peers. Some people argue
that this approach offers a way of reconciling the
public interest in minimizing restrictions on access
to new technologies (Lerner and Tirole 2005),
and thus similar innovation systems have been
suggested in other areas of industry. The recent
Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS)

Patents—Their Pros and Cons
The specific characteristics of information goods
are such that a first-best solution is unattainable.
Patents are a second-best solution in that their
positive effects on incentives to innovate are
balanced against the negative monopoly effects
that come with the market provision of patented
innovations. Alternative incentive mechanisms,
such as research contracts and prizes, avoid the
costs of patent monopolies. However, as Wright
(1983) showed, the superiority of one mechanism
over another depends on the relevant information
held by each party. If innovators hold superior
information about the cost of research or the value
of the (pending) innovation, then patents can be
a superior incentive mechanism to contracts or
prizes.9
These insights explain the success of an innovation
system that has given rise to a high rate of technical
change in agriculture over the past century, long
before intellectual property rights became a
significant force in the agricultural biosciences.
When the overall objective (more food at lower
prices or improved nutrition and public health,

9 Kremer (1998) proposed buying out patents as a means of
retaining the incentive to innovate advantages of a patent system
while avoiding the monopoly price distortions that go with such a
system. Masters (2003 and 2005) has advocated a system of prizes
calculated as a percentage of the surplus generated in African
agriculture to partially compensate innovations targeted to this
sector. Shavell and Ypersele (2001) showed that a reward system
(such as a prize) when combined with a patent system can be
superior to the patent system alone.

for example) was clear and the information gaps
between those funding and those doing the
research were limited, block funding or contract
research (supplemented by “prizes,” including
professional recognition, academic tenure
and salary enhancements) called forth much
innovative effort that yielded high rates of return
overall compared with many other forms of public
investments.
Another aspect of the patent system that is
especially pertinent to agriculture involves the
dynamic distortion of incentives arising from
the cumulative nature of many innovation
processes in agriculture (for example, most
crop breeding research, wherein each round of
varietal improvement draws directly on the many
rounds of R&D that preceded it). A special case of
cumulative innovation involves the development
of research tools—that is, products or processes
whose value stems solely from their input to
follow-on innovations (Koo and Wright 2005). One
prominent example in agriculture is the suite of
inventions that make possible agrobacterium
mediated transformations of plants (Roa-Rodriquez
et al. 2003). When innovation is cumulative, a
strong patent on an initial innovation might
stimulate the earlier-than-otherwise development
of the innovation but reduce the incentive for
subsequent innovations, while a weak patent may
not even induce the initial innovation thereby
undercutting subsequent innovations. This
intertemporal, dynamic distortion of incentives
can be more serious than the static inefficiency
of the monopoly loss because the entire research
sequence can easily be blocked if incentives at any
stage are inappropriate.
In agricultural biotechnology, concerns have also
been expressed about research hold-ups arising
from independent claims on multiple, mutually
blocking inputs. A frequently cited example is
the intellectual property landscape surrounding
the development of Golden Rice technology,
as described in Kryder et al. (2000).10 Relatedly,

10 Binenbaum et al. (2003) questioned the veracity of these
claims in most developing-country contexts. For the specific
case of Golden Rice, the technology timeline described in
Box 1 of this report makes readily apparent that factors other
than constraints on access to intellectual property have been
important determinants of the length of time required to develop
and commercialize this new technology.
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initiative arising out of CAMBIA is an attempt to
initiate open-source development of key enabling
technologies for agricultural biotechnology using
licensing strategies inspired by the open source
movement in software (Nature 2004). In addition,
the Public-Sector Intellectual Property Resource
for Agriculture (PIPRA) initiative is an attempt
by public and nonprofit researchers to provide
mutually consenting parties with reciprocal access
to their proprietary technologies, while also
making such technologies available to developingcountry researchers in ways that do not relinquish
licensing options and potential royalty revenues
from private-sector entities in developed countries
(Graff et al. 2003; Atkinson et al. 2003; and Delmer
et al. 2003).
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Box 1: Golden Rice

by Jorge Mayer, Golden Rice Project Manager, Campus Technologies Freiburg
Worldwide, more than 10 million children die every year from malnutrition. Simple measures, like
breastfeeding, vitamin A and zinc supplementation could reduce the death toll by 25 percent (Black
et al. 2003). The main energy nutrition sources in developing countries are starchy crops low in
provitamin A and other micronutrients. Some 127 million preschool children or about one-quarter
of all preschool children in high-risk regions of the developing world are vitamin A deficient. Vitamin
A deficiency, alone or combined with other nutrient deficiencies, can lead to night blindness and
ultimately irreversible eye damage, growth retardation, damage of mucous membrane tracts,
and reproductive disorders, and increased risk of severe morbidity and mortality from common
childhood infections such as diarrheal diseases and measles (Sommer et al. 1983).
Conventional intervention strategies, like industrial fortification of foodstuffs and supplementation
with vitamin capsules, have achieved notable improvement in a number of countries, yet overall
coverage generally reaches only 55 percent of children under the age of five, while older children and
lactating women are not targeted at all (UNICEF 2003). While urban dwellers have access to fortified
foodstuffs, e.g., provitamin A-enriched oil or butter, the rural poor depend on supplementation
programs. These interventions are limited by cumbersome logistics and costs that for a country as
small as Nepal or Ghana amount to about $2 million annually (MOST, USAID 2004). Children receive
two annual megadoses of vitamin A at best, and their vitamin blood levels will be depleted before
receiving the next dose.
Biofortified crop plants that produce or accumulate the desired nutrients can deliver micronutrients
in a sustainable way. Biofortification can be achieved by conventional breeding, unless the desired
trait is not available in existing, sexually compatible germplasm, as is the case in rice. This is where
genetic engineering comes into play. Once a desirable trait has been introduced into a variety,
it can be easily transferred to any locally adapted variety by conventional breeding, as is being
done at present with Golden Rice. Even though the feasibility of provitamin-A-biofortified rice was
demonstrated in 1999 (Ye et al. 2000), delivery of this technology to the target population will
not be achieved before 2012, to a great extent because of regulatory hurdles (Al-Babili and Beyer
2005).1 The Golden Rice Humanitarian Board is working with national and international institutions
towards deployment of this technology to smallholders in affected regions.
Technology Timeline
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1992 Golden Rice project initiated by Ingo Potrykus (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich)
and Peter Beyer (Univ of Freiburg) with support from the Rockefeller Foundation [(Gura
1999)] (Potrykus 2001).

22

1999 Breakthrough proof-of-concept Golden Rice at 1.6 μg/g beta-carotene. Two genes, one
from daffodil and one from the soil bacterium Erwinia uredovora, were introduced into the
japonica variety TP309.
2000 Publication in Science by Ye et al. and extensive publicity (for example, July 31 cover story of
Time magazine). Also, beginning of campaigns by opponents of the technology.
2001 Humanitarian License Agreement with Syngenta.2
Establishment of Golden Rice Network; most partners in SE Asia.

1 See, for example, Kalaitzandonakes et al. (2007) and Manlo and Ramon (2007).
2 For details see www.goldenrice.org.

continued

u

Box 1 (continued)

2002 Introduction of the trait into indica and javanica (American long-grain varieties) rice varieties
and improved beta-carotene accumulation levels; work by the University of Freiburg and
Syngenta, respectively (Hoa et al. 2003).
2004 First GR field trial in Louisiana.
2005 GR2 developed, with 23X higher beta-carotene level over prototype; work by Syngenta
and donated to the Golden Rice project (Paine et al. 2005). Daffodil gene replaced with corn
homologue.
Initiated backcrossing of the trait into locally adapted indica varieties in the Philippines,
India and Vietnam.
Start of Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation funded 5-year biofortification project (GR + iron,
zinc, high-quality protein, vitamin E)
2006 Bioinformatic study and clearance on allergenic potential (Goodman 2006).
Establishment of Indian Golden Rice Product Development Group.
Ex-ante socio-economic impact studies for GR in India and Bangladesh (Stein et al. 2006 and
2007; Zimmermann and Ahmed 2006).3
2007 Bioavailability studies in the United States.
2008 Bioavailability studies in China.
Regulatory approval process in India and the Philippines.
2009 Multi-location trials planned for India and the Philippines.
2010 Large-scale open-field trials in both countries.
2011 Varietal registration process and seed multiplication.
2012 Anticipated first delivery to farmers in India and the Philippines.
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decentralized ownership of blocking claims in
the presence of significant transaction costs,
introduces the possibility of an “anti-commons”
phenomenon—the underutilization of innovations
subject to multiple, fragmented (perhaps uncertain,
or at least legally untested) property rights (Heller
and Eisenberg 1998).
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Changing Intellectual Property
Rights Regimes
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Putting policies and legal frameworks into place
to protect plant varieties is one thing, seeking
and maintaining varietal rights is a related but
separate thing. Not least, exclusionary IP rights
such as patents or plant breeders’ rights are costly
to obtain and to exercise, meaning economic
choices based on the benefits versus costs of
the rights are paramount.11 Notably, significant
shares of agriculture in many developing countries
involve subsistence or semi-subsistence cropping
systems, with limited commercial opportunities

11 It is worth noting that intellectual property rights only
pertain to the jurisdiction in which they are awarded, meaning
obtaining patents or plant breeders' rights in multiple jurisdictions
(countries) requires incurring the costs of applying for such rights
in each and every jurisdiction. See footnote 14 for an exception
to this situation in the case of European member countries of the
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO).

to market seed and consequently less incentive to
seek varietal rights, even if a legal option to do so
existed.12
Bearing these aspects in mind what is the evolving
status of IPRs worldwide, particularly regarding
those rights that pertain to plant varieties? Briefly,
we observe that
• Among the 150 member countries of the
World Trade Organization (as of January 2007),
a total of 63 countries were also members of
the International Convention for the Protection
of New Varieties of Plants, commonly known
by its French acronym UPOV (as of November
2006).13
• A total of 172,629 plant breeders’ rights
applications have been lodged worldwide
since the early 1970s. Rich countries accounted

12 Box 2 describes current efforts to (re-)develop commercial
seed sectors in sub-Saharan Africa.
13 Many countries base their plant breeders' rights (PBR)
legislation on the model PBR system called UPOV. UPOV was
established by a group of Western European countries in Paris in
1961, and revised in 1972, 1978 and 1991. The only international
intellectual property convention focused directly on agriculture, it
is directed primarily to the interests of commercial plant breeders’
and originally aimed to offer them an alternative to utility patents
for protection of plant varieties, including both sexually and
asexually propagated varieties.
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Source: UPOV (2006).
Note: The spike in 1995 reflects 3,161 applications reported by CPVO, the
first year that data from this source were included in the UPOV series.

• One-third of the PBR applications lodged in the
57 UPOV member countries during the period
2001–2005 were made by foreigners (Table
3). There is some variation among regions in
the foreign share of local PBRs. The variation
is even more apparent in individual countries;
for example, the share of applications filed
by foreigners is 87 percent in Switzerland, 50
percent in the United States, 27 percent in
Japan, and 10 percent in France.This substantial
fraction of foreign applications indicates
extensive potential spillovers of varietal
14 Prior to April 27, 1995 when the Community Plant Variety
Office (CPVO) was established, a breeder seeking protection
for a variety throughout the European Union was required to
submit an application to each of the member states. Now, with a
single application to the CPVO, a breeder can be granted varietal
protection rights throughout the European Union. This Europeanwide system—CPVO members currently include Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom—operates in parallel with respective national
systems, although the owner of a variety cannot simultaneously
exploit both a community plant variety right (CPVR) and a national
plant breeders’ right in relation to that variety. Individuals or
companies from member states of UPOV that not members
of the European Union, can also apply, provided that an agent
domiciled in the Community has been nominated. The duration
of CPVR protection is 25 years for most crops, and 30 years for
potato, vine and tree varieties.

improvement research done in one locale on
seed market and production developments
elsewhere in the world. Notably the share
of resident applications has risen steadily
in upper-middle income countries, perhaps
an indication of an increase in the domestic
incentives to innovate as well as protect locally
developed plant varieties (Figure 8).
• Ornamental crops account for more than half
the total applications in both the United States
and Europe (Figure 9), while cereal crops (such
as wheat and corn) is the next biggest group
(11 percent in the United States and 15 percent
in Europe). Other major groups of plants that
are protected include oil and fiber plants, fruit
crops, and vegetables.
Summing up, it is evident that plant variety
rights are still heavily biased to rich-country
jurisdictions and heavily biased to higher-valued
fruits, vegetables and ornamentals. The extent of
formal intellectual property rights pertaining to
plants is on the rise in selected developing-country
jurisdictions—notably Brazil, China and India—,
but the vast majority of crops in the vast majority of
developing counties are still subject to little if any
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• A total of 50,155 plant breeders’
rights (PBR) applications were
lodged worldwide in the period
2001-2005, of which 5,355 (11
percent) were filed in the United
States and 12,286 (24 percent) in
European member states of the
Community Plant Variety Office
(CPVO). Nearly one-third of CPVO
applications were lodged in the
Netherlands, and more than onefifth in France.14

Figure 7: Plant Breeders’ Rights Applications for
Countries Grouped by Income, 1971-2003

Number of applications

for a high of 96 percent of the
total applications lodged in 1981
85, declining to 77 percent of the
applications lodged in 2001-05.
In contrast, applications for plant
breeders’ rights filed in uppermiddle-income countries have
grown steadily since the early
1980s, but the number from lowermiddle-income countries began
to rise only in the late 1990s and is
still negligible (Figure 7).
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Table 3: Number and Share of Plant Breeder Rights Applications Lodged by Residents and
Foreigners
1998-2005
Economies

Total

Number of applications
High income economies (23)
Upper middle income economies (17)
Lower middle income economies (14)
Low income economies (3)
Total (57)

87,638
17,833
9,144
662
115,277

Share of the total
High income economies (23)
Upper middle income economies (17)
Lower middle income economies (14)
Low income economies (3)
Total (57)

100
100
100
100
100

Residents
(count)
59,268
9,485
6,129
364
75,246
(percentage)
68
53
67
55
65

2001-2005
Non-residents
28,370
8,348
3,015
298
40,031

14,849
3,839
1,886
175
20,749

32
47
33
45
35

35
41
26
39
35

Source: UPOV (Plant Variety Protection Statistics for the period of 1998- 2002, UPOV C/37/7, 2003) and UPOV (Plant Variety
Protection Statistics for the period of 2001- 2005, UPOV C/40/7, 2006).
Note: The bracketed figures indicate the number of countries included.

effective, legally sanctioned forms of
intellectual property protection.15

Figure 8: The Share of Domestic Applications of Plant
Breeders Rights, 1998-2005
100

2.3 COLLECTIVE
ACTION IN R&D
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Share of resident's application

80

26

Lower middle income

Much modern (agricultural) research
High income
entails collective action—be it
60
informal, collegial review and advice
or more purposeful collaboration
Upper middle income
among colleagues working within
40
a department; jointly conceived or
conducted disciplinary or multi
disciplinary research; more formal
20
public, private-non-profit, and privatefor-profit partnerships involving the
pooling or sharing of tacit knowledge
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
or more tangible forms of intellectual
Year
property; or large international
research consortia. Collective action
Source: See Figure 6.
spans the gamut of innovation
processes, from jointly conceiving
the research through to its funding,
development (R&D). Indeed, the interplay among
conduct and the disseminationthese different elements often lies at the core of
cum-marketing of the results of research and
the conceptual and practical problems concerning
collective action in R&D, be it efforts to develop
15 For additional information on the developments concerning
“regional approaches” to R&D—such as the Latin
crop varietal rights in developing countries, see Koo et al. (2006),
American Fund for Irrigated Rice Research (FLAR),
Louwaars et al. (2005) and Srinivasen (2005).

R&D Participants

Figure 9: Plant Breeders’ Rights Stratified by Crop
Categories
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In defining the range of agencies
engaged in R&D, all potential
categories of partner organizations
are represented: national government
agencies,
public
and
private
universities in developing and
industrialized
countries,
NGOs
in developing and industrialized
countries, regional organizations,
development organizations, advanced
research
institutes,
international
agricultural research centers, and the
private sector; including those who
conduct as well as fund agricultural
research. Government agencies differ
widely in their resource base and
capabilities.

Ornamentals

Following Byerlee and Fischer (2002),
agricultural R&D agencies can be
categorized into three groups. Type
1 agencies found in developing
countries such as India, China,
Brazil, Mexico and South Africa are
deemed to have comparatively strong capacity
in molecular biology and an elaborate plant
breeding infrastructure. Type 2 agencies have
the capacity to apply molecular tools and have
significant breeding infrastructure, while Type 3
agencies have “no capacity in molecular biology
and very fragile capacities in plant breeding”
(Byerlee and Fischer 2002, p.932-3). These wide
differences obviously have major implications for
the objectives, suitability and design of various
kinds of partnerships involving public agencies
throughout the developing world.

the Regional Fund for Agricultural Technology for
Latin America and the Caribbean (FONTAGRO),
and the Association for Strengthening Agricultural
Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA)—
public-private joint research ventures, less formal
partnerships, and so forth.
Several disparate strands of economic, business
and legal literatures, including industrial
organization, contract theory, transaction cost
economics, strategic management, knowledge
management, and evolutionary economics,
contribute to the analysis, evaluation and design
of such partnerships. While these approaches have
not yet been integrated into a single coherent
framework (Hagedoorn et al. 2000), several
partial attempts at such integration are currently
underway (Spielman et al. 2006; Binenbaum 2006).
In the section to follow we collate elements from
this extremely diverse literature and describe some
practical examples that are particularly salient for
understanding the potentials and the pitfalls of
partnerships in agricultural R&D for developing
countries.

The “new philanthropists,” including initiatives
funded by large agri-biotech corporations such
as Monsanto and Syngenta as well as finance and
expertise originating from other sectors (e.g., the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation or initiatives
from companies such as IBM or Google) may well
significantly affect the scope and modus operandi
of many agri-food R&D partnerships going forward.
Micro-financing institutions—many of which are
based locally in developing countries—may also
play an increasing role in collectively funded agri
food R&D. These newcomers may well generate
and help fund innovatively designed public-private
partnerships.
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Source: UPOV (2006, CD rom) for European data and USPTO and USDA
website for the U.S. data.
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Box 2: (Re-)Developing African Seed Systems

by Richard Jones, ICRISAT Assistant Director—Eastern and Southern Africa
Improved seed of well-adapted crop varieties, along with other modern inputs, increases the value
and productivity of assets—land, labor or capital. The resulting productivity and quality gains
should drive the development of viable seed systems and yet most small-scale farmers in subSaharan Africa continue to rely on indigenous seed systems.1
The ability of small-scale farmers to experiment with improved seed is limited both by poverty
and their aversion to risk. There are documented examples of the inappropriateness of improved
varieties—particularly under traditional management (see Jones et al. 2002)—that has led some
observers to dismiss the benefits of crop improvement programs. However, advances in science
and technology and the widespread adoption of participatory research methods in response to
these criticisms has resulted in the development of better-adapted material that has been widely
adopted by some of the poorest farmers when they have been able to access improved seed of
these varieties (Jones et al. 2001).
The liberalization of seed markets during the past decade or so has encouraged international
seed companies to increase their stake in the market. For example in pre-liberalized Malawi the
parastatal National Seed Company of Malawi (NSCM) was the only company, but just over a decade
later four multi-nationals were marketing seed and NSCM was sold to Cargill and subsequently to
Monsanto. These same companies market seed regionally in most countries of Eastern and Southern
Africa. A handful of smaller seed companies have also been established. In Kenya there are now
58 registered seed companies. However, most small-scale farmers still have little or no access to
new varieties—particularly for open, self-pollinated, and vegetatively propagated crops other than
maize, vegetables and some cash crops like cotton. Many varieties released by national authorities
are rarely multiplied for commercial distribution.
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Several factors help explain the limited development of regional seed markets. One explanation
is that high market transaction costs raise the price of seed to unacceptable levels in rural markets
and leads companies to concentrate on a few well established seed crops that they know farmers
will buy (e.g., maize, vegetables, and cash crops). These costs are reinforced by the high overheads
of larger seed companies—including the costs of maintaining crop breeding programs. By this
argument smaller seed companies without research overheads may be capable of supplying seed
of secondary crops at competitive prices. Policy and regulatory improvements are expected to
facilitate the growth of existing seed companies, but there is still a need to support the further
development of local seed companies. Smaller seed companies without research overheads
and operating at a state or district level can reduce some transport and delivery costs. They also
can deliver seeds with local demand that do not have enough broad appeal to be produced by
multinationals. These companies are well placed to have a better knowledge of local performance
and farmer preference, and are able to facilitate local distribution.
How to support the development of smaller seed companies? Regular demand for seed needed
to sustain commercial seed businesses is largely derived from the price and quality demands
of functioning output markets as opposed to the inconsistent demand for relief seed. Seed
entrepreneurs wanting to market seed need access to novel varieties, input distribution networks,
seed storage and processing facilities, technical support, business development services and
finance, all of which has to be tailored to the special needs of seed businesses. As seed quality
cannot be observed by the buyer, an effective regulatory environment is required that includes
the establishment and enforcement of appropriate and relevant seed certification standards to
differentiate seed from grain and to stop opportunists from marketing grain as seed.
1 Seed is used for convenience and denotes planting material whether botanical seed or the portions of the plant such as
roots, tubers, corms, vines or planting sticks.

continued
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Box 2 (continued)

An initiative has been started to establish Seed Enterprise Enhancement and Development Services
(SEEDS) across sub-Saharan Africa that will facilitate access to these services. SEEDS are intended
to be autonomous not-for-profit organizations with public/private oversight, for the sole purpose
of identifying, promoting and assisting the development of existing and potential private seed
businesses within a defined geographical area—in summary a one-stop service (fee-based) and
support (development-funded) center for seed company development. Where plant breeders’ rights
have been established, an additional role for SEEDS will potentially be to manage the collection of
royalties on behalf of the national agricultural research system and to use licensing as a way to
stimulate commercial investment in seed production and marketing.
The poor performance of public institutions in disseminating improved varieties to small-scale
farmers is broadly accepted, and there is an urgent need to design and test new institutional
arrangements that combine public investments in crop improvement with commercial seed delivery.
This is the focus of several initiatives including the USAID funded program for the Sustainable
Commercialization of Seeds in Africa (SCOSA) and the joint Bill and Melinda Gates and Rockefeller
Foundations Program for Africa’s Seed Systems (PASS).
References
Jones, R.B., P. Bramel, C. Longley, and T. Remington. “The Need to Look Beyond the Production and Provision of
Relief Seed: Experiences from Southern Sudan.” Disasters 26 (2002): 302-315.

R&D Themes—Roles of
Collective Institutions
A preponderance of collective R&D institutions
or undertakings have specific thematic profiles.
Themes may include commodities or crops (e.g.,
irrigated rice in the case of FLAR); location (e.g.,
a region like Sub-Saharan Africa); aspects of agri
food systems (e.g., irrigation, soil, precision of input
usage, pest control, or agri-food supply chain);
ecosystem, climate, or habitat type; or a specific
type of problem (e.g., a specific pest species). Many
R&D partnerships involve a mix of such themes. For
example, FLAR is both a regional and crop-based
institution.
A wide range of roles, in various combinations,
may be assumed by collective R&D institutions.
Some partnerships focus on funding and carrying
out crop-improvement research, such as FLAR on
rice. R&D activities suitable for being carried out
through the partnership range from upstream
research such as genome sequencing all the way to
downstream product development and evaluation,
involving field trials and communication channels

for farmer feedback. Other collective institutions,
such as FONTAGRO and ASARECA, do not
undertake R&D but rather raise and allocate funds
to others who perform the research. Part of this
role is to conduct or coordinate research impact
assessments. Another important set of roles
involves coordinating and facilitating collective
research, distinct from funding or performing
R&D. Because R&D partnerships have many
possible organizational structures, membership
arrangements, incentive issues and solutions, and
innovation pathways, there is much scope for
institutional innovation. Moreover, prospective
partners may not know of each other’s existence,
or they may be unaware of what they can offer
each other. Hence a potentially useful role consists
of merely bringing potential partners together and
helping them catalyze partnerships. ASARECA and
the International Network for the Improvement
of Banana and Plantain (INIBAP, part of IPGRI) are
examples of collective institutions that have taken
on this role.16 Collective R&D action also entails
16 Plucknett, Smith and Ozgediz (1990) provide a
comprehensive listing of the myriad of networking activities in
the agricultural sciences through the late 1980s.
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the joint provision and utilization of research
infrastructure, including facilities for germplasm
conservation, genetic evaluation, and the storage,
integration and exchange of information. Examples
include the genebanks of mandate crops at the
CGIAR Centers such as IRRI, CIMMYT, CIAT, IPGRI
(INIBAP) and ICRISAT, and the International Network
for the Genetic Evaluation of Rice (INGER). Finally,
educational, training and extension activities are
often a component of collective R&D institutions.

new types of collective action in agricultural R&D
for developing countries.
Those engaged in collective R&D partnerships face
a number of obstacles—including but not confined
to incentive problems—that may prevent them
from realizing the full benefits of R&D cooperation.
These impediments are also listed and elaborated
some in Table 4.

Partnership Patterns
Incentives for and Impediments to
Collective Action in (Agricultural) R&D
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Research is an intrinsically competitive enterprise,
be it scientists racing to be credited with having
been the first to discover, or firms to be first to
invent (and patent perhaps), or countries striving to
sustain or create comparative advantage through
the technological advances that R&D makes
possible. Why then do scientists, firms or countries
opt to engage in collective action regarding
R&D? Arguable the most fundamental reason for
collective (distinct from individual) action is the
mutually positive externalities that may arise from
collective undertakings, as described in some
detail by Mancur Olson in his 1965 volume The
Logic of Collective Action. Table 4 provides a range
of reasons for R&D cooperation, grouped into
seven categories (adapted from Hagedoorn et al.
2000).
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This is a useful checklist. For instance, to our
knowledge, there are currently no agricultural
R&D consortia for developing countries based on
reason (5). In contrast, almost all formal collective
action involves projects that are relatively low-risk.
A well-designed program for collective breeding
or agronomy such as FLAR is highly likely to
yield a reasonably high rate of return—it is not
very risky. A genomics consortium is harder to
assess. Venture capital initiatives such as those
undertaken by the Kilimo Trust based in Uganda
(and underwritten by the Gatsby Foundation)
or those envisaged by the Program for Africa’s
Seed Systems (a joint undertaking of the Gates
and Rockefeller Foundations) to support the
development of small- to medium-sized seed firms
in Africa are efforts to diversify risks over a large
number of small, high-risk projects. These are but
several examples of the unrealized potential for

Building on the elements discussed so far that
encompass considerations about the relevant types
of participants, R&D partnership themes, reasons
for partnering, and obstacles to partnering, we
identify several key patterns in R&D partnerships.
Number of Partners—Exclusivity. Partnerships
of just two or three members have the advantage
of greater flexibility. Contributions and partnership
benefits can be fine-tuned to the partner’s
objectives, needs and ability and willingness to
contribute.
A partnership with a larger number of members
(“consortium”) is fundamentally different in
nature. As transaction costs tend to increase
more than proportionately with the number of
participants, consortia are typically characterized
by standardized arrangements. Members will vary
in their willingness to contribute, and standardized
rules for funding and other contributions must
satisfy the least enthusiastic members—a lowest
common-denominator effect. For example,
WARDA has a mandate similar to FLAR. FLAR,
clearly a consortium, with about 14 members,
serves larger numbers of producers and consumers
while WARDA, an association funded by way of its
membership of the CGIAR system, receives about
10 times as much funding as FLAR. This is not to
say that an alternative arrangement with a smaller
number of members would have made sense for
FLAR; probably not, but the point is that there are
compelling grounds to expect to observe underfunding and a high marginal rate of return in welldesigned and well-managed R&D consortia. This
is an argument to support developing-country
agricultural R&D consortia with matching funding
arrangements from development assistance
funds.

The issue of (non-)exclusivity is a general problem
for collective action, especially when it involves
public-private partnerships. When a public
institution forms an exclusive partnership with
a private firm, it may expose itself to charges of
favoritism. However, for-profit competitors may
be unwilling to join a consortium if that entails
the mutual sharing of sensitive technological
and market information. Furthermore, the
public partner(s) may prefer to establish a trust
relationship with one or a small number of partners,
rather than opening up the joint arrangement to
any interested parties. The trust factor certainly

played a role in the exclusivity of CIAT’s partnership
with Papalotla (van Schoonhoven, pers. com.).17

17 Semillas Papalotla S.A. de C.V., launched as a family business
in 1992, is a seed production, cleaning, marketing and distribution
firm. The Papalotla Group consists of Semillas Papalotla, based
in Mexico City; Tropical Seeds LLC, based in Florida, United
States; and Tropical Seeds do Brasil Ltda, based in Mato Grosso
do Sul, Brazil. Beginning in June 2000, CIAT entered into a series
of agreements with Papalotla concerning the development,
evaluation (in various production environments), and distribution
of hybrid varieties of Brachiaria (a pasture species) developed
by CIAT that have various desirable traits, including adaptation
to drought, resistance to two important pests, spittlebug and
Rhizoctonia, tolerance to high soil levels of aluminum, and high
nutritional quality (Binenbaum, Pardey and Wright 2004).

Reasons

Obstacles

1. Imperfect public goods. R&D outputs are typically
(imperfect) public goods: they are characterized
by imperfect rivalry and/or imperfect (or costly)
appropriability, leading to market failure (e.g., Lindner
2004). A common information base for R&D (such as
a genome) or an industry standard (relevant to many
agri-food products and R&D outputs) are important
examples of consortium themes built on this reason.

Externalities (to group) / leakage to third
parties. Underinvestment and free riding tend
to be exacerbated if participants are concerned
that some of the benefits will leak away to non
participants or to causes that they do not support.

2. Complementarities. Assets and resources—such
as intellectual property, genetic and other materials,
information, and expertise—that serve as inputs into the
R&D process tend to be synergistic or complementary.

Asymmetric information. Complementary bits of
information are dispersed among consortium members.
These may not be shared completely but instead retained
as bargaining chips are for competitive advantage.
Even when the players are committed to transparency
and truthfulness, information sharing will typically be
problematic. Even within firms, valuable knowledge is
not shared between individuals or units in the absence
of an effective knowledge management system (Zack
1999). This is all the more problematic when it comes
to interorganizational cooperation (Holland 1995).

3. Scale and scope effects. Due to economies of scale
and scope in R&D, it may be in a group of players’ interest
to pool resources. For example, science parks—as
developed by, and in the vicinity of, CIAT and ICRISAT
(Spielman et al. 2006)—provide joint infrastructure to a
group of R&D players (as well as facilitating networking,
information exchange and inspiration.) R&D funds
may also be combined so as to create a single pool
from which grants can be allocated more efficiently.

Holdup problems. Partners postpone critical investments/
contributions with an eye to strengthening their bargaining
positions in later deals. For example, when negotiating
the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for
Agriculture, blocks of negotiating countries refused to
include important categories of crops in the Treaty’s sharing
mechanism, probably in order to keep these as national
bargaining chips in later deals, e.g., with multinationals.

4. Technology transfer costs. R&D does not only yield
new knowledge but also enhances an organization’s
“absorptive capacity” and hence its learning
processes—i.e., its acquisition of existing knowledge
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989). R&D cooperation can
thus be a superior vehicle for technology transfer.

Lack of goal convergence. This is the fundamental
problem underlying the three problems listed above.
Even non-profits with supposedly similar missions (say,
benefiting the poor in Africa) will often have divergent
interests because each prefers to receive budget increases
and credit for any successes. This may be termed “own
institution bias” or, in extreme cases, “turf wars”.

5. Risk pooling. R&D cooperation may help players
share and reduce risk (Dodgson 1993; Mathews 2002).

Lack of capacity. It will generally be difficult
to form partnerships with players who lack
basic capacities. National Agricultural Research
Systems (NARS) differ widely in this regard.

continued
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Table 4 (continued)
6. Minimizing unnecessary duplication. R&D
cooperation may help players avoid wasteful duplication
(Irwin and Klenow 1996; Klette et al. 2000).

Lack of appropriate definition of rights, responsibilities,
procedures, objectives and focus. For example: “In the case
of CIMMYT’s Striga-Resistant Maize project, coordination costs
were incurred from poorly defined roles and responsibilities
for African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), a
not-for-profit foundation designed to facilitate PPPs for
the access and delivery of appropriate technologies to
smallholders in Sub-Saharan Africa” (Spielman et al. 2006).
Similarly, collaboration for Bt maize development involving
an early Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project (ABSP,
an initiative of USAID), CRIFC (an Indonesian public research
institute), and ICI Seeds (now AstraZeneca, a U.S. firm),
failed due to lack of patent protection. In contrast, a similar
but later ABSP project aimed at Bt maize development
that involved a joint venture between Pioneer Hi-Bred and
AGERI (an Egyptian public research institute) was successful,
in part because IPR had been carefully delineated (Lewis
2000; Byerlee and Fischer 2002; Binenbaum and Pardey
2004). Mission drift is a related problem. With multiple
sponsors, a lack of direction or focus may emerge over time.

7. Collusive marketing behavior. Players may engage in
R&D cooperation to establish or enhance other kinds of
relationships. For instance, they may use an R&D consortium
for collusive purposes in output markets (Hagedoorn et al.
2000).

Market power. Where competing countries or firms
collaborate in R&D, the danger of collusion in output
markets or a coordinated reduction in innovation may
loom. However, increased market power is in some cases
considered to be a good thing, especially as a counterbalance
to existing market power. For example, farmers or
developing countries may combine forces in order not
to be played off against each other by multinationals.
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Cultural differences, trust, and such. As pointed out
by Hartwich et al. (2006) and Spielman et al. (2006) and
illustrated by them with CGIAR examples, culture clashes and
lack of trust can be a major impediment to R&D partnerships.
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Upstream/downstream balance. The balance between
(upstream) research and (downstream) development,
distribution, and commercialization may be lacking? Thus
there is the danger that potentially valuable research
outputs never realize their potential impact. The most
effective way to avoid this is often to bypass other public
agencies and partner directly with private firms. A
successful example is CIAT’s partnership with the Mexican
seed company Papalotla, whereby the latter helps fund
the former’s breeding of hybrid grasses for cattle foraging.
CIAT holds plant variety rights to the grasses; these are
licensed out exclusively to Papalotla, which takes care
of multiplication, distribution, and follow-up extension
activities. As a result, Papalotla has become actively involved
in innovation; farmers and consumers benefit from increased
dairy/meat productivity; and slash-and-burn practices are
likely to have been reduced (Binenbaum et al. 2004).
Lack of leadership. To overcome the many obstacles to
successful collective action, leadership is essential. Factors
conducive to leadership of one or a few players (and hence
success factors for collective action) include formal power,
superior resources, connectivity, professional standing,
moral standing and impartiality, and an understanding of
the players and the relevant parts of the innovation system.
In the case of FLAR, most of these factors were in place,
which helps explain FLAR’s success (Binenbaum 2006).

Source: Developed by Binenbaum.

The key downside of exclusivity is that it inhibits
potentially valuable partnerships with competitors
of the private-sector partner. Spielman et al. (2006,
p. 40) identify this problem as particularly serious
in ILRI’s East Coast Vaccine partnership with the
firm Merial (discussed below).
Complementary Resources. Many partnerships
can be analyzed primarily in terms of their
implications for access to complementary
resources. Examples include
• Genomics-related consortia. Data, knowledge,
information and genetic resources are often
synergistic. A clear partnership theme is
critical to exploiting such synergies. Areas of
bioinformatics such as genome sequencing,
functional
genomics,
proteomics
and
metabolomics often lend themselves to
being organized around a species—often a
crop. Consortia have played and are playing
an important role in these areas, especially
by assembling common databases and
information banks that greatly enable and
enhance more-applied R&D such as plant
breeding. Prominent examples include the
Consortium for Maize Genomics (MGC), the
International Wheat Genome Sequencing
Consortium (IWGSC), the International Rice
Genome Sequencing Project (IRGSP), the
International Rice Functional Genomics
Consortium (IRFGC), the Rice Blast Genome
Consortium (RBGC), the Global Musa Genomics
Consortium (GMGC), the Potato Genome
Sequencing Consortium (PGSC), the Swine
Genome Sequencing Consortium (SGSC), the
International Sheep Genomics Consortium
(ISGC), and the National Bovine Functional
Genomics Consortium (NBFGC), which in
contrast to the others is not an international
effort. Among these, RBGC is notable because
it involves a pest species, and IRGSP and

NBFGC stand out because they focus on
post-sequencing informatics. Still, the global
medical research community appears to be
ahead of the agricultural community in the
formation and funding of consortia in both
these dimensions (pathogens, and higherorder, more functionally-oriented informatics).
Another notable imbalance is the fact that
major CGIAR mandate crops such as maize,
wheat, rice, bananas and potatoes, all have their
international genomics consortia, whereas, and
perhaps not surprisingly, other major crops
such as cotton, coffee, tea, and cocoa appear to
lag behind in the formation of such consortia.
Some of the aforementioned examples of
genomics-related consortia feature significant
involvement of private-sector partners,
especially multinationals active in agricultural
biotechnology.
• Breeding consortia. Breeding activities lend
themselves well to consortium arrangements.
Breeding consortia, like genomics-related
consortia, are usually crop-focused—e.g.,
FLAR in irrigated rice, or the Latin American
Consortium for Cassava Research and
Development (CLAYUCA) in cassava. There
is a clear advantage in pooling genetic
resources to have a larger selection base for
breeding. There is an upstream-downstream
complementarity as well: consortium-bred
varieties can then be field-tested and/or
used as progenitors for further breeding by
locally based partners. The FLAR consortium
funding arrangement is an alternative for
(or complement to) the traditional CGIAR
donor-based funding (Binenbaum 2006).
A leading breeding consortium in the 1980s
and 1990s was the Latin American Maize
Project (LAMP), a cooperative effort between
various United States research agencies and
11 Latin American countries. LAMP aimed to
(1) improve characterization of approximately
50,000 accessions of corn found in gene
banks around the world, (2) regenerate these
accessions, and thus (3) support and enhance
maize breeding efforts in the CGIAR and the
participating NARS (Knudsen 2000). It was
supported by Pioneer Hi-Bred, the largest
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Issues of coordination and complications
associated with domestic political interests may
arise in international open-membership consortia
(see, for example, Alston, Dehmer and Pardey 2006
with reference to the CGIAR). To avoid these issues,
membership in the consortium may be restricted
to one representative organization per country, as
is the case in FLAR.
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commercial producer of hybrid corn at the
time, and received donations of several
commercial varieties from another private
firm, DeKalb. LAMP provided the basis for two
ongoing follow-up efforts, the Latin American
Maize Landrace Conservation Network (Taba
2003) and the Germplasm Enhancement of
Maize Project (GEM), a successful U.S. publicprivate consortium supported by both the
federal government and major seed companies
(Knudson 2000).
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• Agronomic and ecological systems. Agricultural
production and technology are embedded
in ecological, agronomic, and supply-chain
systems. As these systems consist of intricately
interacting components, and as different
individuals and entities possess complementary
knowledge and other resources relevant to R&D
involving these components and interactions,
consortia may provide suitable R&D structures.
These are often regionally based. For example,
the Latin American Consortium on Ecology
and Sustainable Development (CLADES) “is a
collaborative effort of Latin American NGOs
to prevent the collapse of peasant agriculture
by transforming it into a more sustainable and
productive enterprise” (Altieri 2000). Another
example in this category is the Inland Valley
Consortium, which “was established in 1993 to
respond to social and environmental challenges
in West Africa, related to poverty and food
security on the one hand and degradation of
the natural resource base on the other” (Kiepe
2006). This is a consortium of 10 West African
countries, several CGIAR Centers (WARDA being
the leading partner), and several international
public-sector partners. The consortium’s
research themes are clearly systemic in nature:
“Research objectives in Phase II (2000–2004)
focus on four main themes: characterization of
inland valley land use dynamics; development
and evaluation of technologies for improved
production systems and natural resources
management; socio-economic and policy
aspects of improvements in inland valley land
use systems; and technology dissemination
processes and impact pathways for inland
valley development” (Kiepe 2006). Membership
of practically all consortia with an ecosystem/
sustainability theme currently appears to be

confined to the public and nonprofit sectors.
A related kind of consortium focuses on
specific types of agricultural inputs. R&D on
inputs often requires an understanding of
interactions with other inputs and agricultural
production systems generally. Here we do
observe significant private-sector participation.
For example, the Potash and Phosphorous
Institute of Canada (PPIC), a consortium “which
receives funding from both private firms and
governments and has research programs at
universities in the US and Canada and also
in Latin America, China, India, Sri Lanka and
most of South-East Asia..., is interested in
promoting ‘precision’ agriculture that will
increase the demand for fertilizers” (Rausser
et al. 2000, p. 504, citing a 1999 working paper
by Carl Pray). As of December 2006, PPIC is
active in many countries, and its membership
includes five private firms (Agrium, Intrepid
Potash, Mosaic, Potash Crop, and Simplot).18
Yet another type of partnership or consortium
is based on information complementarities in
supply chains (Holland 1995). For instance, a
large downstream agri-food company might
support or even drive a partnership aimed
at increasing, coordinating, improving the
reliability of, and/or reducing the cost of its
supplies. The multinational Nestlé, while
not a formal partner in the CIAT-Papalotla
partnership, is vital to its success as a distributor
of grass seeds, credit provider to dairy farmers,
and purchaser of milk (Binenbaum et al. 2004).
Another large corporation, Quaker Oats, “funds
an oats crossing program that focuses on
developing varieties suitable for developing
countries. Universities in the United States work
co-operatively with oats breeding programs in
Brazil, Argentina, Chile and other countries”
(Rausser et al. 2000, p. 504).
• Partnerships with key intellectual property assets.
In addition to intellectual property playing
a key role in a Bayh-Dole type mechanism, IP
assets owned by public-sector and nonprofit
institutions are often vital in innovation

18 http://www.ppi-ppic.org/ppiweb/ppibase.nsf/$webindex/
article=A1B712C485256970005F6F2F23D096CC

Type I research agencies, especially those found
among the government agencies operating in
China, India, and Brazil, have greater resources
than the CGIAR Centers for generating R&D
capabilities and IP assets that can be used in
partnerships. For example, the Organization for
Nucleotide Sequencing and Analysis (ONSA),
a network of laboratories mostly funded by
the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo, managed
to sequence the strategically significant
genome of Agrobacterium Tumefaciens (one
of the principal vehicles for gene transfer and
hence a key enabling technology for genetic
engineering) in collaboration with the University
of Washington (UW) and in competition
with Monsanto—a genome sequencing race
comparable to the earlier and more famous
public-private rivalry in decoding the human
genome. As in the latter case, the public and
private research groups were both successful
and ended up simultaneously publishing their
sequencing papers in Science—but the ONSA/
UW paper had the higher scientific value. “The
significance of ONSA’s achievement was that it
gained a position, indeed a successful one, on
[the biotechnology] playing field. Recently this
position has been further consolidated as ONSA
is providing key expertise on comparative
genomics for variants of A. Tumefaciens, with the
University of Washington again and Monsanto,
now changed from competitor to collaborator”
(Harvey and McMeekin 2005, p. 647).

Beyond Collective Action in
Research—Transferring Technologies
Rausser et al. (2000), Qaim (2001), Byerlee and
Fischer (2002), and Tollens et al. (2004) all make
the point that in order to realize agricultural
biotechnology’s potential benefits for poor farmers
and consumers in developing countries, more
public-private partnerships are needed. Although
we provided a number of examples of such
partnerships, their total R&D activity is still dwarfed
by multinationals’ ag-biotech investments that
are concentrated in a small number of products
destined—at least in the first instance—for
affluent markets. With recent increases in available
philanthropic funds (such as Warren Buffett’s
multi-billion-dollar gift to the Gates Foundation)
and given the rapid economic growth in India
and China (enabling these countries to become
a significant source of technology transfer), the
opportunities for such partnerships have vastly
increased. Innovative organizational and funding
models such as FLAR have barely begun to be
emulated, and there is much scope for additional
institutional innovation. Adding to the complexity
is the innovative potential of technology users
such as farmers and farmer cooperatives, various
manufacturers and service providers, and even
consumers (Douthwaite 2002; von Hippel 2005).
While the dividing line between client-oriented
innovation and collaborative innovation is not clear
(e.g., in “participatory plant breeding” as described
by Witcombe et al. 2005), the importance of active
participation in agricultural innovation by earlystage technology adopters is well documented
(Douthwaite 2002). Clearly, the various participants
(donors, multinationals, smaller firms, international
organizations, universities, government agencies,
farmers, the CGIAR Centers and so on) have largely
complementary resources and experiences, giving
rise to a near-infinite array of potential institutional
combinations and solutions to the technology
transfer problem.

2.4 FINANCING AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH
19 The striga case described in Box 3 is another example of
the aggregation of intellectual property assets plus technical and
marketing expertise required to bring a crop-based technology
to African markets.

Collective action features prominently in
arrangements for financing agricultural R&D, and
is increasingly being used in some settings as a
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partnerships where they are complementary
to and can leverage access to privately owned
IP. For example, a patent obtained by ILRI
may have played this role in the Institute’s
partnership with the private firm Merial for the
development of a vaccine for East Coast Fever
which “could reduce livestock productivity
losses in the order of US$300 million per
year, thereby curbing the disease’s negative
impact on the incomes and nutrition of African
smallholders” (Spielman et al. 2006, p. 40).19
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Box 3: Herbicide Resistant Maize Technology to Combat Striga in Africa

by Hugo De Groote and Fred Kanampiu, International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
(CIMMYT)1
Striga, or witchweed, is a parasitic weed that severely affects cereals, primarily maize and sorghum.
In Sub-Saharan Africa it infests an estimated 3.64 million hectares of maize, about a quarter of the
total area, especially in the mid-altitude zones of East and Southern Africa and the savannahs of
West Africa (De Groote forthcoming). Striga seeds only germinate in close proximity to a suitable
host plant, such as maize. After germination, it attaches to the roots of the host plant, from
where it derives its water and nutrients. It also inflicts toxic damage. Much of its damage is done
before emerging, so weeding only helps to reduce the seed production, protecting future crops.
Unfortunately, Striga produces large quantities of seed that can stay dormant in the soil for up to
20 years. It does more damage to weak plants, particularly in areas of poor soil fertility. Therefore,
it is a particular problem in areas where increased population pressure has led to a loss of fallow,
resulting in continuous cropping, the reality many subsistence farmers face. In Kenya, for example,
the Striga-prone area forms a band around Lake Victoria, up to an altitude of 1600 meters, where
it affects about 210,000 hectares of maize, and the lives of 6 million people, with 61 percent living
below the poverty line (De Groote forthcoming).
To tackle this major problem, a consortium of private and public research institutes developed an
innovative technology, based on imidazolinone-resistant, or IR for short, maize. Imidazolinones
are herbicides that are effective against Striga. The gene was discovered in a small Minnesota
laboratory in the United States, Molecular Genetics Inc., who patented it. The company was sold to
American Cyanamid, which was subsequently acquired by BASF, who currently holds the patent. The
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) obtained IR germplasm from Pioneer
Hi-Bred International for experimental purposes and started a research effort in collaboration with
the Weizmann Institute of Science (Israel) and the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI),
supported by the Rockefeller Foundation.
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Herbicide tolerant crop varieties are actually very popular world wide, but mostly they use genetically
engineered varieties, combined with spraying of a herbicide. Neither of these components is
currently acceptable to most countries in sub-Saharan Africa. IR maize, on the other hand, is a
natural mutant, and the technology uses seed coating with the herbicide (in this case, Imazapyr,
one of the imidazolinone herbicides and a product of BASF), using a minuscule amount of herbicide
(30 g/ha) compared with conventional spraying.
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The collaborative research effort quickly established that the seed coating of IR maize was very
effective in controlling Striga (Kanampiu et al. 2001). The IR maize plant stimulates the germination
of nearby Striga seeds, but as the Striga radical approaches the maize it is killed by the herbicide
delivered through the seed coating. Transferring the gene to well adapted maize varieties was
fairly straight forward. The breeding effort has focused on crossing this material with other
CIMMYT germplasm to include traits such as streak virus resistance and tolerance to drought and
low nitrogen conditions. Several hybrids were developed and tested on-station as well as on-farm
(Kanampiu et al., 2003), and those that did well have been approved by the regulatory process in
Kenya. Generally, the technology proved to be very effective, although some problems occurred
when heavy rains washed off the herbicide (De Groote et al. 2007). Combined effects of Striga
1 The authors thank Joe De Vries (Rockefeller Foundation), John Lynam (the Kilimo Trust), Mpoko Bokanga (AATF),
Jonathan Gressel (Weismann Weizmann Institute. of Science), Karl Volker-Sthamer (BASF), Joel Ransom (North Dakota State
University), Dennis Friesen (CIMMYT), and Alpha Diallo (CIMMYT) for their input.

continued
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Box 3 (continued)

control and improved germplasm increased yield two or three times, at an increased cost of about
$4 per hectare.
After developing an effective, field-tested technology, it still needs to be approved by the
appropriated regulatory agencies, and disseminated. In Kenya, herbicides typically need to be
approved by a pesticides board, and new varieties need to go through several seasons of national
performance trials (NPT). The NPT commission compares the results of new varieties to control
varieties, and nominate which varieties get released. The minister of agriculture will release the
variety after sufficient seed is bulked up.
The first four IR maize varieties, all hybrids, were released in 2005. The same year, 13 more OPVs
and two hybrids were entered into the NPTs by 7 seed companies. They were all approved by the
committee and their release is expected in 2007. After the release of a variety, companies need to
produce and disseminate seed. The four approved hybrids were registered, and agreements were
signed with three seed companies who produced 100 tons of commercial seed in 2006, for planting
in 2007. In 2006, free demonstration packages were also distributed to more than 15,000 farmers.
In East and Southern Africa, unfortunately, rules and regulations for the seed sector are not
harmonized, and each country has its own varietal release system. Therefore, wide-scale testing
is on-going in several countries (Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, and Ethiopia), and varieties have been
identified for registration by seed companies in other countries. Several seed companies have been
approached, and agreements have been signed with a seed company in Tanzania, and another
company in Malawi/Zimbabwe.
To optimize the promotion and dissemination of the technology, a partnership was formed
among CIMMYT, BASF, the African Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), seed companies
and NGOs. All IR varieties are registered under the common name STRIGAWAY®. CIMMYT’s role is
(a) to develop maize germplasm adapted to African maize growing environments which possess
the imidazolinone-resistance trait originally provided by BASF, (b) to provide NARS and seed
companies with protocols and testing kits of experimental STRIGAWAY® maize varieties, and (c)
to provide authorized breeder seed. The role of AATF is to facilitate and backstop registration
of STRIGAWAY® maize varieties by NARS and private seed sector and advise on issues related to
intellectual property rights and licensing. BASF registers the herbicide, licenses the STRIGAWAY®
technology to seed companies, and provides all seed treatment required for testing and releasing
STRIGAWAY® maize varieties. Seed companies produce and disseminate the seed, while NGOs help
with demonstration and promotion.

De Groote, H. “Striga Economics.” Chapter in G. Ejeta and J. Gressel, eds., Integrating New Technologies for Striga
Control: Towards Ending the Witch-Hunt. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2007.
De Groote, H., L. Wangare, and F. Kanampiu. 2007. “Evaluating the use of herbicide-coated imidazolinone
resistant (IR) maize seeds to control Striga in farmers’ fields in Kenya.” Crop Protection 26:1496-1506.
Kanampiu, F. K., V. Kabambe, C. Massawe, L. Jasi, D. Friesen, J.K. Ransom and J. Gressel. “Multi-site, Multi-season
Field Tests Demonstrate that Herbicide Seed-coating Herbicide-resistance Maize Controls Striga spp. and
Increases Yields in Several African countries.” Crop Protection 22(2003): 697-706.
Kanampiu, F. K., J.K. Ransom, and J. Gressel. “Imazapyr Seed Dressings for Striga Control on Acetolactate Synthase
Target-site Resistant Maize.” Crop Protection 20 (2001): 885-895.
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complement to more-traditional public financing
methods.20 Other institutional innovations may
also be used to supplement government funding
and thus enhance the total sources of funding
for agricultural science, to lower the social cost of
funds used for agricultural R&D, or to enhance the
economic efficiency with which the funds are used.

agricultural R&D, like other public goods, financed
by general government revenues. Such analysis
and prescription is too simple, however, because
most forms of agricultural R&D are not pure public
goods; and, consequently, other interventions may
be fairer, more effective, or more efficient ways to
correct problems of underinvestment.

This section discusses the expanding range
of mechanisms for financing agricultural R&D,
including (a) collective action programs financed
by commodity taxes (sometimes called levybased or check-off schemes), with and without
arrangements for matching government support,
and (b) mechanisms for enhancing individual
incentives to invest, including intellectual property
rights, tax concessions, fees for service and contract
R&D, prize mechanisms, endowment funding (via
Foundations) and so forth. The discussion here
stresses the economic and institutional issues
involved in these arrangements and gives specific
examples of each. It also reports and assesses the
associated alternative mechanisms for allocating
R&D dollars. To some extent arrangements for
allocating R&D resources must be developed in
conjunction with arrangements for obtaining the
finance, but these are logically distinct elements of
the R&D process and should not be confused with
one another.

Agricultural R&D may be a public good in the sense
of (at least partial) non-excludability and non
rivalness, but this does not mean that everybody
in the nation benefits and it does not mean that
everybody in the nation should pay. Indeed, for
many types of research and common commodity
market conditions, the benefits are confined
to those producers who are able to adopt the
resulting technology because commodity prices
are not affected. In other cases, the adoption
of technology that leads to improvements in
productivity leads to lower commodity prices with
benefits distributed between consumers of the
commodity and producers who adopt the new
technology, perhaps partially at the expense of
producers who do not adopt the new technology,
and, sometimes, those who are slower to do so.
Sometimes the lower prices are transmitted to
producers and consumers in other countries, and
sometimes foreign producers can adopt the new
technology, adding further complications to the
picture of the distribution of the benefits from the
new technology. Citizens who do not consume
or produce the commodity in question are not
beneficiaries even though they may be taxpayers
and asked to support the R&D.21
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Public- versus CollectiveGoods Perspectives
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Much of the economics discussion of agricultural
R&D and agricultural R&D policy refers to the
public goods nature of agricultural R&D, and the
market failures associated with the reliance on
private provision. It would seem to follow that
the natural solution is for the government to
intervene to correct the market failure by providing
20 The European Commission’s Directorate-General for
Research is an example of a multinational model for funding R&D.
The Directorate’s 2002-2006 budget totaled 17.5 billion euros;
less than 5 percent of Europe’s total spending on civilian research
(European Commission 2004). Less than 4 percent of the 2002
2006 budget was directed to agriculturally related (specifically,
food safety and quality) research. The Directorate’s 2007-2013
budget is projected to be 53.2 billion euros. The Directorate can
be seen as a means to address the market failure problem that
bedevils R&D in a multilateral setting. But it is part of a much more
comprehensive process of political and economic integration
in Europe and thus may offer limited lessons for collectively
financing (agricultural) research among (developing) countries
absent that broader framework of integration.

Consequently, rather than public goods, many
types of agricultural R&D may be better thought
of as collective goods, for which the relevant
collection of beneficiaries may be a group
of producers (and consumers) of a particular
commodity coming from a particular region.
Economic efficiency (along with some concepts
of fairness) is likely to be promoted by funding
research so that the costs are borne in proportion

21 Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1995) elaborate at length on
the determinants of the distribution of benefits from research
among producers, consumers, middlemen, foreigners, and so on.

General Government Revenue Funding
In most countries, the primary source of funding
for public-sector agricultural R&D continues to be
general tax revenues, which may be an expensive
source of revenues. As first pointed out by Fox
(1985), it costs society measurably more than a dollar
to provide a dollar of general taxpayer revenues
to finance public expenditures. The U.S. evidence
was reviewed, summarized and synthesized by
Fullerton (1991), whose results indicate that a
dollar of government spending on agricultural R&D
may cost society between $1.07 and $1.25 when
the market distortions induced by taxation are
taken into account (see also Ballard and Fullerton
1992).23 A recognition of the fact that government
funding has a high social opportunity cost helps
explain the persistence of the underfunding

22 Incentive problems in agricultural R&D arise from
inappropriability of benefits and free-riding, and may be serious
unless some way can be found to ensure that beneficiaries share
appropriately in R&D costs. Hence, as argued by Alston and
Pardey (1996), a criterion for efficiency, as well as fairness, is to
whom the benefits accrue. These issues pertain to the mechanism
for allocating research resources among alternatives as well as
processes for raising the revenues.
23 Funding from check-offs (commodity taxes) also involves
potential excess burdens for similar reasons. Against this is the
view that the required low rates of commodity taxes (less than
1 percent) are likely to involve smaller marginal excess burdens
than the prevailing high rates of labor income taxes in most
countries, especially when it is considered that such commodity
taxes may in fact reduce distortions resulting from commodity
support programs in some cases, or from the absence of “optimal”
trade taxes in others.

problem; and at the same time adds to the reasons
for looking for alternative interventions that may
be comparatively economically efficient as well as
more likely to find political support.
The available evidence generally supports the view
that even with the existing, extensive government
involvement, the world is investing too little in
agricultural R&D—especially the developing world
and especially in relation to staple food crops.
Economists often call for governments to address
this underfunding problem simply by increasing the
total amount of government revenues committed
to agricultural R&D, but that prescription seems
increasingly likely to fall on deaf ears. Against that
background, it seems appropriate to look for ways
of developing institutions that are complementary
with government funding, in particular institutions
that have a multiplier effect on government funding
by drawing in funding from industry, as well as
mechanisms that encourage private investment as
a substitute for government spending.
A number of options can be and in many places
are used instead of, or in combination with, the
use of general government funds to finance
agricultural R&D undertaken in the public sector
or the private sector. These include incentives
for private innovation such as the provision of
intellectual property protection or prizes to
enhance inventor benefits or the provision of
tax breaks or other mechanisms to offset private
costs of research—in some senses substitutes for
direct government spending on research. They
also include institutions to encourage collective
action by producers such as the use of commodity
levies with matching government grants—with
levy-based funding serving in some senses as a
complement for government spending.

Enhancing Individual Incentives
Protecting Intellectual Property. The private
and public roles in agricultural R&D hinge largely,
but not exclusively, on the degree to which the
benefits from R&D are appropriable, and, relatedly,
the distribution of the benefits. The nature and
degree of property rights surrounding agricultural
innovations determine these appropriability
aspects and, thereby, the incentives to invent
and the consequences of those inventions. Thus
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to the benefits to the greatest extent possible.22
This can be accomplished by choosing funding
arrangements that reflect the geographic focus and
the commodity orientation of the research. Thus,
different agricultural R&D programs and projects
may call for different funding arrangements—for
instance, at the state, national, or multinational
level or using different mechanisms. However,
a more complete accounting of social costs and
benefits should allow for economies of size, scale,
and scope in research (e.g., see Jin, Rozelle, Alston,
and Huang 2005) and various types of political
costs, administrative costs, and transaction
costs associated with having different research
organizations with overlapping jurisdictions. This
more complete accounting is likely to imply a
smaller economic number of different funding
arrangements than would be implied otherwise.
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the pace and focus of biological innovation in
agriculture (and related industries), who pays
for the R&D and how much, and, ultimately, the
incidence of the costs and benefits of the research,
are all affected by the form of the property
protection afforded the results of the R&D.
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A longstanding policy response to the “access
versus appropriability” dilemma (which at its crux
involves balancing access for the use of innovations
in ways that reveal knowledge that can stimulate
further invention, while conferring some degree
of monopoly rights which generate revenue
streams that reward successful innovation) has
been to enact and enforce a system of property
protection in the form of patents for certain types
of inventions: the first patent act was passed in the
United States in 1790, and patent systems were
instituted even earlier elsewhere, especially in
Europe (Huffman and Evenson 1993). Governmentsanctioned property protection over living things
is a much more recent phenomenon.
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National efforts to protect the intellectual property
of biological innovations are increasingly being
shaped and circumscribed by internationally
agreed laws and conventions. Some of these
international initiatives (e.g., the 1993 Convention
on Biological Diversity) seem to be driven more by
concerns about the equitable distribution of the
benefits from biological inventions (both in space
and time—i.e., within the current population
and across generations) than by concerns about
concepts of economic efficiency implicit in much
of the earlier policy responses to this problem:
there are widespread perceptions that “northern”
firms (i.e., farmers or agribusiness concerns in
richer countries) are benefiting at the expense
of “southern” farmers (i.e., poor farmers in lessdeveloped countries) from the unregulated use of
“southern” germplasm in breeding new varieties
that are sold commercially under the protection
of national systems of property rights. Other
changes in property-rights regimes are related
to broader efforts to strengthen property-rights
regulations, which form part of the package of
internationally agreed policies that underpin the
trading arrangements enforced by the World Trade
Organization. Indeed, the Marrakesh agreement
signed by 131 countries to date, which was part of
the Uruguay Round GATT/WTO trade negotiations

that came into force in January 1995, essentially
committed all developed countries to have a
functioning system of property protection for all
types of inventions, including biological inventions,
within one year (i.e., typically by 1996). Developing
countries had by 2000 to become compliant with
the agreement, and least-developed countries
had until 2006 to enact such legislation. For
product patents such as pharmaceutical patents,
developing countries were not required to provide
product patent protection until 2005. However,
on June 2002, the Council for TRIPS adopted a
decision that extended the deadline for leastdeveloped countries to apply provisions pertaining
to pharmaceutical patents until 2016.
Many of the details regarding the property-rights
policies and laws covering biological innovations
are far from settled, and if past history is any guide,
will continue to evolve as political, economic, and
scientific circumstances dictate. These details may
vary markedly in their economic effects. Specifically,
the form of the property protection may have
significant efficiency as well as equity effects, with
important consequences for the structure of the
R&D market in terms of the research that gets done
and who does it.
Varietal Royalties. Royalty payments to plant
breeders for the right to use new crop varieties serve
as a specific institutional form to implement and
enforce property rights over varietal innovations.
Thus property rights provide an incentive to invest
in innovation. In certain settings they also serve as
a practical means for breeders to extract payment
for their innovative effort. It is a longstanding and
generally accepted practice in agriculture the
world over to charge for the technical changes
embodied in mechanical and chemical inputs. In
contrast it is much less common to charge seed
users (i.e., farmers) for new crop varieties. Partly this
is because of historical precedent, where much of
the crop-related R&D worldwide was funded from
the public purse. Partly it reflects long-standing
seed-saving and sharing practices by farmers that
make it difficult for crop breeders to realize a return
on their inventive effort, absent effective legal
policies and practices.
Those crop royalty schemes already in place
vary markedly in their details. These details

The passing of the 1964 Plant Varieties and Seeds
Act in the United Kingdom means that only
distinct varieties approved for National Listing
can legally be sold in that country. At the point
of seed sale these new varieties incur a royalty
payment, collected by the British Society of Plant
Breeders acting on behalf of crop breeders. The
1964 legislation was amended under European
law in 1994 to bring the United Kingdom (and
other European counties) into line with the 1991
changes to the Plant Breeders Rights protocols
agreed by member countries of the International
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV). These changes mean that in the
United Kingdom, farmer-saved as well as certified
seed is now subject to a royalty payment, although
farmer-saved seed incurs a smaller royalty rate than
certified seed and the royalty applies only to saved
seed of the most recent varieties (BSPB n.d.).
A variant of this scheme is the technologyuse fee charged by multinational agricultural
biotechnology companies for the use of seeds
that incorporate certain biotechnology traits (such
as resistance to corn borer or corn root worm or
herbicide tolerance). Typically the technologyuse agreement allows for the one time use of the
saved seed (thereby ruling out the legal use of
saved seed subject to these conditions of sale).
Compliance rates with these technology use
agreements appear to be high in some countries
such as the United States or Australia but have
proved problematic in countries, such as Argentina
and Brazil, particularly for non-hybrid crops such
as soybeans where seed saving and re-use is a
practical and economic option (GAO 2000).
With the two schemes just described, farmers
incur royalties at the point of seed sale. The 2002
passage of the Plant Breeders Rights Amendment
Bill paved the way for an end-point royalty scheme
in Australia. In this instance, based on a license
agreement signed when they purchase the seed,

farmers make a varietal declaration at the point
of grain delivery (not point of seed sale) and
pay a royalty rate based on the tonnage of grain
sold. In any given year, grain that is consumed
on farm for stockfeed (but not grain retained
for future planting) is also subject to end-point
royalties (AWB 2007). Farmers are precluded from
commercial or “over-the-fence” sales. They are also
held responsible for maintaining accurate accounts
of the disposition of their production, and these
records (and point-of grain-sale declarations) are
subject to independent, contracted audit. The end
point royalties cover the costs of administering the
scheme incurred by grain handlers and a general
goods and services tax (GST), plus the innovator
rents—typically, 80 percent of the royalty passes
back to the crop breeders, with any third-party
equity in the R&D undertaking being paid out of
the crop breeders’ share. End-point royalty rates
are set by the crop breeders and vary markedly
by crop and by variety (Table 5). Kingwell (2005)
observed that rates set by public plant breeding
organizations are generally lower than those set by
private firms. Higher rates may be more in line with
the Australian Government’s Competitive Principles
Agreement, which dictates that no government
business should enjoy any competitive advantage
simply as a result of its public-sector ownership.24
Farmers’ compliance rates with the Australian end
point royalty scheme are estimated at around 80
percent (Wright and Pardey 2006).25 For those crops
(or sub sectors) in those jurisdictions where the
bulk of the crop is consumed on the farm where
it is grown, or where the plant breeders’ rights
that underpin this payment system are lacking
or ineffective, it is doubtful that such a payment
system would be viable. However, farmers in
developing countries may be willing to support
such a scheme when it proves economic to do so,
just as they have been willing to pay for hybrid
corn and other productivity enhancing inputs.

24 Kingwell (2005) noted that an A$8/mt royalty rate for an
AgSeed Limited canola variety constituted less than 2 percent
of the corresponding grain sales (valued at farm gate prices).
Castillo, Parker and Zilberman (2000) observed that average
royalty rates as a percent of sales for analogous R&D intensive
output in engineering was around 6.3 percent and between 6.3
to 9.4 percent for a range of medical materials and services.
25 Enright (2007) reported that in 2005/6 nearly 50 percent of
the Australian wheat crop was sown to varieties subject to end
point royalties.
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may well have significant long-run implications
concerning who conducts and who pays for cropimprovement R&D, the types of crop technologies
that are emphasized, and the uptake and use of
crop varietal innovations. A brief look at some of
the existing schemes illustrates the diversity of
institutions.
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Table 5: End-Point Royalty (EPR) Rates for Australian Crop Varieties, 2007/08
Crop/Class

Variety Names

Wheat (Durum)
Wheat (Durum)
Wheat (Winter)
Wheat
Wheat
Wheat
Wheat
Wheat
Wheat
Wheat

Arrivato
Jandaroi
EGA Wedgetail
Sentinel
Rees
Bowerbird
Drysdale
EGA Hume
Kukri and Lorikeet
Goldmark,Chara,Lang,
Silverstar, Yitipi,
and Petrie
Anlace and Mira
Buloke, Fitzroy
and Grout
Baudin
Possum
Nafice
Rupali and Sonali
Yorker and Flipper
Moti
Tiara
Jindalee
Kaspa
Nuru
Manafest

Wheat
Barley
Barley (Feed)
Oat
Chickpea
Chickpea
Chickpea
Chickpea
Lentil
Narrow Leaf Lupin
Field Pea
Faba Bean
Faba Bean

Breeder Royalty

Management Fee

GSTa

Total EPR

(A$ per mt)
2.50
2.00
1.00
1.40
1.05
0.70
0.70
0.70
0.65
0.55

(A$ per mt)
0.50
0.50
0.45
0.40
0.45
0.30
0.30
0.30
0.35
0.45

(A$ per mt)
0.30
0.25
0.15
0.18
0.15
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10

(A$ per mt)
3.30
2.75
1.60
1.98
1.65
1.10
1.10
1.10
1.10
1.10

0.50
1.50

0.50
0.50

0.10
0.20

1.10
2.20

1.00
1.20
6.00
3.00
2.40
2.00
5.00
0.95
1.70
2.40
1.75

0.50
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.60
0.50
3.00
0.30
0.30
0.60
1.25

0.15
0.17
0.65
0.35
0.30
0.25
0.80
0.13
0.20
0.30
0.30

1.65
1.87
7.15
3.85
3.30
2.75
8.80
1.38
2.20
3.30
3.30

Source: Developed by Pardey from information reported in AWB (2007).
Note: Includes royalty rates on AWB Limited seed varieties for the 2007/2008 harvest period. “Mt” designated metric tons.
a

A goods and services tax that became operational in July 2000. It is a value added tax levied on most goods and services sold in
Australia.
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The advantage of an end-point royalty scheme is
that varietal developers and farmers share in the
yield risk associated with adopting the improved
varieties. If the crop fails because of drought or
hail or other factors, no royalty is paid. An upfront
payment scheme means that farmers bear all
the risk.
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Prizes. Where property rights to invention cannot
be made effective, or where doing so would be
counterproductive (because the resulting price
distortions and disincentives for adoption would
be too expensive), inventors could be offered
prizes for invention as an inducement to invest.
Such institutions have a long and interesting
history (e.g., see Wright 1983 and other papers
cited therein). In recent years variations on these
concepts have been proposed with particular
relevance for research related to staple food crops

in less-developed countries (e.g., Masters 2003 and
2005; Kremer and Zwane 2005).
Tax Breaks. A number of countries have tried tax
concessions for private research (for instance, in the
form of expensing current R&D costs at rates greater
than 100 percent, or accelerated depreciation of
R&D capital costs); a form of joint-venture, public
and private funding of research. It is generally a
blunt instrument. It is difficult to minimize the
transfer effect, wherein (foregone) taxpayer funds
merely substitute for private R&D investments
that otherwise would have taken place. More
specifically, it is difficult to design tax concessions
that discriminate closely among alternative forms
of research (i.e., additional investments in on
going lines of research by existing firms versus
investments in new research by existing firms
versus new, start-up firms; or more strategic kinds

Facilitating Collective Action
Commodity Levies. When research benefits are
contained entirely within an industry, a natural
option is to develop an institutional arrangement
to enable the industry raise its own research
funds. When such options are possible there is less
justification for the use of public funds to support
R&D. Nevertheless there may still be significant
roles for the government to play—for a start,
dealing with what research gets done. Where
research costs and benefits are industry-specific,
there may seem to be no good reason not to leave
the question of research topics to the relevant
industry; but there may be still problems of intraindustry distribution of benefits and costs and
spillovers that lead to distortions in the allocation
of industry-based research funds (e.g., see Alston
2002; Alston, Freebairn and James 2003). And,
once other (extra-industry) spillovers are present
or there are other sources of a mismatch between
industry and national optima, there are additional
reasons for government involvement—possibly
both in supplementing the funding and directing
the R&D effort (e.g., see Alston, Freebairn and
James 2004).
When the government gives producers the
statutory authority to set up an institution such as
a U.S. Marketing Order (e.g., see Carman and Alston
2005) or an Australian Research and Development
Corporation, with powers to collect a levy or tax
from producers to be used to fund research (e.g.,
see Alston and Pardey 1999b), the problems of
non-excludability and non-rivalry are ameliorated.
A greater use of levy funding could enhance

economic efficiency in three ways. First, industry
funding is a potential complement to other
sources of funds which, as a practical matter, are
likely to continue to leave total funding inadequate
from the viewpoint of both the industry and the
nation (in terms of the economically efficient
total investment). Second, from the point of view
of raising funds in the least-cost way, commodity
levies are likely to be a relatively efficient (and fair)
tax base. Third, in relation to allocating the funds
efficiently, industry funding arrangements can be
organized to provide incentives for efficient use of
levy funds and other research resources.
Incentives for industry to adopt a levy-based
funding arrangement may be enhanced by
an appropriate system of intellectual property
protection. Intellectual property rights are
applicable or enforceable only for certain types
of inventions, and come at the cost that privately
optimal prices may exceed socially optimal prices.
Commodity-specific levy arrangements are most
applicable for commodity-specific R&D of a
relatively applied nature. In those cases where the
fruits of invention are only partially appropriable, a
case can be made for partial support from general
government revenues through subsidies or
matching grants in conjunction with commodity
levies, as used in the Australian R&D corporations.
Matching Grants. Government could encourage
a greater use of such funds for agricultural R&D
by providing matching (or more than matching)
support for programs funded using industry
levies. When a combination of industry levy funds
and general revenues is used to finance public or
privately executed R&D, there is a clear case for
government involvement in the administration,
management, and allocation of those funds to
ensure that the public interest is adequately
considered. It is important to understand that
industry levy funding is not to be regarded solely
as a producer “self-help” arrangement in which
producers collectively fund research on their own
behalf and to serve their own ends. Consumers
and taxpayers are also affected, and they too have
a legitimate interest in such enterprises.
When spillovers from industry-funded research flow
beyond the industry to the general community, the
situation is likely to be more complicated. In the
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of R&D with more spillover potential versus applied
research) or among providers of research (e.g., local
versus foreign firms). A blunt tax concession aimed
at stimulating new research done locally could
simply cause research funds being used elsewhere
to be diverted to take advantage of the local tax
breaks (Industry Commission 1995). On the other
hand, while tax-breaks involve some transactions
costs (in terms of the paperwork involved, auditing
costs, and the like) it is a funding approach that is
comparatively inexpensive to administer, at least
in those places (e.g., many developed countries)
where the tax system is well-equipped for such
purposes.
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case where research results exhibit classic “public
good” characteristics—that is, both non-rivalry and
non-excludability are severe—then the research
should be publicly funded, although it may still be
efficient for it to be provided under contract by the
private sector. In this situation it is not possible to
devise a way of extracting finance from a section
of the community, such as farmers, that is optimal
in the sense that problems of non-excludability
and non-rivalry are overcome. However, when a
significant proportion of the benefits accrue to an
industry, that is when the research has both public
and (collective) private good characteristics, it is
appropriate to fund the research from both public
and private sources.
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Questions arise about whose objectives will
determine the setting of the levy and the allocation
of the resources, and what is the appropriate rate
of matching government grant. Alston, Freebairn
and James (2003, 2004) analyzed the factors
that influence the rate of matching support
appropriate to give a producer board incentives
that would be compatible with the interests of the
nation. They showed that there are no simple rules,
even in a relatively stylized setting; but even so
in many cases a simple rule such as 1:1 matching
would be likely to result in enhanced economic
efficiency compared with zero matching support.
In practice, arrangements of this type are more
likely to be embraced by the industry if producers
have the major say in setting the research agenda
and if the rate of matching government support is
higher. At the same time, the greater is the rate of
matching government support, the more likely is
the government to want to set the agenda.
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Other complications arise when we recognize
that within any group of producers interests
will vary because the applicability of research
findings will vary. The distribution of benefits and
costs among producers within a collective action
program may present obstacles to fairness and
efficiency that have implications for both the
amount of funding raised and the allocation of the
funds among alternatives (Alston 2002 discusses
some of these factors). Because some research
has both public and private good components,
the underinvestment may also be “relative” in the
sense that the mix of research may be skewed. The
difficulty is to devise a mechanism by which public

and private efficiency criteria are simultaneously
satisfied. In short, designing a completely fair
and efficient commodity levy arrangement for
financing research is not simple, and perhaps
this helps to understand the limited use of these
arrangements in most countries in the past.26
These drawbacks notwithstanding, a small but
increasing number of countries have adopted
such arrangements for financing and conducting
agricultural research, and in some places they are
used extensively—notably Australia and Uruguay.
Other places appear to be showing some interest
in increasing their use of this option—for instance
Canada and California—as a way of buttressing
an otherwise stagnant or shrinking supply of
public agricultural research funds. For the most
part, however, these policies are little used in lessdeveloped countries. Less-developed countries
might most stand to gain from adopting levybased research funding methods given (a) the
small amount and high opportunity cost of general
government funding, (b) the limited interest of
the private sector, and (c) the reduced prospects
of applicable agricultural technological spillovers
from developed countries, compared with the past.
But the question is more complicated, since many
of the relevant commodities are staples, consumed
to a great extent within the household that
produced them and thus not traded in markets.
Thus there may be significant practical, political,
and economic reasons (including transaction
costs) that militate against the use of levy-based
funding for research for at least some commodities
produced in developing countries.

Resource Allocation Mechanisms
As noted above, resource allocation is to some
extent tied to funding mechanisms, though there
is always some choice about how to allocate the
resources raised by any particular mechanism.
The institutional arrangements used to apportion
research funds among different researchexecuting agencies often result in research

26 Such arrangements are used much more extensively
in most countries as a mechanism for financing commodity
promotion programs than agricultural R&D. A likely explanation
for this fact is that effective generic promotion programs tend
to enhance demand faced by all producers and immediately,
whereas research takes longer and only adopters benefit.

Roles for Economizing. Some would say that in
most countries the system has worked very well
(claiming that high reported rates of return testify
to that) and, by implication, that we should not
spoil a good thing. There is some truth to that view.
The public-sector agricultural R&D system has
achieved a great deal and it would be undesirable
to change it in ways that would diminish its
capacity to contribute to the economy in future.
By the same token, the fact that it has done well
in the past does not mean that it could not have
done better. Moreover, having succeeded in the
past does not guarantee continued future success.
The rapidly changing economic environments
in which national agricultural research systems
find themselves, including changed research
technology and research opportunities, are also
relevant in this regard. Things that worked in the
past may not work in the future.
Allocating scarce research resources is an economic
problem. In practice, too little use is made of
economic analysis, economic incentives, and the
economic way of thinking about problems. Rather,
systems typically emphasize politics and processes,
the inputs side, and pay scant attention to actual
performance, the outputs side. In most countries,
there is a notable lack of any systematic attempt
to undertake meaningful economic evaluations of
agricultural research investments as an integral part
of the resource-allocation process. Resources are
mostly allocated according to ad hoc approaches
that may simply serve to ratify prior prejudices.
Funding Forms. A related issue is how the funding
should be provided. The possibilities include gifts,
which are funds provided with no particular strings
attached, and include certain kinds of block grants;
more-specific grants, which entail some general
commitments by the researchers; and contracts,
which entail specific obligations. In recent years in
many NARSs and in the international agricultural
research system we have seen moves towards

proportionately greater use of contracts and grants,
and a reduction of gifts (i.e., formula funding).
Competitive grants have a great deal to recommend
them as a way of allocating public-sector research
resources. However, competing for grants is hard
work and expensive, and if competitive grants are to
deliver the promised benefits of greater allocative
efficiency, they have to be allocated according
to efficiency criteria. A poorly administered and
corrupt system of competitive grants could easily
be worse than an inflexible system of block grants
or funding according to some formula, unrelated
to past or prospective performance. Managed
competition has been proposed as a way of
making science and scientists more responsive
to changing public research priorities which may,
in turn, enable an expansion of (or stave off a
contraction of ) available funds. Some (e.g., Just
and Huffman 1992; Huffman and Just 1994) have
argued that the transactions costs involved in
competitive grants programs—in terms of the
costs to individual scientists of preparing proposals,
and reporting to granting bodies, and the costs of
evaluating the proposals and deciding which ones
to support—are so high that the programs cannot
be economic. That charge could be correct; but
relevant alternatives must be compared, and on a
comparable footing.
Costs to Consider. Every method of allocating
research resources involves four types of costs: (a)
information costs (the costs of obtaining relevant
information on the benefits from different types of
R&D projects, on which to base decisions); (b) other
transactions costs (the costs of applying for grants,
managing them, and administering them); (c)
opportunity costs of inefficient resource allocation,
because research resources are not being used
in the projects and programs with the highest
social payoff; and (d) rent-seeking costs (costs of
resources being spent wastefully attempting to
cause a redistribution of grant resources). Different
research resource allocation processes will involve
different amounts of particular types of costs. For
instance, through the proposal process, competitive
grants generate information about research
alternatives for decision makers. Although they
may lower the cost of certain types of information,
they also involve relatively high transactions costs.
They might also involve relatively high rent-seeking
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resource allocations that are not based on strong
economic foundations. High measured rates of
return notwithstanding, a sizable share of the
potential benefits from the agricultural research
enterprise may have been wasted in inefficient
resource allocation.
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costs (for instance, scientists do lobby for support).
However, these additional costs may be justified
if competitive grants lead to a lower overall social
cost because they reduce the (opportunity) cost
of resource misallocation. On the other hand,
formula funds involve relatively high resource
misallocation costs, which tend to get higher the
longer a formula stays fixed (since circumstances
change), and relatively low transactions costs. This
is not to say the transactions costs are zero, or that
rent-seeking costs are zero with formula funds
(there is a fair bit of bureaucracy associated with
the administration of the funds; the formulas do
or, at least, may change from time to time; some
resources are spent simply to preserve the status
quo). Earmarked funds may involve the greatest
rent-seeking and resource distortion costs, but
they may also involve relatively small transactions
costs. In short, the full costs should be considered
when comparing research resource allocation
procedures.
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A middle ground is likely to be best for many
situations: enough competition to ensure a vigorous
and adaptable research program, that exploits
optimally the available information on scientific
opportunity and economic implications; enough
security and confidence in future funding so the
scientists will take appropriate risks, pursuing longterm opportunities; not too much cost in terms of
the time scientists spend in drafting proposals,
justifying expenditures, and reporting results; not
too narrow minded so that curiosity and flair are
stifled. Such a Goldilockian optimum, with every
element just right, may be hard to achieve. Part of
the solution is likely to involve relatively long-term
funding of particular people, or research teams,
rather than particular projects, based on their past
performance more than their promises about the
future, perhaps especially for the more basic types
of scientific work. Competition can be effective as
a resource allocation and incentive mechanism
without requiring a morass of planning processes
and committees, which to some represent the
antithesis of competition.

3. STATE OF SCIENCES
FOR AGRICULTURE
In 2000, about $732 billion (international) dollars
was spent on all the sciences worldwide (Pardey,
Dehmer and el Fekki 2007).27 This represented
about 1.7 percent of global GDP in that year,
and double the inflation adjusted total of $362
billion two decades ago. High-income countries
did the preponderance (i.e., 78.5 percent) of
this research, although R&D directed toward
agriculture—recognizing that much other research
in basic biology, health, (bio-)informatics and
other disciplines, for example, also has relevance
for agriculture—constituted a small share (1.8
percent) of their total research expenditure.28
Among developing countries, most of the total
R&D (63.3 percent in 2000) was concentrated in
just three countries—China, India, and Brazil. In
contrast, these countries accounted for only 20.9
percent of the developing country total in 1980.
Contrary to rich-country trends where agricultural
R&D is a declining share of total R&D, the average
share of agricultural R&D relative to all science
spending in developing countries increased
from 6.9 percent in 1980 to 9.6 percent in 2000.29
However, the intensity of investment in agricultural
R&D of the biggest developing-countries—China,
India, and Brazil—actually dropped over this
period, from 12.4 to 7.4 percent, pointing to a
sustained trend among the more technologically
advanced developing economies in the world to
invest a greater share of R&D resources in areas
other than agriculture.
27 This figure includes the total spending by public and private
entities across all areas of science (i.e., including agricultural,
medical, and engineering R&D, information technology sciences,
social sciences, and so on).
28 Food and health outcomes are inextricably intertwined
through nutrition, but in some important cases the agriculturehuman health linkages are even more immediate. See Box 4 for a
contemporary example.
29 According to Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006)
in 2000 high-income countries spent $574.0 billion (international
dollars) on R&D in total, of which $22.3 billion was spent on public
and private agricultural research. In the same year developing
countries spent $157.0 billion on R&D in total of which $13.7
billion was spent on agricultural R&D.

Public Agricultural Research Investments

developing country R&D investment total between
1981 and 2000 (Pardey et al. 2006).

Worldwide, public investment in agricultural R&D
Paralleling spending patterns for all the sciences,
increased by 51 percent in inflation-adjusted
agricultural R&D has become increasingly
terms between 1981 and 2000 from an estimated
concentrated in a handful of countries. Just four
$15.2 billion to $23 billion in 2000 international
countries (the United States, Japan, France, and
dollars (Table 6). It grew faster in less-developed
countries, and the developing world
now accounts for more than half of
Figure 10: Global Public Agricultural R&D Investment,
global public-sector spending, though
2000
still substantially less than half the
world’s total (i.e., public and private)
West Asia
Sub-Saharan
& North Africa
agricultural R&D spending (Figure 10).
Africa
6.0%

The Asia and Pacific region has
continued to gain ground, accounting
for an ever-larger share of the
developing country total since 1981.
In 2000, two countries from this
region, China and India, accounted for
39.1 percent of all developing country
expenditure on public agricultural
R&D, a substantial increase from
their 22.9 percent combined share in
1981. In stark contrast, sub-Saharan
Africa continued to lose market share,
falling from 17.3 to 11.4 percent of the

6.3%

China
13.7%
India
8.1%

Developed
Countries
44.3%

Other Asia
& Pacific
10.9%

Brazil
4.4%

Other Latin America
& Caribbean
6.2%

Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006).
Notes: Data are reported in international dollars based on purchasing
power parity conversions of local currency units in 2000 prices.

Table 6: Total Public Agricultural Research Expenditures by Region, 1981, 1991 and 2000

1991

2000

Asia & Pacific (28)
China
India
Latin America & Caribbean (27)
Brazil
Sub-Saharan Africa (44)
West Asia & North Africa (18)
Subtotal, Developing countries (117)

(million 2000 international dollars)
3,047
4,847
7,523
1,049
1,733
3,150
533
1,004
1,858
1,897
2,107
2,454
690
1,000
1,020
1,196
1,365
1,461
764
1,139
1,382
6,904
9,459
12,819

Japan
USA
Subtotal, high income countries (22)

1,832
2,533
8,293

2,182
3,216
10,534

15,197

19,992

Total (139)

Shares in global total
1981

1991

2000

20.0
6.9
3.5
12.5
4.5
7.9
5.0
45.4

(percentage)
24.2
8.7
5.0
10.5
5.0
6.8
5.7
47.3

32.7
13.7
8.1
10.7
4.4
6.3
6.0
55.7

1,658
3,828
10,191

12.1
16.7
54.6

10.9
16.1
52.7

7.2
16.6
44.3

23,010

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006).
Notes: These estimates exclude East Europe and former Soviet Union countries. To form these regional totals we scaled up
national spending estimates for countries that represented 79 percent of the reported sub-Saharan African total, 89 percent of the
Asia and Pacific total, 86 percent of the Latin America and Caribbean total, 57 percent of the West Asia and North Africa total, and
84 percent of the high-income total. Data construction standards conform to guidelines presented in OECD (1993).
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Agricultural R&D spending
1981
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Box 4: Avian Influenza—Linking Agriculture, Human Health and R&D

by John McDermott, Christine Jost and Jeffrey Mariner, International Livestock Research
Institute (ILRI)
The emerging threat of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) has captured the world’s attention,
not least because of concerns that this animal disease could spark a global influenza pandemic in
humans on the scale of the 1918 “Spanish Flu” pandemic—an influenza A strain (H1N1) that was
believed to infect one third of the world’s population (about 500 million people) and resulted in an
estimated 50-100 million deaths.1
The natural hosts of avian influenza viruses are water fowl. These viruses can evolve rapidly and
become adapted to other hosts such as pigs and human beings. Influenza viruses vary widely in their
ability to cause disease (pathogenicity). The H5N1 strain currently circulating in poultry in Africa
and Asia is able to kill poultry in a matter of hours and more than 50 percent of confirmed human
infections result in death.2 Fortunately, the disease is largely confined to birds and transmission to
humans is rare. As yet, no sustained chains of human transmission have been detected. However,
each human infection raises the chance of the virus becoming adapted for human-to-human
transmission—the key event that could spark a global pandemic with potentially high fatality rates.
Major funding has been mobilized to control the disease in poultry and reduce the risk of the virus
becoming adapted for human transmission. This is a major paradigm shift from previous pandemic
influenza preparedness planning (Martinot et al. 2007). The immediate and real impact of H5N1
avian influenza has been on the livelihoods and incomes of poultry keepers, market agents and
consumers in a number of developing countries. Critical control points along poultry production and
marketing chains will have highest risks for transmission of H5N1 virus to new hosts, whether birds
or people, and are key points for integrated veterinary and public health surveillance systems.
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H5N1 avian influenza was first detected in Hong Kong in 1997, although it likely emerged some time
before in southern China (Morris and Jackson 2006). The disease was reported sporadically in China
and Vietnam until 2003 then spread first across Southeast Asia—during which time Indonesia, Viet
Nam and Thailand became endemic—and then further to Southern Asia, Europe and eventually
into Africa. H5N1 was first confirmed in Nigeria in January 2006, eventually spreading to a total of
nine countries in West and East Africa and leading to persistent foci in Egypt and West Africa (FAO
2007).
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Addressing the risks of HPAI requires a range of new science and technology skills from molecular
biology through to modeling and risk assessment. Genetic characterization of virus isolates is
providing knowledge about changes in circulating viruses. This kind of research has been well funded
as HPAI early warning systems depend on knowing what genes or genetic markers may be used in
predicting a virus’s pathogenicity in poultry, ability to infect humans, and potential for human-to
human transmission. These tools also contribute to the race to formulate new vaccines that can
protect human and bird populations against evolving viral strains. Such efforts bring together the
combined skills and experience of the international public and private sector biomedical research
establishments and their associated health science funding sources. The harvesting of virus strains

1 This influenza strain was believed to spread initially from rural Kansas to France and then to the rest of Europe, followed
by two much more virulent waves that spread globally in the fall and winter of 1918-19. For more comprehensive information
on the biology, epidemiology, and policy aspect of this and other infectious diseases (including detailed information on avian
influenza) see the Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy at the University of Minnesota (www.cidrap.umn.edu).
2 As of June 2007, the World Health Organization (www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/) reported 313
confirmed cases of which 191 resulted in death. One hundred of the cases were in Indonesia, 93 in Viet Nam, and 36 in
Egypt.

Box 4 (continued)

for genetic analysis and vaccine development has raised critical issues of intellectual property rights
related to the origins of different viral strains, and how such rights might be controlled.
Given variations in the transmission and impact of avian influenza in different developing-country
settings, applications of technology to assess and manage risks are critical. To be useful, there
needs to be improved integration of disease control and eradication strategies that highlight the
synergies between epidemiological and diagnostic technologies and their application in a broader
socio-economic, market and production system context. Moreover, for many developing countries,
greater understanding of the interactions between different production and marketing systems
in the transmission and distribution of disease is required both to control disease and to develop
sustainable incentive mechanisms to promote compliance with control efforts.
For example, China has managed its daunting avian influenza control challenge by up-scaling
vaccine production and delivery in its massive domestic chicken and duck populations to an
unprecedented level. Alternatively, Thailand has focused its efforts on strategies to eradicate
the disease, particularly adjacent to its commercial export sector, and to restructure its export
industry from exporting chilled to cooked poultry products. In Indonesia, efforts are focused on
building participatory capacity to identify and contain disease outbreaks using the approach of
participatory disease surveillance (Mariner et al. 2003). Control challenges in different settings
require local solutions based on analyses of market chains and production systems, disease
transmission dynamics, control capacities, and culturally-defined values. A greater understanding
of incentives—both market and livelihood-based—for compliance with disease control measures
is critical.
Avian influenza has constantly challenged the international community with unexpected twists and
turns. Initially, the challenge of H5N1 avian influenza was approached through calls for rapid mass
action to contain the disease. Countries were asked to absorb significant amounts of funding and
carry out short-term interventions. In some locations, this approach was partially successful, or at
least reduced risk while critical capacity and improved control programs were developed. However,
as the global epidemic in poultry has evolved, the emphasis is shifting to building local capacity
that is able to deal with emerging disease threats in a more sustainable manner, such as approaches
that are better at ensuring food security, enhancing food safety and protecting public health. The
case of H5N1 avian influenza illustrates that human and animal health, as well as the health of the
developed and developing worlds, are deeply intertwined. There are no quick fixes. Agricultural
research and development as well as research on agricultural institutions and processes have direct
consequences for human health and well-being across the globe.
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Germany) accounted for 66 percent
of the public R&D conducted by
developed countries in 2000; about the
same as two decades before. Similarly,
just five developing countries (China,
India, Brazil, Thailand and South
Africa) undertook just over 53 percent
of the developing countries’ public
agricultural R&D in 2000, up from 40
percent in 1981. Meanwhile, in 2000, a
total of 80 countries with a combined
population of approximately 625
million people conducted only 6.3
percent of total agricultural R&D
(Table 7).

Table 7: Concentration of Public Expenditures in
Agricultural Research and Development, 1995 and 2000
2000
1995
Top 5
Top 10
Bottom 80

49.5
64.6
8.9

2000

GDP

Population

(percentages)
51.3
48.9
66.3
57.5
9.50
6.6

47.6
51.9
12.6

Source: Authors’ estimates based on ASTI data.

The patterns of spending growth are uneven (Figure
11). Notably, the more recent rates of increase in
inflation-adjusted spending for all developing

regions of the world failed to match the rapid
ramping up of public agricultural R&D spending
that Pardey and Beintema (2001) reported for the
1970s. The growth in spending for the Asia and
Pacific region as a whole rebounded in the late
1990s from the slower growth rates observed for

Figure 11: Public Agricultural R&D Spending Trends
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Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006).
Notes: Inflation-adjusted growth rates calculated as weighted regional averages, using the least-squares method, as described by
the World Bank (2006, 305).

Overall investments in agricultural R&D in subSaharan Africa grew by less than 1 percent per
annum during the 1990s, the continuation of a
longer-term slowdown (Figure 11) (Beintema and
Stads 2004). Even more concerning is the fact that
of the 27 African countries for which national total
estimates are available, approximately 50 percent
spent less on agricultural R&D in 2000 than in
1991 (Beintema and Stads 2004).
A notable feature of the trends was the contraction
in support for public agricultural R&D among
developed countries. Although spending in the
United States increased in the latter half of the
1990s, albeit slower than in preceding decades,30
public R&D was massively reduced in Japan
(and also, to a lesser degree, in several European
countries) towards the end of the 1990s, leading to
a decline in developed country spending as a whole
for the decade. The more recent data reinforce
the longer-term trends observed earlier. Namely,
support for publicly performed agricultural R&D
among developed countries is being scaled back,
or at best is slowing down. In part, this points
to a shifting emphasis from public to privately
performed agricultural R&D, but also to a shift in
government spending priorities.
Inevitably, this will affect productivity prospects in
agriculture for the countries in question. Pardey,
Alston and Piggott (2006) suggest a more subtle
and arguably more important consequence is
that a slowdown or cutback in developed-country
spending will curtail the future spillover of ideas and

30 According to Alston et al. (2007) the rate of growth in U.S.
public agricultural R&D spending rebounded some in the 2000
2004 period, but at rates well below the long-run, post-World War
II average.

new technologies from developed to developing
countries. Developed-developing country linkages
will be even more attenuated as the funding trends
proceed in parallel with other policy and market
developments. These include strengthening IPRs
and biosafety regulations, and, most significantly,
a reorientation of developed country R&D agendas
away from productivity gains in food staples
towards concerns for the environmental effects
of agriculture and food quality, as well as the
medical, energy, and industrial uses of agricultural
commodities.31 With developed countries as a
group still accounting for 44 percent of public
agricultural R&D worldwide (and nearly 80 percent
of all science spending) the consequences of a
continuation of these funding, policy, and market
trends is likely to be particularly pronounced in
terms of the productivity-enhancing effects on
food staples.
In addition to these broad trends, other aspects
of agricultural R&D funding that have important
practical consequences are also of concern. For
example, variability in R&D funding continues to be
problematic for many developing country research
agencies. This is especially troubling for agricultural
R&D given the long gestation period for new crop
varieties and livestock breeds, and the desirability
of long-term employment assurances for scientists
and other staff (Pardey, Alston and Piggott 2006).
Variability encourages an over-emphasis on
short-term projects or on projects with short lags
between investment and outcomes, and adoption.
It also discourages specialisation of scientists and
other resources in areas of work where sustained
funding may be uncertain, even when these areas
have high pay-off potentials.

Public Agricultural R&D Intensities
Turning now from absolute to relative measures
of R&D investments, developed countries as a
group spent $2.36 on public agricultural R&D for

31 For example, Alston et al. (2007) report that only 58.7
percent of the $3,207 million of R&D conducted by the U.S. State
Agricultural Experiment Stations (SAES) in 2004 was directly
related to enhancing farm productivity, compared with 68.9
percent in 1975. Environmental (including forest- and fish-related)
R&D has now grown to 14.1 percent of total SAES spending, basic
crop and livestock genomic research accounted for an additional
4.5 percent and post-farm (including food processing) research
was 10.8 percent of the 2004 total.
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the 1980s. This was especially so in China and India
during the 1996 to 2000 period, in both instances
reflecting government policies to revitalise public
R&D and improve its commercialisation prospects,
including linkages with the private sector (Fan et
al. 2006; Pal and Byerlee 2006). Spending growth
throughout the Latin American region as a whole
was more robust during the 1990s than the 1980s,
although the recovery was more fragile and less
certain for some countries in the region (such as
Brazil, where spending contracted at the close of
the 1990s).
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every $100 of agricultural output in 2000: a sizable
increase over the $1.41 spent per $100 of output
two decades earlier, but slightly down from the
1991 estimate of $2.38 (Figure 12). This longerterm rise in R&D intensity in developed countries
starkly contrasts with the group of developing
countries where there was no measurable
growth in the intensity of agricultural R&D (in this
case, agricultural R&D spending expressed as a
percentage of agricultural gross domestic product,
AgGDP). In 2000, developing countries spent
just $0.53 on agricultural R&D for every $100 of
agricultural output.
At first glance the rise in developed country
intensity ratios and the stagnating R&D intensities
for developing countries appears to misrepresent
the trends in spending, which showed that the

growth in investments in agricultural R&D in
developing countries significantly outpaced
the corresponding growth in investments in
agricultural R&D in developed countries (i.e., 3.13
percent per year vs. 2.11 percent per year from
1981-2000). Delving deeper, agricultural output
grew much faster in aggregate for developing
versus developed countries over the previous
several decades, so that the faster growth in
aggregate agricultural R&D spending among
developing countries had, nonetheless, barely kept
pace with the corresponding growth in output.
In addition, more than half of the developed
countries, for which data were available, had
higher R&D intensity ratios in 2000 than 1981.
The majority of rich countries spent in excess of
$2.50 on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of
AgGDP. Only 10 of the 26 countries in sub-Saharan

Figure 12: Intensity of Public Agricultural R&D
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Source: Calculated by Pardey and Beintema based on Agricultural Science and Technology Indicators (ASTI) initiative data.
Agricultural GDP data are from World Bank (2005b).
Note: The intensity ratios measure total public agricultural R&D spending as a percentage of agricultural output agricultural GDP.
The developing-country category includes countries that also constitute regional totals.

Africa in the sample for which longer-run data were
available had higher intensity ratios in 2000 than in
1981, while most countries in the Asian and Latin
American sample increased their intensity ratios
from 1981 to 2000 (9 out 11 Asian countries and 8
out of 11 Latin American countries).
Other research intensity ratios are also
revealing. Developed countries spent $692 per
agricultural worker in 2000, more than double
the corresponding 1981 ratio, while developing
countries spent just $10 per agricultural worker in
2000, an increase of less than 50 percent over the
1981 figure (Table 8). These developed-developing
country differences are, perhaps, not too surprising.
A much smaller share of the developed country
workforce was employed in agriculture, and the
absolute number of agricultural workers declined
more rapidly in developed countries than it did in
the developing ones.
While only some segments of society are directly
involved in agriculture as producers, everyone
consumes
agricultural
outputs,
therefore
agricultural R&D spending per capita is instructive.
For developed countries, spending per capita rose
substantially from 1981 to 1991 (a continuation of
earlier trends documented by Pardey and Beintema
2001), but declined thereafter so that spending
per capita in 2000 had slipped well below 1991
levels. This developed country reversal was driven
mainly by developments in Japan, although only
half the developed countries continued to increase

their per capita spending on agricultural R&D
throughout the 1990s.
Per capita spending rates were much lower among
developing compared with developed countries:
typically less than $3 per capita for developing
countries (especially those in Africa) whereas 59
percent of the developed countries invested more
than $10 per capita in 2000. Nonetheless, and
in contrast to the group of developed countries,
spending per capita for the group of developing
countries continued to rise; from $2.09 per capita
in 1981 to $2.72 in 2000. The outliers to this general
trend are sub-Saharan Africa, where agricultural
R&D spending per capita has continued to decline
since 1981, and Latin America, where spending
per capita declined from $5.43 in 1981 to $4.94 in
1991, and $4.96 in 2000.

Private Agricultural R&D Investments
In agriculture, in particular, it is difficult for
individuals to fully appropriate the returns from
their R&D investments, and it is widely held that
some government action is warranted to ensure an
adequate investment in R&D (Pardey, Alston and
Piggott 2006). The private sector has continued
to emphasise inventions that are amenable
to various intellectual property (IP) protection
options such as patents, and more recently, plant
breeders’ rights and other forms of IP protection.
Private investments in agricultural R&D, similar

Table 8: Alternative Public Agricultural Research Intensities, 1981, 1991, and 2000
Agricultural R&D spending (2000 international dollars)

Region/grouping
Asia—Pacific
Latin America and the Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
Developing-country subtotal
High-income country subtotal
Total

1981

1991

2000

1981

1991

1.31

1.73

2.35

3.84

5.23

7.57

5.43
3.14
3.24
2.09
10.91

4.94
2.69
3.63
2.34
13.04

4.96
2.28
3.66
2.72
11.92

45.10
9.79
19.15
6.91
316.52

50.54
9.04
27.30
8.14
528.30

60.11
8.22
30.24
10.19
691.63

3.75

4.12

4.13

14.83

16.92

18.08

Source: Pardey and Beintema's estimates based on ASTI data.
Note: See Table 6.
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to investments in all forms of R&D, are motivated
and sustained by the returns to innovation reaped
from the investment. IP policies and practices are
but one dimension of the incentive to innovate.
Important other dimensions include potential
market size and the cost of servicing the market,
which in turn are dependent on the state of
communication and transportation infrastructure,
farm structure and size, and farm income. So too
is the pattern of food consumption. As incomes
rise, a larger share of food expenditure goes to
food processing, convenience and other attributes
of food, areas where significant shares of private
agricultural R&D effort are directed.
The private sector has a large presence in
agricultural R&D, but with dramatic differences
between developed and developing countries
and among countries. In 2000, the global total
spending on agricultural R&D (including pre-, on-,
and post-farm oriented R&D) was $36.3 billion.
Approximately 37 percent was conducted by
private firms, and the remaining 63 percent by
public agencies. Notably, 93 percent of that private
R&D was performed in developed counties, where
some 54 percent of the agricultural R&D was
private, well up on the 44 percent private share
of 1981 (Table 9). This rich-country trend may well
continue if the science of agriculture increasingly
looks like the sciences more generally. In the United
States, for example, the private sector conducted
nearly 52 percent of agricultural R&D in 2000,
compared with 72 percent of all R&D expenditures
in that same year (NSF 2005). These increasing
private shares reflected increasing industry R&D

by the farm-input supply and, especially, the food
processing sectors. Around the general trend was
much country-specific variation. According to data
underlying Pardey et al. (2006), Japan conducted
slightly more of its agricultural R&D in the private
sector than the United States whereas Australia
and Canada—both reliant on privately developed,
technology-intensive imports of farm machinery,
chemicals and other agricultural inputs—had
private-sector shares of agricultural R&D spending
less than 25 percent in 2000.
In developing countries, only 6.2 percent of the
agricultural R&D was private, and there were large
disparities in the private share among regions
of the developing world. In the Asia and Pacific
region, around 8 percent of the agricultural R&D
was private, compared with only 2 percent of the
R&D throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The majority
of private agricultural R&D in sub-Saharan Africa
was oriented to crop-improvement research, often
(but not always) dealing with export crops such as
cotton in Zambia and Madagascar and sugarcane
in Sudan and Uganda. Almost two thirds of the
private agricultural R&D performed throughout
the whole region was carried out in South Africa.
The rich/poor country disparity in the intensity
of agricultural research noted in Figure 12 is
magnified dramatically if private research is also
factored in (Figure 13). In 2000, in developing
countries as a group the ratio of total agricultural
R&D spending to agricultural output (specifically
AgGDP) was 0.57 percent (i.e., for every $100 of
agricultural GDP, 57 cents was spent on agricultural
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Table 9: Estimated Global and Private Agricultural R&D Investments, Circa 2000
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Expenditures
(million 2000 international dollars)

Shares
(percent)

Public

Private

Total

Public

Private

Asia-Pacific
Latin America and the Caribbean
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
Developing-country subtotal
High-income country subtotal

7,523
2,454
1,461
1,382
12,819
10,191

663
124
26
50
862
12,086

8,186
2,578
1,486
1,432
13,682
22,277

91.9
95.2
98.3
96.5
93.7
45.7

8.1
4.8
1.7
3.5
6.3
54.3

Total

23,010

12,948

35,958

64.0

36.0

Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006).

Figure 13: Public, Private, and Total Agricultural R&D Intensities, circa 2000
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Source: Pardey, Beintema, Dehmer, and Wood (2006).

R&D) compared with an intensity ratio of 5.16
percent for developed countries—a rich-to-poor
country ratio in intensities of 8.7:1, compared with
a 4.8:1 ratio if just public research spending were
considered.

Rich vs Poor Countries—A Growing
Scientific and Knowledge Divide
Collectively these data point to a disturbing
development—a growing divide regarding the
conduct of (agricultural) R&D—and, most likely,
a consequent growing technological divide in
agriculture. Only a select few developing countries
show signs of closing in on the higher amounts and
higher intensity of investment in agricultural R&D
typically found in the rich countries. Meanwhile,
large numbers of developing countries are either
stalling or slipping in terms of the amount spent
on agricultural R&D, the intensity of investment,
or both.

Table 10 makes more concrete the nature of that
divide through a comparison of Africa (a region
consisting of 42 contiguous countries plus 6
island nations) and America (a nation of 50 states,
48 of them contiguous). The agricultural areas
in both parts of the world are similar, but African
agriculture uses far fewer hectares per worker
than in the United States. Moreover, land and
labor are still dominant components of the cost
of production in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas in
America the combined cost share of these two
inputs fell considerably during the past 50 years at
least. Purchased inputs now constitute 38 percent
of the total cost of production in U.S. agriculture,
compared with 23 percent in 1949.
Not only is the structure of agriculture dramatically
different, so too is the structure of agricultural
R&D. Africa has almost 30 percent more public
agricultural researchers than America, but the
training of these researchers continues to lag well
behind that of those in the United States (and well
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Notes: The intensity ratios measure total public and private agricultural R&D spending as a percent of agricultural output
(agricultural GDP).
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behind those researchers working
elsewhere in the developing world).
African public agricultural research
agencies are heavily skewed to the
small end of the size distribution,
with three quarters of these agencies
employing fewer than 20 researchers,
whereas almost all the public agencies
in the United States employ more
than 100 researchers. Moreover,
the lion’s share of public research in
the United States is now performed
by universities, while the average
university share in Africa is less than 20
percent.32 Crucially, real spending per
researcher in the United States is more
than four times the spending of their
African counterparts. And the gap is
growing. The long-run trend continues
to show an increase in spending per
scientist in the United States while
inflation-adjusted spending in Africa
has shrunk to less than half what is was
in 1981.

Table 10: America vs Africa, 2000

Agricultural (arable) area (mill ha)
Ag land/labor ratio
(ha per worker)
Land and labor cost shares
a

Number of public agencies
Total pblic FTEs
Share of FTEs with PhDs

Share of agencies < 200 fte
Share of agencies > 100 fte
Total public expendituresa
University share of public

America

Africa

175.5

181.5

141

5.6

45%

80%

51

390

9,368

12,224

100%

25%

4%

76%

96%

3.5%

$3,465 mil

$1,085 mil

78.2%

19.3%

$4,167 mil

$30 mil

54.6%

2.6%

$369,910

$88,590

Public only

2.65%

0.72%

Public and Private

5.84%

0.73%

Total private expendituresa
Private share
a

Spending per FTE

Agricultural research intensity
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Source: Compiled by Pardey from data underlying Beintema and Stads
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These measures suggest the immensity,
(2004) Pardey et al. (2006), and Alston et al. (2007).
if not the outright impossibility, of
a
Data refers to agricultural research spending and agencies.
playing catch-up, and the consequent
need to transmit knowledge across
borders and continents. The measures
International Agricultural R&D
also underscore the need to raise current levels
of funding for agricultural R&D throughout the
In the mid-1940s, programs of internationally
region while also developing the policy and
conceived and funded agricultural research
infrastructure needed to accelerate the rate of
were launched in an effort to overcome the
knowledge creation and accumulation in Africa
biases against the development and diffusion
over the long haul. Developing local capacity to
of agricultural technologies among developing
carry forward findings will yield a double dividend:
countries. Through the 1950s, these programs
increasing local innovative capacities while also
expanded as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations
enhancing the ability of African science to tap
placed agricultural staff in less-developed
discoveries made elsewhere.33 Not least, this calls
countries to work alongside scientists in national
for increasing investments in primary, secondary,
research organizations on joint-venture research.
and higher education, which is essential if the
These efforts became the model for subsequent
generation and accumulation of knowledge is to
programs in international agricultural research, as
gain the momentum required, putting economies
they evolved into the International Rice Research
on a path to lift people out of poverty.
Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines in 1960 and the
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
(CIMMYT) in Mexico in 1967. Hoping to show that
32 Notably, government agencies accounted for over half the
the model of international agricultural research
publicly performed agricultural R&D in the United States through
could achieve success in broad agroecological
to the mid-1900s, but the university share has grown steadily in
the decades since then.
regions as well as specific commodities, other
international centers were established in Nigeria
33 Section 4 deals with these aspects in more detail.

While the CG system has captured the attention
of the international agricultural R&D and aid
communities, through the impact of its scientific
achievements and through its pivotal role in the
Green Revolution, it has spent only a small fraction
of the global agricultural R&D investment.35 In
2000, the CG system represented 1.5 percent
of the $23 billion (2000 prices) global publicsector investment in agricultural R&D and just
0.9 percent of all public and private spending on
agricultural R&D.
Figure 14 plots the nominal and real (that is,
adjusted for inflation) values of total expenditures

34 Here the “CGIAR system” is used to denote the CGIAR itself
and the international centers it funds. In his definitive history of the
first 15 years of the CGIAR, and its antecedent operations, Baum
(1986) left little doubt that the main impetus for the CGIAR was
a collective funding instrument. In chapter 2, titled “Mobilizing
the Aid Community, 1969-71,” of his book, Baum describes the
landmark Bellagio Conference of April 1969—the oft described
institutional genesis of the CGIAR—as “… a golden opportunity
to bring the work of the international institutes before the heads
of aid agencies that were potential financing partners (p. 28).”
He continued “… Later in the discussion, Robert S. McNamara,
president of the World Bank, mentioned the possibility of forming
a consultative group or consortium for fund raising, and John
Hannah of USAID promptly seconded the idea… (p.30).
35 The CGIAR funded centers are not the only organizations
doing agricultural R&D for developing countries. Two large French
agencies engaged in tropical agricultural research are the Centre
de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour
le Développement (CIRAD), established in 1984 from a merger of
various French institutes operating mainly in Africa, many since
the 1940s, and the Institut de Recherche pour le Développement
(IRD), formerly Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique
Outre-mer, (ORSTOM). In 2005 CIRAD was structured around
seven research departments: annual crops; tree crops; fruit and
horticultural crops; animal production and veterinary medicine;
forestry; territories, environment and people; and advanced
methods for innovation in science. It employed 1,820 people,
including 1,050 senior staff members, and had an operating
budget of 200 million euros (CIRAD 2006). In 2005, IRD’s activities
were clustered into six programs: natural hazards, climate and
non-renewable resources; sustainable management of Southern
ecosystems; continental and coastal waters; food security in the
South; public health and health policy; and globalization and
development. It had a total budget of 195.2 million euros and
employed 2,256 staff, of which 43 percent were located outside
mainland France (IRD 2006).

by the CGIAR system. After an initial expenditure
of $7.4 million in 1960, total spending rose to
$1.3 million per year in 1965. By 1970, the four
founding centers—IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and CIAT—
were allocated a total of $14.8 million annually.
The progressive expansion of the total number of
centers, and the funding per center, during the
next decade involved a tenfold increase in nominal
spending, to $141 million in 1980. During the
1980s, spending continued to grow, more than
doubling in nominal terms to reach $305 million
in 1990. The rate of growth had slowed but was
still impressive. In the 1990s, however, although
the number of centers grew—from 13 to 18 at one
point, but now 15—funding did not grow enough
to maintain the level of spending per center, let
alone the growth rates.
Since 2000, funding has grown in total to $450
million in 2006, but with a continuing trend
toward earmarked support for specific projects
and programs of research involving multiple
centers and other research providers outside the
CG system. In fact the period after 1983 was one
of a continuing decline in the share of unrestricted
funds—down to 43 percent of the total in 2005
compared with a 1980s average of 80 percent (and
a 1970s average of 88.3 percent for the precursor
centers of the CG system).
The rationale for government intervention in the
private provision of agricultural R&D is market
failure: individuals will under-invest, hoping that
they may free-ride on the efforts of others. In an
international context, countries play the roles
of individuals to some extent. Any one country
may under-invest in R&D if the results could
be adopted and applied elsewhere so that the
investing country could capture only a fraction of
the benefits from investing in invention. In relation
to R&D applicable to less-developed countries,
both domestic and international market failures
of these types have led to a major persistent gap
between the socially desirable rates of investment
in agricultural R&D and actual investments.
The efficiency rationale for the CG system is to
overcome, to some extent at least, the underinvestment problem. The humanitarian rationale
is to help the food-poor. The real reason why the
CGIAR exists as it does combines elements of
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(the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture,
IITA) in 1967 and Colombia (the International Center
for Tropical Agriculture, CIAT) in 1968. The further
development of international agricultural research
centers took place largely under the auspices of
a collective funding instrument known as the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR, or CG for short), established in
1971 as bilateral and multilateral donors bought
into the model.34
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Figure 14: Nominal and Real Expenditure of CGIAR-Supported Centers
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Source: Compiled by Pardey from CGIAR Annual Financial Reports and unpublished financial data provided by CGIAR System
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these two rationales, with the effects of some selfserving motives of certain donors adding further
complications. In order to be effective in achieving
any of these objectives the CG, given its relatively
small resource base, should focus on the areas in
which the market failures are greatest and where it
has a comparative advantage relative to public and
private research in the NARSs.
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In its first three decades, the CG system made its
mark. The primary focus was on cereal crops, in
an adaptation of the pre-existing centers founded
privately. Many of the more tangible effects of the
CG system are still those that can be identified most
clearly with the first four centers. The progressive,
dramatic expansion of the CG system over the years
involved the addition of a further nine centers in the
1970s and more in the 1990s. Funding per center
grew initially, but more recently competition for
funds among centers became more pronounced.
The total funding has become more uncertain in a
number of ways. And, of the total funding, a much
greater proportion is now provided in the much

less secure, and less flexible, form of restricted
or project funding. Like the U.S. agricultural R&D
system, the CG system is becoming more subject
to earmarking by those who fund it. In addition,
with expansion of the number of centers and the
broadening mandate, the management of the CG
system has progressively become more complex,
top-heavy, administratively burdensome, and
expensive, notwithstanding some recent attempts
to streamline operations.
With the rise in the number of centers, the
mandates of the system have changed, and the
emphasis has shifted away from crop productivity
toward the newer areas that have also risen in
prominence in the national agricultural research
systems of richer countries—emphasizing things
such as sustainability, nutrition, and income
distribution, at the expense of productivity.
The comparative advantage of the CG system
does not appear to have been a major criterion

Alston, Dehmer and Pardey (2006) suggest it is time
to rethink international approaches to agricultural
R&D, both because of the changes that have taken
place within the CG system and the changing
context in which it will have to operate. Richcountry NARSs are changing how they do business
in ways that will have important implications for
the types of technologies that will be available for
the poor countries. Poor country NARSs will have
to change what they do, accordingly, and clearly
so will the international agricultural research
centers (IARCs). The potential role of international
cooperative ventures such as the CG system is
likely to be even greater than in the past, but this is
happening at a time when the CG system is losing
ground.
To re-energize the CG system it may have to
be re-engineered. Such re-engineering could
contemplate a narrower constitution of the system,
a different set of mandates for the IARCs that the
CG supports, and different modes of operation,
but would retain the concept of multinational
collective action—including charitable support
from the richer countries—to provide agricultural

36 See Alston, Dehmer and Pardey (2006), for a more complete
elaboration of this point and others raised in this and the
subsequent paragraph.

R&D for poor countries.37 It is important to define
clearly the limits of the role of the CGIAR and to
understand the links between the CG system and
other institutions. Universities and other public
elements of national agricultural research systems,
and, perhaps, increasingly, private for-profit and
private nonprofit enterprises are engaging in
myriad collective R&D efforts.
More concretely, one option is to refocus the CGIAR
on its original core concept—that is, a collective
funding instrument for internationally conceived
and conducted agricultural R&D. Arguably, the
transactions costs of collectively financing an entire
system of centers in which more than half the funds
are now earmarked by donors may exceed the
benefits (at least to some if not many of the centers,
their scientists, and the developing-country clients
they serve). A reassertion of the independence of
the IARCs, but, perhaps, with a subset of funding
for IARC research being pooled and subject to
CGIAR oversight funding, could free up the IARCs
to pursue different forms of engagement with
different agencies—be they research funders,
research partners, or technology delivery agents—
that best suit the circumstances.38 In particular, the
notion of a “CG-wide” budget is now, in essence,
a fiction. In fact, the critical details of much of
that budget are already set bilaterally between
donors (or groups of donors) and the IARCs
(either individually or in groups, and increasingly
with other research providers). Throwing off the
remaining vestiges of the “CG member approved”
agenda or budget formulation processes is likely
to foster innumerable institutional innovations
that are presently stymied by the consensual and,
in certain key aspects, inflexible decision-making
structures that still persist in the CGIAR system.39

37 In 2006, the developing countries collectively contributed
$15 million (3.3 percent) to the overall funding of the CGIAR
system (CGIAR Secretariat 2007).
38 In his history of the CGIAR, Baum (1986, p.310) observed
that “... it is useful to distinguish between the activities of the
IARCs and those of the CGIAR itself.” Over time, this distinction
has become blurred, if not lost to many.
39 A sampling of some of the newer forms of collective action
regarding R&D is described in Section 2.3. Some CGIAR-supported
centers are engaged in some of these undertakings, but much
more institutional innovation seems possible, and present CG
governance structures and administrative requirements appear
to impede rather than facilitate the necessary institutional
experimentation.
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in more recent decision-making.36 An apparent
abundance of research resources may have led
to a perception that there was no opportunity
cost to accommodating the newer political
agendas in the system. This perception was clearly
wrong. As noted above, similar patterns have
been apparent in the agricultural R&D systems
of the world more generally, perhaps for similar
reasons. The consequence has been a reduction
in the resources available for the more-traditional,
productivity-enhancing investments. Thus, over
time, the priorities of the CGIAR have shifted in
the same direction as the rich country agendas
for agricultural R&D—that is, towards “luxury”
goods such as safer, higher-quality food and
enhanced environmental amenities—which the
poorest people of the world might not choose
to emphasize at the expense of the availability of
food and the ability to pay for it.
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A looser federation of IARCs could also be the means
to substantially reduce the significant transactions
costs currently being incurred by the various
centralized CG priority setting, accountability and
administrative functions. Retaining sufficient,
perhaps collectively-administered, core funding
is likely to be critical, for a number of reasons, not
least as a means for ensuring the right share of
longer-term, more risky, scale sensitive, and less
site-specific R&D is retained in the international
agricultural research portfolio. Centralized
provision of some multi-center services may persist,
but with the latter ideally provided on a fee-bid
basis. These multi-center services might include
such things as collective financial reporting, shared
communication and information services, joint
representation at international funding agencies
and fora, and occasional, perhaps biennial or
triennial, joint scientific meetings.

4. TECHNOLOGICAL
DISTANCE, SPILLOVERS, AND
KNOWLEDGE STOCKS
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R&D spillovers across disciplines (or fields of inquiry
more generally construed), institutions (e.g., public
vs private), economic sectors, agroecologies and
countries are pervasive but poorly understood. In
a geographic (or geo-political) sense, R&D spillins
entail the local adoption of new knowledge and
technologies developed in other countries or
other regions. Analyses of agricultural productivity
gains have shown that spillins are a major source
of productivity gains, accounting for up to half
of local productivity increases. The potential for
technological “spillovers” is difficult to quantify, but
may be approximated by measures of similarity
among countries or regions.
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Because agricultural production is especially
dependent on natural resources and climatic
conditions (i.e., suitability of particular crops or
production practices), the degree of agro-ecological
similarity can facilitate or limit the degree to which
spillins can be exploited. Countries that share agro
ecological characteristics are likely to have high
potential for spillovers—i.e., technologies or crop
varieties developed in one country may be readily
adopted in the other. Similarly, spillins would tend
to flow more readily among countries that produce

similar crop mixes. In contrast, technological
spillovers will be limited among countries that are
technologically distant, or dissimilar in their agro
ecological characteristics or production patterns. In
the section to follow we present new metrics of the
agricultural technology distance among countries
and regions of the world as a means of refining our
understanding of research spillover potentials.

Measuring International Spillover Potential
Since there are numerous agro-ecological zones
and numerous agricultural commodities, either
type of similarity is multi-dimensional and requires
a measure more complex than a simple correlation
coefficient that compares just one dimension
against another. Jaffe (1986, 1989) developed a
measure he called the “angular separation of the
vectors,” which is adapted for this study. Following
Jaffe’s approach, we define for each country or
region i a vector fi = (fi1, fi2, … fiM), where fik is the share
of attribute k in country or region i. In measuring
the similarity of agro-ecological resources, fik is the
share of cultivated land in agro-ecological zone k in
country i. In measuring the similarity of agricultural
production, fik is the value share of agricultural
output k for country i. By definition, the shares
sum to one over all attributes. The vector fi locates
each country i in M-dimensional space, and Jaffe’s
measure of the technological distance between
countries i and j is equal to the cosine of the angle
between the two vectors. More formally, Jaffe’s
measure is calculated as:
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Like a correlation coefficient, ωij varies between 0
(indicating no similarity) and 1 (indicating perfect
similarity), and is symmetric (i.e., ωij = ωij).
To make the idea behind this distance metric
concrete, consider three countries whose only
agricultural outputs are wheat and milk. The value
shares of wheat and milk for the three countries
are plotted in panel a of Figure 15. Clearly, country
a specializes in milk production, while country
b produces a more balanced mix and country
c specializes in the production of wheat. Jaffe’s

Figure 15: Illustrative Example of Jaffe’s Angular Separation of Vectors
Panel a. Value Shares for Three Hypothetical Countries

Panel b. Cosine as a Function of the Angle of Separation
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Technological Distance by Income
We present measures of similarity for the
distribution of land among 26 agro-ecological
zones (AEZs) and for the distribution of agricultural
production value among 185 outputs (averaged
over the 2002-2004 period).40 Calculations are
based on a data set including 156 countries—31
high-income countries, 47 African countries, and
78 low- or middle-income countries in other parts
of the world. In addition to country-to-country
comparisons, countries are also aggregated using
different rules so that region-to-region similarities
could be assessed. Patterns in the measures
of technological distance reveal potential for
spillovers as well as some particular challenges

40 The commodity value shares were developed by the authors
using quantity data taken from FAO (2006) and unpublished
average world prices denominated in 2000 international prices
obtained from FAO.

that Africa and other low-income regions face in
exploiting spillover potential.
Table 11 shows the ωij values for regions aggregated
on the basis of income. Two important patterns are
revealed. First, in every case, there is more similarity
among regions in their agricultural production
than in their agro-ecological resources. This is true
in most cases, whether pairs of countries or regions
were considered, and regardless of how countries
are aggregated. The second notable pattern is the
dissimilarity in both dimensions between lowincome countries and those with higher incomes.
Low- to high-income regions share very little in
terms of agro-ecological characteristics, with an
ω AEZ
LowInc,HighInc of just 0.06. Agricultural production
is more similar ( ω AgProd
LowInc,HighInc = 0.38), but is still the
least similar pair in Table 11. The low-income region
is more similar in both dimensions to the uppermiddle income region, and even more so to the
lower-middle income region. This lack of similarity
with the high-income countries highlights the
difficulty one would expect low-income regions to
encounter in exploiting spillins.
Since around two-thirds of the world’s agricultural
R&D is conducted in high-income countries, it
is instructive to look at the similarities between
individual countries and that aggregate. For
each country i there are 31 country-to-country
ωij measures (where j indexes the 31 countries
classified as high income). Taking an average of
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measure is the cosine of the angles between the
vectors representing the input mixes. Panel b of
Figure 15 shows the cosine function as the degrees
in an angle increases. Over the relevant range
of angles (0 to 90, since all value shares must be
positive), cosine varies between 1 and 0, where the
wider the angle, the more dissimilar are the input
mixes and the closer the cosine is to zero. Jaffe’s
formula applies the same idea to M dimensions.
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country i’s 31 country-to-country ωijs
Table 11: Measures of Similarity in Agro-Ecological
would give equal weight to each,
Zones and Agricultural Output Between Regions
regardless of the size or agricultural
Defined by Income
importance of country j. On the other
Upper- Lowerhand, forming an aggregate of the 31
High
Low
Middle Middle
high-income countries and calculating
High
Zone
1.00
the ωij between that aggregate and
Output
1.00
individual countries yields a ωi,HighInc
Upper-Middle
Zone
0.81
1.00
value that is larger than an average of
the 31 country-to-country ωijs (since
Output
0.95
1.00
by construction, the high-income
Lower-Middle
Zone
0.56
0.69
1.00
aggregate will be more diverse than
Output
0.74
0.71
1.00
each of the 31 countries). In order to
Low
Zone
0.06
0.13
0.44
1.00
avoid systematically overstating the
Output
0.38
0.38
0.64
1.00
similarity between individual countries
and the high-income aggregate while
Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations.
giving each country-to-country ωij
appropriate weight, we constructed
a weighted average of ωij. For each
country j in the high-income category,
combined. For example, approximately 60 percent
ωij is assigned a weight equal to country j’s share
of cultivated land area has an ω AEZ
i,HighInc less than or
of agricultural R&D spending in rich countries. The
equal to 0.10, and less than 20 percent has ω AEZ
i,HighInc
weighted ωijs are then summed over j. The result
greater than 0.40. The green and orange lines
is a composite index of country i’s similarity with
show separate distributions for African and nontechnology-producing rich countries.
African countries. Not only do the average ω AEZ
i,HighInc
values differ between Africa and the rest of the
Figure 16 shows ag-producing areas overlaid with
world, but the distributions differ substantially
a color code to show each country’s composite
as well. Specifically, all agricultural land in Africa
index of similarity with high-income countries.
has an ω AEZ
i,HighInc less than 0.20, while less than half
Panel a maps the ω AEZ
index.
The
closer
the
i,HighInc
of the agricultural land in the rest of the world
color is to pink, the more technologically distant
is so technologically distant from high-income
is the country from the high-income aggregate in
countries.
terms of agro-ecology. African countries are among
the most agro-ecologically distant from the highPanel b shows the averages and cumulative
income region. Panel b is constructed similarly
distribution of technological distance as measured
using an output based measure of similarity in
by similarity in agricultural output mixes. Once
agricultural production. Here, we see that many
again, African countries are, on average, less similar
more countries are similar in their production to
to high-income countries (average ω AgProd
i,HighInc of
the high-income aggregate (dark red shading), but
0.30 in Africa, compared with 0.50 in non-African
that Africa and parts of Southeast Asia are the least
countries, and 0.44 for all countries combined).
similar.
In addition, the cumulative distribution of the
value of agricultural production by technological
Another way of looking at the technological
distance is very different for Africa than for the rest
distance from high-income regions is shown in
of the world. For instance, half of the agricultural
Figure 17. Panel a includes the average value of
production value in Africa is produced in countries
ω AEZ
i,HighInc across all countries in the data set (0.19),
with ω AgProd
i,HighInc less than or equal to 0.40, compared
African countries (0.02), and non-African countries
with only 23 percent of agricultural value in the
(0.27). It also shows the cumulative distribution
rest of the world.
of land with respect to the agro-ecological
similarity with high-income countries. The solid
blue line shows the distribution for all countries

Figure 16: Technological Distance from High-Income Countries
Panel a: Technological Distance Measured by Agro-Ecological Zones
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Technological Distance within Africa
The substantial differences between African
countries and high-income countries make
it difficult to exploit technological spillovers.
Heterogeneity among countries within Africa
compounds the problem. Table 12 shows regionto-region ωijs for regions of Africa. As in Table
11, there is more similarity in production than

agro-ecology. The differences in agro-ecological
resources are startling. For instance, countries in
the Northern region of Africa are more similar to
the non-African world than to other regions in
Africa. Even within the Southern region, there is
a great deal of variation. When comparing South
Africa to other countries in Africa, the ω AEZ
for
ij
agro-ecological zones is only 0.17, just slightly
higher than the ω AEZ
between South Africa and
ij
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outside the extent of agricultural areas
no data
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Figure 17: Cumulative Distribution Functions for Technological Distance from High-Income
Aggregate
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Table 12: Measures of Similarity in Agro-Ecological Zones and Agricultural Output Between
Regions of Africa and the Rest of the World
North
North

West

East

South w/o
S. Africa
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South Africa
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South
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Zone
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Output

1.00

West

Zone
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Figure 18: Technological Distance Within Africa and
Across the Atlantic
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Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations.
R&D in sub-Saharan Africa. However
the technological distances among
countries within the continent
suggests that geographic proximity
improvement research, which is intrinsically
may not necessarily translate into spillover
cumulative by nature—for example, today’s crop
potential, and so regional cooperative agreements
breeders stand firmly on the shoulders of the
may not be the most efficient way to capitalize
scientists and farmers who bred the improved
on spillovers. A closer look at South Africa, often
crop varieties of yesteryear. Here, we examine the
considered a potential engine of innovation within
knowledge stock of Africa while incorporating
(Southern) Africa, is instructive. Table 12 shows
spillins into the stock calculations. The intensity
that South Africa shares little in common with
of the knowledge stock, calculated as the stock
other African countries. Figure 18 shows the ωijs
of knowledge divided by agricultural GDP, is
for agro-ecological zone (on horizontal axis) and
compared to that of the United States under several
agricultural output (on vertical axis) for all possible
assumptions. Knowledge stocks are formed first by
combinations of South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia, and
compiling public spending on agricultural R&D
Mexico. Looking at the three points that include
each year from 1956 to 2000 for all countries in the
South Africa, it is clear that South Africa is more
data set.41 Spending over time is accumulated into
similar in both dimensions to Mexico than it is to
stocks of productive knowledge stemming from
either Ethiopia or Kenya. In fact, of all countries
science by assuming a lag structure where the
in the data set, South Africa is the most similar to
value of a dollar spent increases over twelve years,
Mexico in terms of its agricultural production (and
when it reaches its full value (i.e., until innovations
to Iran in its agro-ecology). Ethiopia and Kenya
are adopted), and then decreases over time (i.e.,
are also similar to Mexico, but are more similar to
as past innovations are gradually replaced), until it
each other in their agro-ecology. These types of
reaches zero (i.e., innovations are obsolete).42 Each
relationships may suggest where to focus efforts to
country’s stock was calculated, and spillins to Africa
identify and capitalize on technological spillovers.

Local and Spill-in Stocks of
Agricultural Knowledge
The benefits from agricultural R&D accrue as
research investments, and the new know-how
and innovations they make possible, accumulate
over time. This is especially so for crop and animal

41 Actual spending data are not available prior to 1981 (and
less data are available for some countries), so in order to backcast,
the ratio of R&D spending to agricultural GDP is calculated for each
year. R&D spending is approximated by holding the spending
intensity equal to the average value over the five earliest years
of spending data, and multiplying by agricultural GDP for the
relevant year. Since agricultural GDP was only available as early
as 1961, spending levels for 1956 through 1960 were assumed to
equal those for 1961.
42 Drawing on the work by Alston et al. (2007) for their study
of returns to U.S. investments in agricultural R&D we modeled this
lag structure using a gamma distribution.
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the non-African world ( ω AEZ
SouthAfrica,ROW
= 0.14). Although the ωijs are larger for
agricultural production, they are still
fairly small, with five of the six ω AgProd
ij
values less than 0.60.
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political tension and war or where researchers
have comparatively less training and less spending
per scientist (such as Africa), we would expect the
generation and accumulation of knowledge to be
less efficient.43 Assuming these efficiencies in SubSaharan Africa are half those of the United States,
the resulting intensities of productive knowledge
stocks are shown in the second line of Table 13.
Africa’s own-knowledge stock intensity decreases
by roughly half, doubling the U.S. intensity relative
to Africa. Applying the same scaling to all regions
and recalculating spillins, both knowledge stock
intensities decrease. However, because the majority
of the U.S. spillins originate from the relatively

and the United States were found by multiplying
AEZ
each country j’s stock by ω AEZ
Africa, j or ω U.S., j so
that spillins are determined by the technological
distance between the country where spending
occurs and the country where spillins are realized.
The first row of Table 13 shows the knowledge stock
intensities in this base scenario. Ignoring spillins,
the U.S. stock of agricultural knowledge for 2000
from public R&D spending was approximately 89
percent of its agricultural GDP. In contrast, Africa’s
own-knowledge stock was only 24 percent of its
agricultural GDP. Even with knowledge stocks
normalized to adjust for the size of their respective
agricultural sectors (measured by output value), the
United States has a knowledge stock that is nearly
four times that of Africa. Accounting for spillins
exacerbates the difference. Spillins increase both
intensities, but the U.S. intensity increases more
when spillins are included, causing its intensity to
increase to over four times that of Africa.

43 A meta-analysis conducted by Alston et al. (2000) identified
over 1,700 estimates of the rate of return to different types of
agricultural research conducted in different parts of the world.
The average estimate of the rate of return for research conducted
in developed countries was 98.2 percent, while the average
measured rate of return for research conducted in Africa was
49.6 percent (i.e., just 50.5 percent of the average for developed
countries). One option (as done here) is to use these average rateof-return-relativities as indicators of regional differences in the
efficiency of knowledge generation and accumulation. However,
when doing so one should bear in mind that Alston et al. (2000)
found low signal to noise ratios in these rate of return estimates
(and so comparatively little confidence can be placed in any one
estimate or the idea that these statistical averages are indicative
of the overall rate of return in a given region). Moreover, the
efficiency with which R&D is transformed into knowledge stocks
is unlikely to be simply related to the rate of return to R&D.

The accumulation of knowledge depends not only
on the total amount of research spending, but
also on a host of institutional factors, such as the
stability of research budgets and communication
infrastructure (Pardey et al. 2006). In areas rife with

Table 13: Knowledge-Stock Intensities for U.S. and Africa
Own Knowledge Stock
Intensity
U.S.

Africa

(percentage)

U.S. /
Africaa
(ratio)

Total Knowledge Stock
Intensity
U.S.

Africa

(percentage)

U.S. /
Africaa
(ratio)
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Public R&D Spending only

66

Assuming all countries accumulate
knowledge with same efficiency

89

24

3.76

273

60

4.55

Assuming countries accumulate knowledge
in proportion to rates of returnb

89

12

7.44

266

38

7.08

Assuming all countries accumulate
knowledge with same efficiency

200

24

8.22

578

69

8.41

Assuming countries accumulate knowledge
in proportion to rates of return

200

12

16.28

570

45

12.57

Public and Private R&D Spendingc

Source: James, Pardey and Wood's calculations.
a

U.S. / Africa ratios are calculated as the U.S. knowledge stock intensity divided by Africa’s knowledge stock intensity.

b

Rates of return for regions are averages taken from the meta-analysis conducted by Alston, et al. (2000).

c

To approximate private spending, knowledge stocks for 2000 were increased using the shares of public/private spending for
2000 (included elsewhere in this report).

Accounting for R&D spending from private sources
adds another dimension to the knowledge stock
intensities. As shown in Table 7 of this report,
public R&D spending accounted for only 44.8
percent of agricultural R&D spending in developed
countries in 2000, while it accounted for nearly
all (98 percent) of African R&D spending. In the
last two lines of Table 13, the knowledge stocks
are scaled up to reflect total (public and private)
R&D spending, assuming the shares of public and
private spending for 2000 were constant over the
time when the knowledge stock was accumulated.
Not surprisingly, incorporating private spending
amplifies the difference between United States
and African knowledge stocks, roughly doubling
the relative U.S./Africa knowledge stock intensity
to 8.41 (accounting for spillins). Adjusting the
knowledge stocks for differences in efficiency, the
relative intensity increases even more, with the U.S.
knowledge stock intensity more than twelve times
that of Africa.
These disparities in the intensity of knowledge
stocks are much larger than the differences in
the intensity of research spending presented
in Figure 13. A multitude of science policy
and institutional implications flow from these
knowledge stock differentials. For one, persistence
pays. It is a steady stream of R&D investment
over the long haul that produces the stocks of
knowledge necessary for productivity growth in
agriculture. Moreover, purposefully tapping into
other people’s technologies and know-how is an
effective way to expand the pool of potentially
productive knowledge. Africa has institutional and
agro-ecological impediments to harnessing R&D
spillovers. Figures 4 and 16a reveal that Australia
suffers from the same agro-ecological impediments.
However, while contemporary rates of land
productivity in Africa and Australia are similar,
Australia has adapted other people’s technologies
and invested intensively in developing home
grown technologies suited to local conditions that
have given rise to labor productivity rates that are
40-50 times higher than those in Africa.

These new findings have important, and perhaps
poorly understood, policy implications. Investing
in research elsewhere in the world and spurring
the necessary institutional innovation to enhance
technological spillins into Sub-Saharan Africa may
be just as critical to technical progress in Africa as
enhancing the capacity to develop home-grown
technologies throughout the region. However,
these technological distance metrics indicate that
for any particular country in Sub-Saharan Africa
the spill-in potentials for relevant agricultural
technologies may be higher from elsewhere in the
world than from elsewhere in Africa. This suggests
a radical rethinking of research networks and other
similar institutional initiatives that simply rely on
regional clusterings within Sub-Saharan Africa.

5. RISK AND REGULATION OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
5.1 AGRICULTURAL AND
TECHNOLOGICAL RISK
Sources of Agricultural Risk
A multitude of production, market, and health
factors expose farmers to significant risk. Crop
production is subject to the vagaries of weather,
which interact in complex ways with soils and
landscape. Livestock production’s reliance on
adequate feed, water, and land means it is also
subject to the vagaries of the complex interactions
between weather, soils, and landscapes. These
complex abiotic interactions make it difficult for
farmers to know precisely how their efforts will
ultimately affect the quantity and quality of their
output. Agricultural production is also subject to
numerous biotic sources of risk. Insect and animal
pests feed on crops, which can reduce biomass or
degrade quality. Weed pests compete with crops
for precious water, nutrient, and solar resources.
Pathogens disrupt the normal physiology of crops
and livestock resulting in limited growth or death.
Furthermore, these biotic factors can interact
with abiotic factors to further disrupt production.
For example, a mild winter can foster the survival
of overwintering insects, resulting in increased
pest pressure during the growing season. Even
when a farmer achieves some reasonable level of
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efficient developed countries, the U.S. knowledge
stock intensity decreases only slightly (from 273 to
266 percent), while Africa’s decreases by nearly 40
percent (from 60 to 38 percent).
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control in production, he must still contend with
the volatility of agricultural markets arising, for
example, from boom and bust production cycles,
finicky consumers, and transitory government
policies. Farming is also a physically demanding
occupation that can be taxing on individual health.
The handling of livestock and farm equipment
can result in acute or debilitating physical injury
or death. Exposure to farm chemicals can lead to
acute and chronic health problems or death.

Agricultural Technology
and Production Risk
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Technological change has been responsible for
impressive gains in agricultural productivity
throughout most of the world. Through increased
productivity, technology is generally believed
to have decreased production risk from the
common perspective. From an economic
perspective, some technological advances have
been found to decrease risk, while others have
been found to increase it.44 Understanding the
effect of technological advance on risk is further
complicated by the fact that it can depend on, for
example, the crop (e,g., Ramaswami 1992), crop
attribute (e.g., Kim and Chavas 2003), time (e.g.,
Traxler et al. 1995), and space (e.g., Kim and Chavas
2003 and Dalton et al. 2004).
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Technical change in agriculture has taken a variety
of forms: mechanical, biological, chemical, and
informational. Of these different forms of change,
the most studied in terms of production risk have
been genetic crop improvement, fertilization,
irrigation, and pest control. Production risk in cereal
crops has drawn special attention because of the
importance of stable production to food security
and emerging evidence that the production
gains of the 1960s and 1970s were accompanied
by increased production variability or increased
risk. To identify policies to reduce this increased
production risk, a better understanding of the
sources of risk and their relationship to technical
change was sought. The results of this research
have been mixed.

44 Risk from an economic perspective is based on what is
referred to as the risk premium, which depends on the variance
of the loss as well as the expected loss. Box 5 discusses alternative
perspectives on risk.

For technical change that resulted in the genetic
improvement of crops, Anderson and Hazell (1989)
reported that under controlled experimental
conditions most improved crop varieties of maize,
pearl millet, rice, and wheat tended to exhibit
higher yield variability when measured in terms of
the variance, but the same or lower yield variability
when measured in terms of the coefficient of
variation. Using controlled experimental data
collected by the International Maize and Wheat
Center (CIMMYT), Traxler et al. (1995) found that
varietal development in wheat tended to increase
the variability of yields in Mexico between 1950
and 1970, but tended to decrease variability
between 1970 and 1986. Pingali et al. (1990)
found a similar trend for rice using data collected
by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).
Using more recent crop insurance data, Carew and
Smith (2006) found that between 1995 and 2003
canola yield variance in Manitoba, Canada was not
affected by improved varieties.
Roumasset et al. (1989) reviewed seven fertilizer
studies published between 1969 and 1986
covering potatoes in Peru, rice in the Philippines,
and wheat in Australia, and concluded that the
application of fertilizer generally increased the
variance of crop yields. Traxler et al. (1995) found
no independent effect of nitrogen on wheat yield
variance in Mexico between 1950 and 1986, but
did find an interaction between nitrogen and
varietal development that reduced yield variability.
Ramaswami (1992) reports that relatively low
rates of application of nitrogen are risk increasing
for cotton, but relatively high rates may be risk
increasing or decreasing depending on how an
individual dislikes variability. Alternatively, for corn,
relatively low rates of application of nitrogen may
be risk increasing or decreasing, while relatively
high rates are risk increasing. Hurley et al. (2004)
found that the variance of corn yields from an
on-farm experiment in the United States was
influenced by the amount of applied nitrogen.
The yield variance was lower for relatively low and
relatively high nitrogen applications and higher
for more moderate applications. Villano and
Fleming (2006) found fertilizer was risk increasing
using data from 46 rice farmers in the Philippines
between 1990 and 1997, while Carew and Smith
(2006) found that potassium fertilizer reduced

Box 5: What is Agricultural Risk?

by Terrance Hurley, University of Minnesota
Risk is commonly defined as the exposure to the chance of loss (or injury). There are two important
and distinct elements to this definition that deserve greater specificity. The first is the idea that the
outcome is unknown, but the range of possible outcomes is known—either there is a loss, or there
is not. The second is the idea that the unknown outcome is a matter chance, which in statistical
terms means probabilities can be assigned to the range of possible outcomes. In the context of this
definition, risk is interpreted as undesirable and beneficial reductions in risk can be thought of in
terms of either decreasing the chance or severity of loss.
This notion of risk is not always particularly useful when trying to understand risky behavior
because if individuals only care about the chance and severity of loss, they will always choose
activities to reduce them. But, individuals often engage in activities that increase rather than
decrease the chance or severity of loss: many people use cigarettes even though it increases the
chance of developing lung cancer or dieing prematurely. What this notion of risk fails to account
for is the opportunity cost of reducing the chance or severity of loss: the physical and psychological
discomfort of nicotine withdrawal from discontinuing the use of cigarettes.
Two important assumptions play a key role in interpreting risk from an economic perspective: (i)
individuals prefer more to less, and (ii) individuals do not like variability. In the simplest terms, this
interpretation implies individuals will make decisions based on the tradeoff between the expected
outcome (what will happen on average) and what is referred to as the risk premium. Chambers
and Quiggin (2000) provide a rigorous definition of the risk premium, but for present purposes, it
is enough to say that the risk premium reflects the variability of possible outcomes and the degree
to which an individual does not like this variability. The risk premium is the fundamental measure
of risk from an economic perspective. The difficulty with using the risk premium is that individuals
have different tolerances for risk, so it can be difficult and costly to measure. To circumvent this
difficulty, the variance of possible outcomes (or some other notion of variability like the coefficient
of variation) is often substituted for the risk premium because variability is an important component
of the risk premium and in some circumstances, the two are directly related.
It is important to note that these two perspectives of risk can lead to different conclusions regarding
the risk consequences of engaging in a particular activity. From the common perspective, activities
that decrease the expected loss are interpreted as reducing risk regardless of whether the variability
of the expected loss (or risk premium) has increased or decreased. From the economic perspective,
activities that decrease the variability of the expected outcome (or risk premium) are interpreted as

the variance of canola yields in Manitoba, Canada
between 1995 and 2003.
Pandey (1989) reviewed the literature on the effect
of irrigation on yield variability but did not find any
consistent trends due to wide variation in irrigation
practices and policies. More recently, Dalton et al.
(2004) found the risk reduction benefits of irrigation
for potato production in the Northeastern United
States are dependent on scale, location, and the
cost of developing adequate water sources.
Carlson (1989) suggested pesticides typically
decrease yield variability, however, he noted that

u

there are reasons and cases to suggest pesticides
could actually increase yield variability. Hurd (1994)
found that pesticide use in cotton production
in the Western United States was risk increasing.
Alternatively, Villano and Fleming (2006) obtained
results for herbicide use in rice production in the
Philippines that support Carlson’s conclusion that
pesticides typically reduce yield variability. Hurley
et al. (2004) showed that transgenic Bt corn with
built in pesticides likely increased risk in terms of
the profitability of corn production for Midwestern
U.S. farmers, even though it has likely decreased
the risk associated with yield variability.
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Box 5 (continued)

reducing risk regardless of whether the expected outcome increases or decreases. These differing
perspectives are a common source of confusion and miscommunication.
Another source of confusion and miscommunication with economic risk is the distinction often
drawn between the risk premium and the marginal risk premium. The marginal risk premium refers
to how the risk premium changes as an individual engages in more of a risky activity. The risk
premium is important for assessing the welfare effects of risk. When the risk premium is positive,
individual welfare is diminished, while when the risk premium is negative, individual welfare is
enhanced. Alternatively, the marginal risk premium determines how much of a risky activity an
individual will engage in. If the marginal risk premium is positive, engaging in an activity is said
to be risk increasing because an individual who does not like variability will engage in less of the
activity than an individual who does not care about variability. Alternatively, if the marginal risk
premium is negative, engaging in an activity is said to be risk decreasing because an individual
who does not like variability will engage in more of the activity than an individual who does not
care about variability. There is not always a direct correspondence between the risk premium
and marginal risk premium. That is, engaging in an activity can be risk increasing even if the risk
premium is negative. For example, a farmer may use less fertilizer when fertilizer increases yield
variability because he does not like variability (i.e., the marginal risk premium increases as fertilizer
applications increase), yet the risk implications of his fertilizer use can still be welfare enhancing (i.e.,
the risk premium decreases). Many studies of economic risk focus on estimating the risk premium or
some approximation, while others focus on estimating the marginal risk premium.
A final caveat worth mentioning when talking about risk is the risk of what: crop yields, crop prices,
farmer profits, farmer health, public health, or environmental health. The effects of pesticides on a
farmer’s yield risk can differ from the effect of pesticides on profit risk, even though yields are an
important determinant of profit. The reason for this is that yield risk does not include the cost of
pesticides, the price received for the crop, and other important determinants of profit. If crop yields
are all a farmer cares about, then measuring yield risk is sufficient to understand the implications
of risk on the farmer, but if the farmer cares about crop yields only to the extent that these yields
influence profit, then measuring yield risk may not provide an adequate understanding of the
implications of risk on the farmer.
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Technical change in agricultural has increased
production. In terms of production risk, the
results are mixed. Some technical improvements
have reduced production risk, while others
have increased it. Furthermore, the effects of
technological change on production risk have
varied over time, space, and production activities.
What is important to realize is that the effects of
technical change in agriculture extend beyond
quantity and quality of agricultural output. It has
also had important health and environmental
effects. Some of these side effects of technological

change have been detrimental to individual and
public welfare, while others have been welfare
enhancing.
Pesticides have improved crop yields and tended
to reduce yield risk. But many pesticides have
been shown to pose significant risk to human and
environmental health. The health risks of pesticides
have been shown to be particularly pervasive in
developing countries where pesticide use is less
regulated and farmers have less information on
the potential hazards and tend to be less cautious
in their use. Based on data collected from 152
rice farming families in the Philippines between

Similarly, while increases in the use of fertilizers like
nitrogen have had a positive impact on agricultural
production, they have also had notable negative
effects on human and environmental health.
Nitrogen is a particularly mobile nutrient that is
carried into surface water supplies with rainfall
runoff and is also leached into groundwater
supplies. Nitrogen reaching drinking water supplies
is a public health risk because at high concentrations
it can cause conditions like methemoglobinemia,
where hemoglobin cannot carry sufficient oxygen
through the blood. Furthermore, available evidence
indicates that too much nitrogen is reaching some
drinking water supplies. For example, the U.S.
Geological Survey (1996) found that 12 percent of
domestic wells in agricultural regions of the United
States exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s drinking water standards. Important
environmental problems are also associated with
too much nitrogen reaching waterways. When
there is too much nitrogen in water dissolved
oxygen can be depleted, resulting in what is
called hypoxia, which can be harmful to aquatic
animals. A prominent example of hypoxia is the
“Dead Zone” that appears in the Gulf of Mexico
every summer (Beardsley 1997). Nitrogen fertilizer
runoff from agricultural production is believed to
be a significant factor contributing to this annual
“Dead Zone.”

Recent transgenic crop varieties offer good
examples of technical changes that have resulted
in increased production and reduced human and
environmental risk. For example, new varieties
of herbicide tolerant crops such as Roundup
Ready soybean have promoted reduced tillage
production practices. Reduced tillage reduces the
amount of sediment and agricultural chemicals
that are carried to surface water supplies in
the form of runoff. The use of Roundup Ready
soybeans has also resulted in the substitution of
glyphosate for other herbicides that are believed
to pose greater health and environmental risks.
Plant-incorporated-protectants like Bt corn have
been found to reduce the level of mycotoxins such
as fumonisin in corn (Munkvold et al. 2001; Wu
2006). The incidence of human esophageal cancer
has been related to fumonisin consumption in
Africa, Asia, Central America, and the United States.
Additionally, mycotoxin poisoning of livestock can
result in increased incidence of disease, reduced
reproductive capacity, and other deleterious
health issues.
While transgenic crop varieties provide some
good examples of reductions in risks to health and
the environment associated with technological
change in agriculture, they also provide a good
example of when technical changes have resulted
in increased marketing risk for farmers. Transgenic
crops have been controversial because of concerns
regarding unknown and unpredictable side
effects. This has led some consumers to reject
transgenic crop products and lobby for regulations
to limit their market access. Regardless of the
validity of consumer concerns, farmers who plant
transgenic crops can risk losing market access
or face selling their output at a discounted price.
These risks were particularly salient in 2000 after
the European Union adopted a moratorium on
approving new transgenic crop varieties, which
led to a substantial slowdown in the adoption
of Bt corn by U.S. farmers and the adoption of Bt
corn and other transgenic crops in developing
countries. As consumer acceptance has improved,
the marketing risk faced by farmers has subsided
and the adoption of Bt corn and other transgenic
crops is again increasing rapidly.
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1989 and 1991, Pingali et al. (1994) concluded
that reductions in pesticide use could enhance
farmer welfare because any cost in terms of lost
productivity could be more than compensated
by improved health. Antle and Pingali (1994)
found similar results using data collected between
1989 to 1991 from 73 farmers and 40 pesticide
applicators in two major rice producing regions in
the Philippines. Using data collect from 40 potato
farmers in Ecuador, Crissman et al. (1994) also
found important tradeoffs between pesticide use
and farmer health. Increased pesticide use has
also increased public and environmental exposure
to pesticides. For example, Barbash et al. (1999)
reported that six common herbicides were found in
ground water and aquifers used for drinking water
in a number of agricultural and non-agricultural
regions of the United States.
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Risk Implications of Technical
Change in Agriculture

at the expense of others and possibly involving
deadweight losses to the national welfare.

Two broad conclusions can be drawn regarding
technical change in agriculture and its effect on
production, health, and environmental risk. First,
technical change has increased the quantity and
improved the quality of agricultural products, but it
has also had varied effects on production risk. These
varied effects on production risk may be as much
of a blessing as a concern. Farmers have different
tolerances for risk. When farmers can choose from
a variety of technologies that have varied effects
on risk, they can choose combinations of technical
practices to manage production risk (Just and
Zilberman, 1983; Chambers and Quiggin, 2000).
Fostering access to improved technologies is thus
a key objective for policies targeted to helping
farmers manage production risk.

Whether it is primarily for efficiency or
distributional reasons, the development,
release, adoption, and application of agricultural
technologies is increasingly subject to public
scrutiny and regulatory approval or other controls.
Technological regulations and the attendant
regulatory processes differ among countries and
within countries, across industries, and across
types of technologies. The regulatory requirements
and the associated costs of compliance differ
significantly, for instance, between biotech crop
varieties and the technologies that they might
replace, including products of conventional crop
breeding or chemical pest-control technologies.
The regulations therefore modify the rate and form
of technological change and the distribution of
benefits and costs. There can be no doubt that the
economic consequences are very significant, but
the full consequences of technological regulation
in agriculture are not well understood.

Second, the effect of technical change in
agriculture extends beyond improvements in the
quantity and quality of output. Some technologies
have had unintended negative impacts within
and beyond the farm gate, while others have had
unintended positive impacts. These external effects
have fueled increased regulatory activity, which is
having important implications in terms of further
technical development in agriculture.
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5.2 REGULATING TECHNOLOGIES
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Changes in agricultural technology drive
economic growth in developing countries and
contribute significantly to economic well-being
in rich countries. While they generally provide net
economic benefits new technologies almost always
involve some losers, and some of the negative
consequences may involve external effects on
human health or the environment.
The actual or perceived existence of externalities—
associated with food safety, environmental
pollution, animal welfare, farm-worker safety,
costs of product segregation, or loss of market
access—provides a justification for regulation
(or other government intervention) aimed at
increasing national net benefits from production
and consumption. It also provides a rationale
that can be used to defend regulation when the
main purpose is redistribution, benefiting some

Rationalizing Regulation
The conventional economic argument for
government intervention in the economy is based
on the idea of market failure—that the unfettered
working of the free market mechanism has given
rise to an inefficient allocation of resources or an
unsatisfactory distribution of income—and that
government intervention can make things better.
The argument for regulation, as opposed to other
policies, is that it will work better than the nextbest intervention that might be applied to correct
the perceived market failure.
Various types of market failures can and do arise
in agriculture, often associated with the use of
particular technologies, giving rise to arguments
for government intervention. Examples include
various kinds of pollution externalities (such as
pollution of air or groundwater associated with
the use of agricultural chemicals); incomplete,
ill-defined, or ill-enforced property rights to
assets such as irrigation water or other natural
resource stocks, or to intellectual property
including plant varieties or other inventions;
incomplete or asymmetric information about
product characteristics including how a product

Government regulations to address concerns
such as these are pervasive, and largely taken for
granted, but evolving as knowledge and other
factors change. Various agricultural chemicals, for
instance, have been banned (e.g., DDT is only one
of many pesticides that are no longer allowed to
be used in U.S. agriculture) or are only allowed
to be used in particular applications; and there
are environmental and occupational health and
safety regulations over how they may be applied
and so on. Similarly, the laws and rules governing
rights to natural resources and to intellectual
property are constantly evolving as circumstances
and institutions change. In particular, expanded
intellectual property rights applied to plant
varieties have contributed importantly to the
development of the agricultural biotechnology
industry as a predominantly private enterprise in
the United States. And with rising affluence, and in
the wake of various food scares, we have witnessed
increasing attention to the public provision of
information and food-safety assurance, and an
attendant rise in food-safety regulation.
In contemplating the economics of regulation of
agricultural technologies, one set of questions
concerns understanding the nature of the costs
and benefits, and obtaining measures of the
costs and benefits and their distribution. To get
this right it is important to get the counterfactual
right, in terms of the nature of the pre-existing
distortions that the regulation may be designed
to address, but also to deal with the complications
of further distortions created by the intervention.
Government intervention that purports to correct
one distortion may create another, and all such
interventions have redistributive consequences.
Consequently the full effects may be difficult to
discern. For instance, the provision of patents or
comparable intellectual property rights to the
firms that invent new agricultural chemicals or
new genetically modified crop varieties has two
somewhat offsetting effects: it enhances the
incentives for firms to invest in R&D, reducing the
market distortion associated with too slow a rate

of invention; at the same time it allows the firms
to charge monopoly prices for their inventions,
resulting in too low a rate of adoption of given
inventions. Moreover, as well as having mixed
effects on the rate of technological change and
total benefits, intellectual property rights have
consequences for the distribution of the benefits
and costs of consumption and production of the
affected commodities.
A second set of questions relates to explaining
the policy choices, which to some extent turns
on understanding their consequences. The
question of who bears the costs and who reaps the
benefits may be difficult to answer precisely but is
nevertheless likely to be worth asking if we want to
understand why particular regulations are applied.
It seems likely in many cases that the redistributive
consequences have more to offer as an explanation
of particular regulatory choices than any theory
based on a simple notion of correcting market
failures. The distribution of benefits and costs within
a country may help explain choices of particular
regulatory instruments, and the choice to regulate
versus alternative policies including laissez faire;
and differences in these aspects among countries
may help account for differences among their
policies. Similarly, the distribution of benefits and
costs among countries may help account for some
international differences in policies, especially
as they pertain to commodity trade policy as an
element of technological regulation.

Causes and Consequences of
Biotechnology Regulation
The regulation of agricultural biotechnology
is an important contemporary example that
serves also to illustrate the main issues in the
regulation of agricultural technologies more
generally.45 Biotechnologies are regulated from
the point of initial experimentation, through the
stages of field trials, and ultimate release, and the
processes of compliance with these regulations
add considerably to the costs borne by biotech
companies and to the number of years consumed
in the process (Kalaitzandonakes, Alston, and

45 This discussion draws significantly on the recent book by
Just, Alston, and Zilberman (2006). See also Josling, Roberts and
Orden (2003).
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was produced and whether it is safe to consume;
market distortions arising from the exercise of
market power by agribusiness firms in the supply
of inputs or technology, or in the marketing of
agricultural products.
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Bradford (2006) estimated that compliance with
regulatory requirements added between 6 and 16
million dollars to the cost of developing a single new
biotech crop product). Even after the technologies
are “deregulated,” such that farmers are allowed
to grow biotech crops, further regulations govern
where and how the crops may be grown, and how
and where the products may be sold.
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It is notable, that the substantial adoption of
agricultural biotechnology to date has been
concentrated in a small number of countries and
confined to a small number of traits in a small
number of crops: specifically, pest-resistance and
herbicide tolerance in feed grains, oil seeds, and
cotton.46 Biotech food products emphasizing
output traits (e.g., long shelf-life tomatoes) or input
traits (e.g., Bt potatoes or sweet corn) have been
ignored or dis-adopted by food manufacturers or
retailers in the face of perceived market resistance
or political opposition. The fact that adoption of
the available biotech products has been limited to
a small number of countries reflects a combination
of market resistance, legal barriers to adoption and
trade barriers against importation of biotech crop
products. The same barriers also have reduced
incentives for biotech companies to invest in the
development of new biotech products, and the
same factors may have contributed to the erection
of regulatory barriers to the development and
adoption of biotech crops, which themselves
provide a further disincentive for biotech
companies.
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One set of regulations governs the R&D process
and whether a new biotech crop variety is
allowed to be grown commercially. Prior to the
development and release of a new genetically
modified crop variety, a biotech company must
satisfy a host of regulations that govern what is
allowed to be done in the lab and in the field. In
the United States “deregulation” to allow a crop
to be grown commercially requires separate
authorization from the Department of Agriculture
(USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
reflecting the separate roles played by these
agencies in relation to the environment, food

46 Box 6 provides an overview of the uptake of crop
biotechnologies worldwide.

safety, and agricultural production. To obtain these
approvals requires a very significant investment in
testing, evaluation, and reporting, in a process that
adds a number of years and millions of dollars of
costs to the commercial process of research and
development, all borne by the biotech company
(Kalatizandonakes, Alston, and Bradford 2006).
Even though the U.S. policy explicitly is to evaluate
the product not the process of invention, it seems
to discriminate against biotechnology (Miller
and Conko 2005). Presently the requirements on
biotech crops are much more onerous than the
corresponding requirements as they apply to
competing technologies, such as crop varieties
developed by conventional techniques (including
mutagenesis and selection) or chemical pest
control technologies. Concern about the potential
implications for market acceptance mean that
U.S. biotech firms in many cases also go through
regulatory approval processes in other countries,
such as Japan, before they will release a new
biotech crop variety for production in the United
States. The cost of compliance with international
regulations is additional to the domestic cost.
Concern about international market acceptance
and the loss of access to some markets owing
to inability to segregate GM and non-GM crop
products has also led some countries that depend
on exports to regulate against the adoption of
biotech crops, even though they might otherwise
find them profitable to grow. The fact that some
consumers want to avoid biotech crops has led
some countries to ban them altogether, and other
countries to require segregation and labeling,
which in some instances is a de facto ban.
The development of resistant pests or herbicide
tolerant weeds is an important potential
consequence of the adoption of biotech crops.
The U.S. government has opted to treat this
as an externality—apparently presuming that
the biotech firms would not have appropriate
incentives to manage the problem, even with
proprietary technologies—and therefore it
has imposed refuge requirements as part of its
regulatory approval process for biotechnologies,
although it has not done likewise with chemical
pesticides.

Box 6: Uptake of Bioengineered Crops

by Philip Pardey, University of Minnesota
Where the crop varieties and bioengineered traits embodied in them perform well and are given
approval for commercial use, the rate of uptake has been rapid, although contrary to some claims,
not entirely unprecedented, even for biological innovations used in agriculture.1 In 2006, twelve
years after bioengineered crops were first grown, an estimated 102 million hectares were planted to
them worldwide (about 10 percent of the world’s harvested crop area), an increase from 90 million
hectares in the previous year and well up on the 2.8 million hectares planted in 1996.2
Despite this growth, the agricultural, geographical and technological scope of commercially grown
bioengineered crops is still small. In 2006, the preponderance of the area under these types of crops
consisted of bioengineered soybeans, which accounted for 57 percent of the total bioengineered
cropping area. Around 25 percent of the total bioengineered area was sown to bioengineered
maize, 13 percent to cotton, and 5 percent to canola. Just 4 countries accounted for 88 percent of
the global total in 2006—55 percent of this global total was planted in the United States, 18 percent
in Argentina, 11 percent each in Brazil, and 6 percent in Canada (Panel a). Two traits dominate the
picture, namely, herbicide tolerance mainly in soybeans and canola, and insect tolerance mainly in
corn and cotton, though there are some limited use of bioengineered viral resistance in papaya and
squash.

1 For example, hybrid corn technologies—another crop genetic change that was controversial at the time of its
invention—went from 0 to 50 percent of Iowa’s corn acreage in just six years following its release in 1932; by 1940, 90 percent
of the corn area in Iowa was sown to hybrid varieties (Griliches 1957).
2 In 1994 the Flavr-SavrTM tomato, genetically engineered to delay softening so the tomato could ripen on the vine and
retain its “fresh picked” flavor, became the first bioengineered crop to be grown commercially. As Marra, Pardey and Alston
(2003) described, the technology was a scientific success, but a colossal business failure. Although the tomatoes achieved
the delayed-softening and taste-retention objectives of their developers, yields were poor, mechanical handling equipment
turned most of them into mush before they got to market, and consumers weren’t willing to pay enough of a premium over
conventional fresh tomatoes to cover costs.
3 For example, all the officially approved Monsanto/DeltaPine bioengineered cotton varieties grown in China are the same
varieties grown in the United States, while most of the bioengineered Chinese varieties are based on older DeltaPine varieties
introduced into China in the 1940s and 1950s. Likewise the transgenic cotton varieties grown in Mexico are from the United
States; and in South Africa, NuCotn 37-B, an American variety, is widely used.

continued
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The developing country’s share of global bioengineered crop area has grown from 14 percent of
the world total in 1997 to 40.9 percent in 2006. Notably, plantings in just 5 countries, soybeans in
Argentina and Brazil, and cotton in China, South Africa, and India, account for the lion’s share (95
percent) of the developing-country bioengineered acreage. Finding bioengineered traits that deal
successfully with local production constraints is one thing, expressing them in specific crop varieties
that compete well against locally grown landraces and conventionally bred varieties of the same
crop, absent the bioengineered trait, is another thing. Not surprisingly, the bioengineered traits
are being grown in developing-country areas that are agroecologically similar to the rich countries
for which the traits were first developed, and in many cases involve the identical crop varieties.3
This is precisely where the spillover costs are smallest and consist mainly of local screening and
regulatory approval costs along with the costs of marketing the technology. That is, disseminating
these particular bioengineered crop varieties involves only adaptive or imitative technology
development costs beyond the initial discovery costs, a much smaller cost than inventing entirely
new bioengineered traits and successfully expressing those traits in locally superior varieties of
locally important crops.

u
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Box 6 (continued)

Given that the United States dominates the world totals, its trends are worth scrutinizing. Ranked
in terms of total acreage, the world and U.S. crop relativities for 2006 are the same—soybeans
dominate, followed by corn and cotton. However, the intensity of use of bioengineered versus
classically bred crops differs markedly between the United States and the rest of the world. The
United States uniformly makes more intensive use of bioengineered crops than the rest of the world
(Panel b). While almost all the U.S. canola crop was sown to bioengineered varieties in 2006, the
corresponding rest-of-world share was just 3.4 percent. Likewise, bioengineered soybeans covered
89 percent of the U.S. soybean acreage compared with nearly 44 percent of the rest-of-world soybean
area. For cotton the corresponding shares were 83 percent for the United States and 13.3 percent
for the rest of the world; for corn it was 61 percent for the United States and 16.5 percent elsewhere.
This reflects both technology and market realities. While the dominant bioengineered traits such
as those that target mainly budworm/boll weevil complexes in cotton and European stem borers
and rootworm in corn, as well as Roundup® and Liberty Link® resistance in soybeans and canola
have yield-enhancing or cost-reducing consequences for rest-of-world farmers, they are especially
consequential for United States producers. In addition, given their earlier regulatory approval in
the United States, these traits are now incorporated into an increasing number of crop varieties that
are optimized for ever more refined agroecological growing conditions, thus contributing to their
widespread use.
Panel a: Area Planted to Biotech Crops,
1995-2006

Panel b: Biotech Cropping Intensities—
United States vs. Rest-of-World, 2006
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Consumers in some countries may believe—
for whatever reason and possibly without any
scientific basis—that genetically modified foods
are unsafe to eat, or that the processes used to
produce them are environmentally unsafe. Such
consumers may favor a ban on biotechnology or
a labeling requirement (see Huffman and Rousu
2006; McCluskey, Grimsrud and Wahl 2006). In
general the consumer lobby as such has not been
a very potent force in the political economy of
regulation of agricultural technologies in the past,
and the same observation may apply in the case
of biotech food crops. It seems more likely that the
real pressure giving rise to regulation and market
resistance (by retailers and food manufacturers)
has been exerted by other groups, such as
environmentalists, some of which purport to
represent the interest of consumers even though
they are not a consumer lobby per se.
Environmental groups such as Greenpeace have
opposed the introduction of biotech crops, in
spite of compelling evidence that they will allow
a substantial reduction in the environmental
burden of chemical pesticides, and in the absence
of any evidence of a serious environmental risk
(at least with regard to the currently available
crops). It seems likely that their opposition reflects
a coalition of interest of environmentalists and
others (such as those who oppose capitalism or big
business generally) rather than a simple objective
of environmental conservation.
Farmers in some countries, or in some parts of
a country, may be aided by regulation, since
agricultural biotechnology may influence the
strength (or even the direction) of comparative
advantage, favoring one group of farmers over
another. Anderson (2006) suggests that while
farmers in Europe as a whole would find it profitable

to adopt currently available biotechnology, they
would be worse off if they had to compete in a
world in which farmers worldwide were free to
adopt compared with a world without biotech
crops. Hence, European farmers might naturally
oppose the development of biotech crops
generally. But Anderson also shows that European
farmers can be even better off, even if they do not
adopt biotechnology themselves, if the adoption
of biotech crops in other countries leads to the
erection of new regulatory barriers on imports by
the EU that amount to trade protection against
competition from both conventional and biotech
crop producers.
Agricultural technology firms clearly have an
interest. Graff and Zilberman (2004) speculated
that agricultural technology firms in Europe had a
comparative advantage in chemical technologies
whereas agricultural technology firms in the
United States had a comparative advantage in
biotechnology. Hence, firms in Europe (perhaps
in coalition with European farmers) would oppose
biotech and influence their governments to
regulate accordingly, whereas firms (and farmers) in
the United States would do the opposite. A possibly
contradictory view is that regulatory compliance is
a barrier to entry, that the successful biotech firms
in the United States have a comparative advantage
in meeting the requirements (see Heisey and
Schimmelpfennig 2006). The implication is that
incumbent U.S. biotech firms may have encouraged
the introduction of more stringent and costly
regulations so as to preserve their market power.
These questions are made more complex when
we observe that the major firms are involved in
both chemical technologies and biotechnologies,
that they are integrated with non-agricultural
applications of biotechnology, and that they are
multinational.

6. THE ROLE OF SKILLS AND
EDUCATION IN AGRICULTURE
The impact of scientific and technological
progress in improving agricultural production in
developing countries is intimately related to the
skills and education of the populations in those
countries. There are three key groups whose
skills and education levels are of fundamental
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These various regulatory interventions have
impeded development and adoption of biotech
crops, especially for food crops and particularly
for minor crops since biotech firms will require a
large potential market and a high rate of adoption
to justify the large overhead cost of R&D and
regulatory compliance (Alston 2004; Bradford,
Alston, and Kalaitzandonakes 2006). One can
speculate about the roles of different interest
groups in promoting this outcome, and why.
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importance: farmers, information providers and
researchers. This section examines the role of skills
and education for all three groups, focusing on the
skills and education of farmers.

Skills and Education of Farmers

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

T. W. Schulz (1975) persuasively argued that farmers
obtain little benefit from education, at least in
terms of their agricultural productivity, in settings
that are stable; that is, where there is little or no
technological progress. In such settings trial and
error over many years (and even many generations)
will eventually lead farmers to the best methods
to maximize productivity, or more specifically to
maximize farm profits. Yet if there are changes,
especially rapid changes, in scientific knowledge
and agricultural technology, then education helps
farmers to adopt, and to adapt, new agricultural
technologies that will make them better off. Several
empirical studies have provided support for this
claim; farmers’ education has been shown to have
a positive impact on technology adoption in China
(Lin 1991) and India (Foster and Rosenzweig 1996),
although a study of Indonesia yielded inconclusive
results (Pitt and Sumodiningrat 1991).

78

As discussed in other chapters in this report, the
days of slow technological progress are long gone.
Instead, technological progress in agriculture and
related fields is proceeding at a rapid rate. This
implies that the skills and education of farmers
will become more important determinants of farm
income and, more generally, social welfare in rural
areas of developing countries (for recent evidence,
see the review by Huffman 2001). In this process,
farmers (and even entire countries) with low levels
of education will be left behind. Indeed, prices for
their products may drop, so that farmers who do
not adopt new technologies may see their incomes
decline. Fortunately, schooling levels in developing
countries have increased dramatically in the past
40 years, as shown in Table 14.
This raises two fundamental questions:
1. What policies will increase school enrollment,
and learning while in school, for children in
rural areas, both those who will eventually
become farmers and those who are likely to
work in other occupations?

2. What kinds of skills should be taught in primary
and secondary schools to children who are
likely to become farmers?
Of course, these two questions are interrelated. If
the “wrong” skills are taught, rural households will
be less likely to enroll their children in school.
Turning to the first question, research in the past
10-15 years has reached some conclusions about
what policies are most effective in increasing
school enrollment in rural areas. Glewwe and
Kremer (2006) provide a recent assessment of the
literature. Some evidence shows that increased
school quality, measured in a variety of ways,
increases school enrollment and eventual years
of completed schooling. In addition, there is very
strong evidence that reduction in tuition and other
costs of attending school, as well as subsidies to
parents to keep their children enrolled in school
(and regularly attending), lead to increases in school
enrollment and years of schooling completed.
The second question has received less attention.
One may think that primary and secondary schools
in rural areas should teach students detailed
information about the most recent technological
advances in agriculture, but this may not be very
useful because new technologies will arise soon
after the students have left school, rendering
obsolete much of what the students would have
learned from this type of curriculum. Instead, it is
better for schools to teach general basic skills, such
as literacy, numeracy, and basic science knowledge.
This will provide students with a foundation
that they can use to learn on their own the latest
technologies as they become available. Empirical
support for this recommendation is seen in the
strong evidence that general education raises farm
productivity, while in contrast there is only mixed
evidence that extension education raises farm
productivity (see, inter alia, Hussain and Byerlee
1995). This finding is consistent with studies of job
training programs in the United States; programs
that focus on teaching specific skills for specific
types of jobs have little effect on the employment
and wages of program participants (see Heckman,
Lalonde and Smith, 1999, for a recent review).
A second reason for schools in rural areas to focus
on basic skills is that those skills can reduce the cost

Returning to the issue of the impact
of skills and education on agricultural
productivity, the returns to human
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
capital in agriculture are unlikely
Country group
to decrease, and most likely will
2.2a
3.7
4.6
5.2
Low-income
1.6a
Middle-income
2.8
3.5
4.2
5.1
5.9
increase, as more sophisticated
High-income
7.4
7.9
9.2
9.5
10.1
methods are developed to increase
Region
farm efficiency. In particular, the
Sub-Saharan Africa
1.7
2.0
2.3
3.0
3.4
advent of “knowledge-intensive crop
Middle East/North Africa
1.4
2.2
2.9
4.1
5.4
management technologies” requires
Latin America
3.2
3.7
4.4
5.3
6.0
South Asia
1.5
2.0
3.0
3.8
4.6
more skills, and greater ability to learn
3.4b
4.6
5.6
6.2
East Asia
2.5b
new skills, on the part of farmers.
b
b
b
b
b
7.6
8.5
9.0
9.7
East Europe/FSU
6.5
These
technologies
emphasize
OECD
7.3
7.8
9.1
9.5
10.1
the timing of applying agricultural
inputs, and the measurement of soil
Source: Barro and Lee (2001).
conditions and other site-specific
Note: Countries with populations of less than 1 million are excluded.
a
factors for determining which inputs
Data are based on between 25 percent and 50 percent of the total
population of the country group or region.
to apply, when, and in what quantities
b
Data are based on between 10 percent and 25 percent of the total
(see Byerlee 1998). Indeed, the more
population of the country group or region.
sophisticated methods may require
different production strategies for
each plot of land operated by a given
of providing extension services. Extension agents
farmer, and even variation in inputs
can provide written materials to literate farmers
on different sections of a single plot of land (this is
who have a good grasp of basic science, which will
known as “precision agriculture,” as recently survey
greatly reduce the amount of time that extension
by Norton and Swinton 2001). This increasing
agents need to spend with those farmers. Indeed,
importance of education in determining farm
general farmer education may serve as a substitute
productivity could lead to increased inequality in
for extension services, since more-educated
rural areas, at least in countries where education is
farmers can acquire information directly from a
unequally distributed in rural areas, and to income
variety of sources, including sources that extension
gaps between countries with high (e.g., East Asia)
agents rely on.
and low (e.g., South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa)
levels of education in rural areas.
A third important reason for focusing on basic
skills, instead of teaching the details of the
Another difficult issue regarding schooling in
latest agricultural methods, is that it provides
rural areas of developing countries is that many
an alternative to farming for rural residents. In
schools in those countries are not very effective
developing countries, as farmers become more
at teaching basic literacy, numeracy and science
productive, less farm labor will be demanded,
skills, as explained in Glewwe and Kremer (2006).
and thus many children of farmers will either
This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa, where
work in rural areas in nonagricultural occupations
years of school attendance often lead to little
or migrate to urban areas to work in activities
learning. Research to date has provided some clues
unrelated to farming. Returns to education in
as to how to increase school quality, but much
nonagricultural activities are certainly sizable, but
remains to be learned. Progress on providing skills
the precise size is still a matter of debate (Behrman
to farmers will be slow until more is learned about
1999). This movement of labor out of agriculture is
how to make schools more effective in rural areas
economically efficient and will help avoid low rural
of developing countries.
incomes resulting from an “oversupply” of farmers
and farm output.
A final issue regarding the skills and schooling
of farm households is that there are potentially
important information problems that retard the
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Table 14: Average Years of School of Adults, Age 15+
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adoption of new agricultural technologies. Even
when farmers have adequate skills to adopt
a new technology there is an externality that
keeps initial adoption rates below their optimal
levels. This occurs because new technologies are
somewhat risky, and the first farmer to try a new
crop technology in a given community provides
information to neighboring farmers on how well
the new technology is suited for that locality.
The first farmer to try the new technology is
not compensated for the social benefit of the
information he or she provides to other farmers,
since the result of trying the new crop is public
knowledge (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995). This
implies that the government should provide
subsidies to farmers who are among the first
to adopt new technologies, even if the new
technology proves to be unprofitable.

Skills and Education of Providers
of Agricultural Information
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Farmers rarely obtain information about new
developments in agricultural technology from
the researchers who develop the new technology.
Instead, they obtain it from intermediaries, of
whom there are two main types: government
employees, such as agricultural extension agents,
and private sector marketing agents, such as
sellers of new technology items and purchasers of
farmers’ crops. The services provided by both types
of intermediaries are likely to depend on their
levels of education. This subsection briefly reviews
the role of education and skills for both types of
intermediaries.

80

The Ministries of Agriculture in almost all
developing countries train and deploy large
numbers of agricultural extension agents, who
are responsible for providing useful information to
farmers on a wide variety of topics, including new
technologies relevant for agricultural production.
These agents typically have at least a secondary
school education, and often several months, or
even 1-2 years, of training in agricultural science.
The training varies widely across countries, and
more generally the impact of agricultural extension
agents, and other government employees charged
with providing information to farmers on new
technologies, also varies widely.

Some economists have argued that government
extension agents often perform poorly in providing
useful services to farmers because they have little
incentive to do so. In contrast, vendors of new
methods have a direct financial motive to provide
farmers with new, more productive, technologies.
Indeed, in many developing countries most farmers
obtain hybrid seeds and other inputs related to
new technologies from private sector vendors,
and the role of private providers (relative to the
role of agricultural extension agents) is steadily
increasing in many developing countries. On the
other hand, relying solely on private sector sources
for information could lead to serious inefficiencies
and possible negative consequences for the
environment because private vendors have strong
incentives to provide only the information that
is favorable to the success of their businesses. As
farmers’ levels of education increase, governments
should develop systems that allow them more
direct access to recent research results. This could
take the form of brochures, magazines, books and
(eventually) websites operated by the government.
This is another example of how farmer education
can be a substitute for extension services.

Skills and Education of Researchers
The smallest, but arguably the most important,
group in the process of providing new technology
to farmers are the researchers who develop those
technologies, who are found in both developed
and developing countries. This subsection focuses
on research capacity in developing countries.
Appropriately trained scientists and engineers are
critical for effective national (and international)
agricultural research programs. The most rigorous
training is often obtained in developed countries,
although large developing countries may have one
or more universities with strong departments in
fields of science relevant to agriculture (examples
include China, India and Brazil). There are at least
two problems with obtaining skilled scientists with
graduate degrees by sending them to developed
countries for training. First, they need to have strong
math and science skills to succeed in graduate
programs in developed countries, requiring the
requisite undergraduate training to be offered in
developing countries. Second, individuals who
obtain graduate training in developed countries

In the medium to long term, more developing
countries need to develop strong programs to
train scientists and engineers to conduct research
that is relevant for their home countries. Countries
with large populations can each develop their
own program, but it may be more effective for
small countries to pool their resources to develop,
or at least be able to access, the training capacity
they require. A very recent example of the latter
is found in Sub-Saharan Africa (which includes
many countries with small populations), namely
the Education Initiative of the Alliance for a Green
Revolution in Africa.47 These programs are just
in their beginning stages, but nonetheless have
important potential for increasing the quantity and
quality of agricultural researchers in developing
countries.

7. IMPLICATIONS
During the 1900s, the world’s agricultural economy
was transformed remarkably, fuelled by agricultural
productivity growth, primarily generated by
agricultural R&D that was financed and conducted
by a small group of developed countries, especially
the United States, but also France, Germany, and
Japan. In an increasingly interdependent world,
both developed and developing countries have
been dependent on agricultural R&D conducted
in the private and public laboratories of these few
47 More information on this program can be found at http://
www.agra-alliance.org/revitalising/experts.html.

countries, even though they have not contributed
to financing the activity.

Diverging Research Agendas
However, dietary patterns and other priorities
change as incomes increase. As a result, developed
country research agendas are shifting; in particular,
the past emphasis on simple productivity
enhancement and enhancing the production
of staple foods is declining in favour of interest
in enhancing certain attributes of food (such as
increasing demand for processed and so-called
functional foods) and food production systems
(such as organic farming, humane livestock
production systems, localised food sources and ‘fair
trade’ coffee). In contrast, food security concerns
are still pervasive among less affluent communities,
predominantly in developing countries.
In addition, to growing differences in consumer
demand for innovation between developed and
developing countries, R&D agendas may diverge
because of differences in producer and processor
demands. Farmers in developed countries are
demanding high technology inputs that often are
not as relevant for subsistence agriculture (such
as precision farming technology or other capitalintensive methods). Agribusiness in developed
countries is demanding value-adding processes
designed to meet consumer demands, and farm
production technologies designed to satisfy
evolving demands for farm products with specific
attributes such as particular food, feed, energy,
medical, or industrial applications.
As developed countries’ agricultural R&D programs
respond to these changing patterns of demand
for innovations, the emphasis of the science is
being skewed in ways that could undermine the
international spillovers that have traditionally
contributed significantly to gains in food
production throughout developing countries
of the world. These spillovers are not generally
well understood and their importance is underappreciated.
Other aspects of agricultural science policy,
and the context in which it is conducted, are
changing as well. In particular, the rise of modern
biotechnology and enhanced intellectual property
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may be reluctant to return to their own countries
because their training enables them to earn much
higher incomes in developed countries than they
are likely to obtain in their home countries (Eicher,
2006). Three possible remedies to the second
problem are: 1) increases in salaries for researchers
who return to work in their home countries; 2)
development of programs (coordinated with
immigration authorities in both countries) that
require students in developing countries who
obtain graduate degrees in developed countries
to return to their home countries for several years
after obtaining their degrees; and 3) enabling
developing country students to obtain advanced
degrees in those developing countries that have
strong programs, such as Brazil, Chile, India and
Thailand.
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rights (IPRs) regimes mean that the types of
technologies that were once freely available will
be more difficult to access in the future. Moreover,
the new technologies may not be as portable as
in the past. Biotech companies are mostly located
in developed countries, particularly in the United
States, and tend to emphasise technologies that
are locally applicable. These and other factors limit
incentives for companies to develop technologies
for less-developed countries. Hence some fear lessdeveloped countries may become technological
orphans, abandoned by their former private- and
public-sector benefactors in developed countries.

Changes in the emphasis of developed country
agricultural R&D, combined with new IP rules and
practices in conjunction with an increased use of
modern biotechnology methods, have already
begun to spell a decline in the public pool of
new varieties. In addition, the other main source
of varietal materials, the CGIAR, has changed its
emphasis and is scaling back its role of providing
finished material or advanced breeding lines.
The reduction in spillovers from these traditional
sources will mean that less-developed countries
will have to find new ways of meeting their
demands for new varieties.

New Pressures for Self-Reliance

Pervasive Underinvestment

International spillovers of public agricultural R&D
results are extremely important as they have
profound implications for the distribution of R&D
benefits between consumers and producers, and
thus among countries (Alston 2002). They have
also contributed to a global underinvestment in
agricultural R&D, which the existing public policies
have only partly succeeded in correcting. The stakes
are high because the benefits from agricultural
technology spillovers are worth many times more
than the investments that give rise to them.

Although investment in agricultural R&D has high
returns and has played a major role in helping to
provide food for large and expanding populations,
support for this form of R&D is declining.
Underfunding of agricultural R&D is pervasive,
especially in developing counties. This trend is
alarming given:

The world’s least affluent countries have depended
on spillovers of technologies from industrialized
countries (especially from the United States, but
also the United Kingdom, France, and others), both
individually and through their collective action via
the Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research (CGIAR). Until recently, much of the
successful innovative effort in most developing
countries was applied at the very last stage of
the process, selecting and adapting varieties for
local conditions using breeding lines and other
materials developed elsewhere. Only a few larger
countries, such as Brazil, China, and India, were
able to achieve much by themselves at the more
upstream stages of the research and innovation
process, even for improved crop technologies for
which conventional breeding methods are widely
applied. Until recently, that strategy of conducting
adaptive research and relying on spillovers for
basic material was reasonable, given an abundant
and freely accessible supply of suitable materials;
at least for the main temperate-zone food crops.

• the continuing and substantive growth of
populations, especially in developing countries
• an increasingly scarce and deteriorating natural
resource base
• the pervasive pockets of hunger and poverty
that persist in developing countries, in many
cases despite impressive national average
productivity increases
• the growing divergence between developed
country research agendas and the priorities of
developing countries.
The problem of underfunding may worsen,
especially for R&D that is related to the production
of food staples in less-developed countries, as
evidenced by the recent funding trends.
Agricultural R&D is at a crossroads. The close
of the 20th century marked changes in policy
contexts, fundamental shifts in the scientific basis
for agricultural R&D, and shifting funding patterns
for agricultural R&D in developed countries. These
changes imply a requirement for both rethinking of
national policies and reconsidering multinational

1. The types of technologies being developed in
the developed countries may no longer be as
readily applicable to less-developed countries
as they were in the past.
2. Those technologies that are applicable may
not be as readily accessible because of IP
protection of privately owned technologies.
3. Those technologies that are applicable and
available are likely to require more substantial
local development and adaptation, calling for
more sophisticated and more extensive forms
of scientific R&D than in the past.
In short, different approaches may have to be
devised to make it possible for countries to achieve
equivalent access and tap into technological
potential generated by other countries, and in
many instances countries may have to extend their
own agricultural R&D efforts farther upstream, to
more fundamental areas of the science.

Epilogue
The balance of global agricultural R&D investments
is shifting in ways that will have important longterm consequences, especially for the world’s least
affluent countries. The primary reason is changes
in supply and demand for agricultural technologies
in developed countries, which have been the main
producers of agricultural technologies. These
countries seem unlikely to provide the quantities
of productivity-enhancing technologies, suitable
for adaptation and adoption in food deficit
countries, that they did in the past. This trend has
been compounded by a scaling back of developedcountry support for the international agricultural
R&D system, which has already diverted its
own attention away from finished productivityenhancing technologies, especially for staple food
crops.
A shift in R&D agendas is forcing a rethinking of
some national and multinational policies. National
governments can take some initiatives in national
agricultural R&D policy, such as enhancing IP and
tailoring the institutional and policy details of IPRs
to best fit local circumstances; increasing the total
amount of government funding for their national
agricultural R&D systems; introducing institutional
arrangements and incentives for private and
joint public-private funding; and improving the
processes by which agricultural R&D resources are
administered and allocated.
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approaches to determine the types of activities to
conduct through the CGIAR and similar institutions
and how these activities should be organised and
financed. Even though there is no evidence to
suggest that the world can afford to reduce its rate
of investment in agricultural R&D and there is every
indication that more should be invested, it cannot
be assumed that developed countries will play the
same roles as in the past. In particular, countries
that in the past relied on technological spillovers
may no longer have that luxury available to them in
the same ways or to the same extent. This change
can be seen as involving three elements:

83

84

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

REFERENCES
Alston, J.M. and P.G. Pardey. “Market Distortions and Technological Progress in Agriculture.” Technological
Forecasting and Social Change 43(3/4) May/June (1993): 301-319.
Alston, J.M. and P.G. Pardey. Making Science Pay: Economics of Agricultural R&D Policy. Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1996.
Alston, J.M., G.W. Norton, and P.G. Pardey. Science Under Scarcity: Principles and Practice for Agricultural
Research Evaluation and Priority Setting. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995 (reprinted in soft cover by
CAB International 1998).
Alston, J.M., M.C. Marra, P.G. Pardey, and T.J. Wyatt. A Meta Analysis of Rates of Return to Agricultural R&D: Ex
Pede Herculem? Washington, D.C.: IFPRI Research Report No 113, 2000.
Alston, J.M. “Spillovers.” Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 48(3)(2002): 315–346.
Alston, J.M., J.W. Freebairn, and J.S. James. “Distributional Issues in Check-off Funded Programs.” Agribusiness:
An International Journal 19(3)(Summer 2003): 277-288.
Alston, J.M., J.W. Freebairn, and J.S. James. “Levy-Funded Research Choices by Producers and Society.”
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 48(1)(March 2004): 34-64.
Alston, J.M. “Horticultural Biotechnology Faces Significant Economic and Market Barriers” California
Agriculture 58(2)(April 2004): 80-88.
Alston, J.M., S. Dehmer and P.G. Pardey. “International Initiatives in Agricultural R&D: The Changing Fortunes
of the CGIAR.” Chapter 12 in P.G. Pardey, J.M. Alston, and R.R. Piggott, eds. Agricultural R&D in the Developing
World: Too Little, Too Late? Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.
Alston, J.M., K.J. Bradford, and N. Kalaitzandonakes. “The Economics of Horticultural Biotechnology.” Journal
of Crop Improvement (special volume entitled Transgenic Approaches for Horticultural/Ornamental Crop
Improvement) 18(1-2)(2006): 413-431.
Alston, J.M., M.A. Andersen, J.S. James, and P.G. Pardey. U.S. Agricultural Productivity Growth and the Benefits
from Public R&D Spending: A Reassessment. InSTePP and Giannini Foundation Monograph. St Paul and
Davis: University of Minnesota and University if California, Davis, 2007 (in preparation).

Anderson, K. “Interactions between Trade Polices and GM Food Regulations.” Chapter 7 in R.E. Just, J.M.
Alston, and D. Zilberman (eds). Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics and Policy. Washington,
D.C.: Kluwer-Verlag, 2006.
Anderson, J.R. and P.B.R. Hazell. “Synthesis and Needs in Agricultural Research and Policy.” In J.R. Anderson
and P.B.R. Hazell eds. Variability in Grain Yields: Implications for Agriculture Research and Policy in Developing
Countries. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1989.
Antle, J.M. and P.L. Pingali. “Pesticides, Productivity, and Farmer Health: A Philippine Case Study.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(3) (1994): 418-30.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Altieri, M. “Agroecology in Action.” Online document, accessed 19th December 2006 at
http://nature.berkeley.edu/%7Eagroeco3/clades.html, 2000.

85

Atkinson, R.C., et al. “Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management.” Science 301(July 11)
(2003): 174-175.
AWB (Australian Wheat Board). “End Point Royalties Overview.” Available
http://www.awb.com.au/growers/awbseeds/endpointroyalties/. Downloaded June 2007.

online

at

Ayele, S., J. Chataway, and D. Wield. “Partnerships in African Crop Biotech.” Nature Biotechnology 24(6)
(2006): 619–21.
Ballard, C.L. and D. Fullerton. “Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 6 (Summer 1992): 117-131.
Barbash, J.E., G.P. Thelin, D.W. Kolpin, and R.J. Gilliom. Distribution of Major Herbicides in Ground Water of
the United States. Water-Resources Investigations Report 98-4245, U.S. Geological Survey, Sacramento,
California, 1999.
Barro, R. and J-W Lee. “International Data on Educational Attainment: Updates and Implications.” Oxford
Economic Papers, 53(3) (2001): 541-563.
Baum, W.C. Partners Against Hunger: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank, 1986.
Beardsley, T.“Death in the Deep: ‘Dead Zone’ in the Gulf of Mexico Challenges Regulators.” Scientific American
277(5) (1997): 17-20.
Behrman, J. “Labor Markets in Developing Countries.” Chapter in A. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds. Handbook
of Labor Economics, Volume 3. North Holland: Amsterdam, 1999.
Beintema, N.M. and G. Stads. Investing in Sub-Saharan African Agricultural Research: Recent Trends. 2020
Africa Conference Brief No. 8. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2004.
Benkler, Y. “Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents.” Science, 305(August 20, 2004):
1110-1111.
Bessen, J. “Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods.” Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 2004.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Binenbaum, E., C. Nottenburg, P.G. Pardey, B.D. Wright and P. Zambrano. “South-North Trade, Intellectual
Property Jurisdictions, and Freedom to Operate in Agricultural Research on Staple Crops.” Economic
Development and Cultural Change 51(2)(2003): 309-336.

86

Binenbaum, E. and P.G. Pardey. “Intellectual Property Strategy in the Context of Inter-Organizational
Relations: The Case of International Agricultural Research.” Chapter 12 of R.E. Evenson & V. Santaniello
(eds.), The Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology. Oxon, UK: CABI Publishing, 2004.
Binenbaum, E., P.G. Pardey, and B.D. Wright. “The CIAT-Paplotla Agreement: Intellectual Property in a
Partnership that May Help Transform Tropical Cattle Farming.” Unpublished Working paper, Adelaide:
University of Adelaide, 2004.
Binenbaum, E. “Qualitative Analysis of R&D Consortia.” Unpublished Working Paper. Adelaide: University of
Adelaide, 2006.

Boldrin, M. and D. Levine. “The Case Against Intellectual Property.” American Economic Review 92(2)(2002):
209-212.
Bradford, K.J., J.M. Alston, and N. Kalaitzandonakes. “Regulation of Biotechnology for Horticultural Crops.”
Chapter 29 of R.E. Just, J.M. Alston, and D. Zilberman (eds). Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics
and Policy. Springer-Verlag publishers, 2006.
Bruinsma, J., ed. World Agriculture Towards 2015/2010: An FAO Perspective. London, U.K.: Earthscan Publications
(for FAO), 2003.
BSPB (British Society of Plant Breeders). Plant Breeding: The Business and Science of Crop Improvement. Ely,
U.K.: BSPB, n.d.
Byerlee, D. “Knowledge-Intensive Crop Management Technologies: Concepts, Impacts, and Prospects for
Asian Agriculture.” Chapter in P. Pingali and M. Hossain (eds). Impact of Rice Research. Manila: International
Rice Research Institute, 1998.
Byerlee, D. and K. Fischer. “Accessing Modern Science: Policy and Institutional Options for Agricultural
Biotechnology in Developing Countries.” World Development 30 (2002): 931-48.
Byerlee, D., and G. Traxler. “The Role of Technology Spillovers and Economies of Size in the Efficient Design
of Agricultural Research Systems.” Chapter 9 in J. M. Alston, P. G. Pardey, and M. J. Taylor, eds. Agricultural
Science Policy: Changing Global Agendas, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.
Carew, R., and E.G. Smith. “Assessing the Contribution of Genetic Enhancements and Fertilizer Application
Regimes on Canola Yield and Production Risk in Manitoba.” Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics
54(2)(2006): 215-226.
Carlson G. “Pest-Resistant Varieties, Pesticides, and Crop Yield Variability: A Review.” Chapter in J.R. Anderson
and P.B.R. Hazell, eds. Variability in Grain Yields: Implications for Agriculture Research and Policy in Developing
Countries. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989.
Carman, H.F. and J.M. Alston. “California’s Mandated Commodity Programs.” Chapter 2 in H. Kaiser, J.M.
Alston, J. Crespi, and R.J. Sexton (eds). The Economics of Commodity Promotion Programs: Lessons from
California. New York, NY: Peter Lang Publishing, 2005.

Castillo, R., D. Parker and D. Zilberman. “Offices of Technology Transfer and Privatization of University
Discoveries.” Unpublished Working Paper, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Berkeley:
University of California, Berkeley, May 2000.
CGIAR Secretariat. “Executive Summary of the 2006 CGIAR Financial Results (Draft).” Washington, D.C.: CGIAR
Secretariat (joint with IRRI), 2007.
Chambers, R.G., and J. Quiggin. Uncertainty, Production, Choice and Agency: The State Contingent Approach.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
CIRAD (Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement). Annual Report
2005. Paris: CIRAD.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Cassman, K. and S. Wood. “Cultivated Systems” Chapter 26 in Ecosytems and Human Well Being. Volume 1:
Current State and Trends. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Island Press. Washington, D.C. January 2006.

87

Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal. “Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces of R&D.” Economic Journal 99
(1989): 569-96.
Crissman C.C., D.C. Cole, and F. Carpio. “Pesticides Use and Farm Worker Health in Ecuadorian Potato
Production.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(3) (1994): 593-97.
Dalton, T.J., G.A. Porter, and N.G. Winslow. “Risk Management Strategies in Humid Production Regions: A
Comparison of Supplemental Irrigation and Crop Insurance.” Agricultural and Resource Economics Review,
33(2)(2004): 220-232.
Deen, T., Development: Agriculture Workers Too Poor to Buy Food. New York: UN IPS, 2000.
Delmer, D.P., C. Nottenburg, G.D. Graff, and A.B. Bennett. “Intellectual Property Resources for International
Development in Agriculture.” Plant Physiology, 133(2003): 1666-1670.
DeVries, J. and G. Toenniessen. Securing the Harvest: Biotechnology, Breeding and Seed Systems for African
Crops. Wallingford CAB International, 2001.
Dodgson, M. Technological Collaboration in Industry; Strategy, Policy and Internationalization in Innovation.
Routledge, 1993.
Douthwaite, B. Enabling Innovation: A Practical Guide to Understanding and Fostering Technological Change.
New York: Zed Books, 2002.
Eicher, C. “The Evolution of Agricultural Education and Training: Global Insights of Relevance for Africa.” Staff
Paper 2006-26. Department of Agricultural Economics. Michigan State University.
Enright, T. Personal Communications as chairman of GRDC Board. Canberra: Grains Research and
Development Corporation, 2007.
European Commission. The Directorate-General for Research; General Information. Brussels: European
Commission, 2004.
European Commission. Research Directorate-General, online
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/research/index_en.html, accessed July 2007.

information

available

at

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Evenson, R.E. and D. Gollin. “Assessing the Impact of the Green Revolution.” Science 300(2 May 2003):
758-762.

88

Fan, S. K. Qian, and X. Zhang. “China: An Unfinished Reform Agenda.” Chapter in P.G. Pardey, J.M. Alston,
and R.R. Piggott, eds. Agricultural R&D in the Developing World: Too Little, Too Late? Washington, D.C.:
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.
FAO. “FAOSTAT Classic 2006 Rome: FAO,” downloaded in June, 2006.
FAOSTAT. “Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, On-line Statistical Databases.” Rome:
FAO, downloaded from http://faostat.fao.org in 2004.
Foster, A. and M. Rosenzweig. “Learning by Doing and Learning from Others: Human Capital and Technical
Change in Agriculture.” Journal of Political Economy 103(5)(1995): 1176-1209.
Foster, A. and M. Rosenzweig. “Technical Change and Human Capital Returns and Investments: Evidence
from the Green Revolution.” American Economic Review 86(4)(1996): 931-953.

Fox, G.C. “Is the United States Really Underinvesting in Agricultural Research?”American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 67 November (1985): 806-812.
Fullerton, D. “Reconciling Recent Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation.” American Economic
Review 81(1)(1991): 302-308.
GAO (United States General Accounting Office). Biotechnology: Information on Prices of Genetically Modified
Seeds in the United States and Argentina. Washington, D.C.: General Accounting office, January 2000.
Giri, C, Z. Zhu, and B Reed. “A Comparative Analysis of the Global Land Cover 2000 and MODIS Land Cover
Data Sets. Remote Sensing of Environment. 94 (2005) 123-132.
Glewwe, P. and M. Kremer. “Schools, Teachers, and Education Outcomes in Developing Countries.” Chapter
16 in E. Hanushek and F. Welch, eds., Handbook of the Economics of Education. Amsterdam: North
Holland, 2006.
Graff, G.D., S.E. Cullen, K.J. Bradford, D. Zilberman, and A.B. Bennett. “The Public-Private Structure of
Intellectual Property Ownership in Agricultural Biotechnology.” Nature Biotechnology 21(9)(2003):
989-995.
Graff, G.D. and D. Zilberman “Explaining Europe’s Resistance to Agricultural Biotechnology.” University of
California Giannini Foundation Update 7(5)(2004): 1-4.
Hagedoorn, J., A.N. Link, and N.S. Vonortas. “Research Partnerships.” Research Policy 29 (2000): 467-86.
Harvey, M., and A. McMeekin, “Brazilian Genomics and Bioinformatics: Instituting New Innovation Pathways
in a Global Context.” Economy and Society 34 (2005): 634-58.
Hayami, Y. and V.W. Ruttan. Agricultural Development: An International Perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985.
Heckman, J., R. Lalonde, and J. Smith. “The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs.”
Chapter in A. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3. North Holland:
Amsterdam, 1999.

Heller, M.A. and R.S. Eisenberg. “Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research.”
Science 280(1998): 698–701.
Holland, C.P. “Cooperative Supply Chain Management: The Impact of Interorganizational Information
Systems.” Journal of Strategic Information Systems 4 (1995): 117-133.
Huffman, W. “Human Capital, Education and Agriculture,” in B. Gardner and G. Rausser, eds., Handbook of
Agricultural Economics, Volume I. North Holland: Amsterdam, 2001.
Huffman, W.E. and M. Rousu. “Consumer Attitudes and Market Resistance to Biotech Products.” Chapter 10 in
R.E. Just, J.M. Alston, and D. Zilberman (eds). Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics and Policy.
Springer-Verlag publishers, 2006.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Heisey, P and D. Schimmelpfennig. “Regulation and the Structure of Biotechnology Industries.” Chapter
19 in R.E. Just, J.M. Alston, and D. Zilberman (eds). Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics and
Policy. Springer-Verlag publishers, 2006.

89

Huffman, W.E., and R.E. Evenson. Science for Agriculture: A Long-Term Perspective. Ames: Iowa State University
Press, 1993.
Huffman, W.E., and R.E. Just. “Funding, Structure, and Management of Public Agricultural Research in the
United States.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(1994): 744-759.
Hurd, B.H. “Yield Response and Production Risk: An Analysis of Integrated Pest Management in cotton.”
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 19(2)(1994): 313-326.
Hurley, T.M., G.L. Malzer, and B. Kilian “Estimating Site-Specific Crop Response Functions: A Conceptual
Framework and Geostatistical Model.” Agronomy Journal 96 (2004): 1331-1343.
Hurley, T.M., P.D. Mitchell, and M.E. Rice. “Risk and the Value of Bt Corn.” American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 86(2)(2004): 345-358.
Hussain, S.S. and D. Byerlee. “Education and Farm Productivity in Post-Green Revolution Asia.” Chapter in
G. Peters and D. Headley (eds.) Agricultural Competitiveness, Market Forces, and Policy Choices: Proceedings
of the 22nd Conference of the International Agricultural Economics Association. Dartmouth Publishers:
Aldershot, U.K., 1995.
IFPRI. “Proposal for Deriving an Integrated Cropland Surface.” Unpublished internal IFPRI memo. Washington,
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.
Industry Commission. Research and Development: Volume 2. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing
Service, 1995.
IRD (Institut de Recherche pour le Développement) Annual Report 2005. Paris: IRD, 2006
Irwin, D.A. and P.J. Klenow. “High-Tech R&D Subsidies: Estimating the Effects of SEMATECH.” Journal of
International Economics 40 (1996): 323-344.
Jin, S., S. Rozelle, J.M. Alston, and J. Huang. “Economies of Scale and Scope and the Economic Efficiency of
China’s Agricultural Research System.” International Economic Review 46(3) August (2005): 1033-1057.
Josling, T., D. Roberts, and D. Orden. Food Regulation and Trade: Toward a Safe and Open Global System.
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2003.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Just, R.E. and D. Zilberman. “Stochastic Structure, Farm Size and Technology Adoption in Developing
Agriculture.” Oxford Economic Papers 35(2)(1983): 307-28.

90

Just, R.E., J.M. Alston, and D. Zilberman (eds). Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics and Policy.
Washington, D.C.: Kluwer-Verlag, 2006.
Just, R.E. and W.E. Huffman. “Economic Principles and Incentives: Structure, Management and Funding
of Agricultural Research in the United States.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 74 (1992):
1102-1108.
Kalaitzandonakes, N., J.M., Alston and K.J. Bradford. “Compliance Costs for Regulatory Approval of New
Biotech Crops. Nature Biotechnology 25 (2007): 509-511.
Kiepe, P. “Integrating Aquaculture into Agroecosystems in West Africa: The Roles of WARDA—The Africa
Rice Center and the Inland Valley Consortium”. Chapter in M. Halwart and A.A. van Dam (eds.) Integrated
Irrigation and Aquaculture in West Africa: Concepts, Practices and Potential. Rome: FAO, 2006.

Kim, K., and J. Chavas. “Technological Change and Risk Management: An Application to the Economics of
Corn Production.” Agricultural Economics, 29(2) (2003): 125-142.
Kingwell, R. “Institutional Change and Plant Variety Provision in Australia.” Australasian Agribusiness Review
13(2005). Available on-line at http://www.agrifood.info/review/2005/.
Kingwell, R. “Charging for the Use of Plant Varieties”, Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
45(2)(2001):291-305.
Klette, T.J., J. Moen, and Z. Griliches. “Do Subsidies to Commercial R&D Reduce Market Failures?
Microeconometric Evaluation Studies.” Research Policy 29 (2000): 471-95.
Knudson, M.K. “The Research Consortium Model for Agricultural Research.” Chapter 9 in K.O. Fuglie and
D.E. Schimmelpfennig (eds.), Public-Private Collaboration in Agricultural Research. Iowa State University
Press, 2000.
Knudson, M.K. and V.W. Ruttan. “Research and Development of a Biological Innovation: Commercial Hybrid
Wheat” Food Research Institute Studies 21 (1)(1988): 45-68.
Koo, B. and B.D. Wright. “Dynamics of Patenting Research Tools and Tool-Using Innovations”, Washington,
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, mimeo, 2005.
Koo, B., P.G. Pardey, K. Qian, and Y. Zhang. “An Option Perspective on Generating and Maintaining Plant
Variety Rights in China.” Agricultural Economics 35(2006): 35-48.
Kremer, M. “Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics
113(1998): 1137-1167.
Kremer, M. and A.P. Zwane. “Encouraging Private Sector Research for Tropical Agriculture.” World Development
33(1)(2005): 87-105.
Kryder, R. D., S. P. Kowalski, A.F. Krattiger. “The Intellectual and Technical Property Components of pro-Vitamin
A Rice (GoldenRiceTM): A Preliminary Freedom-To-Operate Review.” ISAAA Briefs No. 20. The International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications (ISAAA), 2000.
Lerner, J. and J. Tirole. “Some Simple Economics of Open Source.” Journal of Industrial Economics 50 (2002):
197-234.

Lin, J. “Education and Innovation Adoption in Agriculture: Evidence from Hybrid Rice in China.” American
Journal of Agricultural Economics 73 (1991): 713- 723.
Lindner, B. “Privatised Provision of Essential Plant Breeding Infrastructure.” Australian Journal of Agricultural
and Resource Economics 48 (2004): 301-21.
Louwaars. N.P., R. Tripp, D. Eaton, V. Henson-Apollonio, R. Hu, M. Mendoza, F. Muhhuku, S. Pal and J.
Wekundah. Impact of Strengthened Intellectual property Rights Regimes on the Plant Breeding Industry in
Developing Countries. Wageningen: Wageningen UR, 2005.
Masters, W.A. “Research Prizes: A New Kind of Incentive for Innovation in African Agriculture.” International
Journal of Biotechnology 7(1/2/3)(2005): 195-211.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Lerner, J. and J. Tirole. “The Economics of Technology Sharing: Open Source and Beyond.” Journal of Economic
Perspective 19(2)(2005): 99-120.

91

Masters, W.A. “Research Prizes: A Mechanism to Reward Agricultural Innovation in Low-Income Regions”
AgBioForum 6(1&2)(2003): 71-74.
Mathews, J.A. “The Origin and Dynamics of Taiwan’s R&D Consortia.” Research Policy 31 (2002): 633-51.
McCluskey, J.J. K.M. Grimsrud and T.I. Wahl. “Comparison of Consumer Responses to Genetically Modified
Foods in Asia, North America and Europe.” Chapter 11 in R.E. Just, J.M. Alston, and D. Zilberman (eds).
Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics and Policy. Springer-Verlag publishers, 2006.
Miller, H.I. and G. Conko. “The Science of Biotechnology Meets the Politics of Global Regulation.” Issues in
Science and Technology (Fall 2000): 47-54.
Mowery, D.C. “The Changing Structure of the US National Innovation System: Implications for International
Conflict and Cooperation in R&D Policy.” Research Policy 27(1998): 639-654.
Munkvold, G.P., R.L. Hellmich, and L.G. Rice. “Effects of Bt Transformation Events on Fusarium: Ear Rot and
Fumonisins, 1999.” Biological and Cultural Tests for Control of Plant Diseases (2001): C2.
Nature. “Open-Source Biology.” Nature 431(September 30, 2004): 491.
Norton, G.W. and S.M. Swinton. “Precision Agriculture: Global Prospects and Environmental Implications.” In
G.H. Peters and P. Pingali, eds. Tomorrow’s Agriculture: Incentives, Institutions, Infrastructure and Innovations:
Proceedings of 24th International Conference of Agricultural Economists, 2000. London: Ashgate, 2001.
NSF (National Science Foundation). National Patterns of Research and Development Resources: 2003. NSF 05
308. Arlington, Virginia: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics, 2005.
OECD. Frascati Manual: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental Development.
Paris: OECD, 1993.
Olmstead, A.L. and P. W. Rhode. “The Red Queen and the Hard Reds: Productivity Growth in American Wheat,
1800–1940.” Journal of Economic History 62 (4)(2002): 929–966.
Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Pal, S. and D. Byerlee. “India: The Funding and Organization of Agricultural R&D¬ Evolution and Emerging
Policy Issues,” Chapter in P.G. Pardey, J.M. Alston, and R.R. Piggott, eds. Agricultural R&D in the Developing
World: Too Little, Too Late? Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.

92

Pandey S. “Irrigation and Crop Yield Variability: A Review.” In J.R. Anderson and P.B.R. Hazell. eds. Variability
in Grain Yields: Implications for Agriculture Research and Policy in Developing Countries. Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press, 1989.
Pardey, P.G. and N.M. Beintema. Slow Magic: Agricultural R&D a Century After Mendel, IFPRI Food Policy Report.
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, October 2001.
Pardey, P.G., J.M. Alston, and R.R. Piggott, eds. Agricultural R&D in the Developing World: Too Little, Too Late?
Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.
Pardey, P.G., N.M. Beintema, S. Dehmer, and S. Wood. Agricultural Research: A Growing Global Divide? IFPRI
Food Policy Report. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.

Pardey, P.G., S. Dehmer, and S. El Feki. Global Spending on Science—A New Order in the Making? International
Science and Technology Practice and Policy (InSTePP) Center. St Paul: University of Minnesota, 2007 (in
preparation).
Pardey, P.G., S. Wood and R. Hertford, eds. Research Futures: Projecting Agricultural R&D Potentials for Latin
America and the Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: FONTAGRO and IFPRI, 2007 (in process).
Pingali, P.L., C.B. Marquez, and F.G. Palis. “Pesticides and Philippine Rice Farmer Health: A Medical and
Economic Analysis.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76(3)(1994): 587-92.
Pingali, P.L., P.F. Moya, and L.E. Velasco. The Post-Green Revolution Blues in Asian Rice Production: The Diminished
Gap Between Experiment Station and Farmer Yields. International Rice Research Institute, Social Science
Division Paper No. 90-01, Manila, 1990.
Pitt, M. and G. Sumodiningrat, “Risk, Schooling, and the Choice of Seed Technology in Developing Countries.”
International Economic Review 32 (1991): 457-473.
Plucknett, D.L., N.J.H. Smith and S. Ozgediz. Networking in International Agricultural Research, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1990.
Qaim, M. “A Prospective Evaluation of Biotechnology in Semi-Subsistence Agriculture.” Agricultural Economics
25 (2001): 165-75.
Ramankutty, N. and J.A. Foley. “Estimating Historical Changes in Global Land Cover: Croplands from 1700 to
1992.” Global Biogeochemical Cycles 13(4) December (1999): 997-1027.
Ramaswami, B. “Production Risk and Optimal Input Decisions.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
74(4) (1992): 860-869.
Roa-Rodriquez, C.C. Nottenburg, J. Mayer, and D. Ashton. Agrobacterium-mediated Transformation of Plants.
Canberra: CAMBIA Intellectual Property Resource, 2003.
Roumasset, J.A., M.W. Rosegrant, U.N. Chakravorty, and J.R. Anderson. “Fertilizer and Crop Yield Variability: A
Review.” Chapter in J.R. Anderson and P.B.R. Hazell, eds. Variability in Grain Yields: Implications for Agriculture
Research and Policy in Developing Countries. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1989.

Runge, F.C., B. Senauer, P.G. Pardey, and M.W. Rosegrant. Ending Hunger in our Lifetime: Food Security and
Globalization. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2003.
Schultz, T.W. “The Value of the Ability to deal with Disequilibria.” Journal of Economic Literature 13(3)(1975):
827-846.
Schultz, T.W. “On Economics and Politics of Agriculture.” In Distortions in Agricultural Incentives, T. W. Schultz,
ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.
Service, R. “A Growing Threat Down on the Farm.” Science 316 (25 May 2007): 1114-1117.
Shavell, S. and T. van Ypersele. “Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights.” Journal of Law and Economics
44(2001): 525-547.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Rausser G., L. Simon, and H. Ameden. “Public-Private Alliances in Biotechnology: Can They Narrow the
Knowledge Gaps between Rich and Poor?” Food Policy 25 (2000): 499-513.

93

Siebert, S. and P. Döll. A Digital Global Map of Irrigated Areas—An Update for Latin America and Europe. Report
A0102, Center for Environmental Systems Research, University of Kassel, 2001.
Siebert, S., P. Döll, S. Feick, and J. Hoogeveen. Global map of irrigated areas version 4.0. Johann Wolfgang
Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, Rome, Italy, 2006.
Spielman, D.J., F. Hartwich, and K. von Grebmer. “Building Bridges and Sharing Science: Public-Private
Partnerships in the CGIAR.” ISNAR Discussion Paper, forthcoming December 2006. Washington, D.C.:
International Food Policy Research Institute, 2006.
Srinivasan, C.S. “The International Trends in Plant Variety Protection.” e-Journal of Development Economics
2(2)(2005): 182-220.
Sunding, D. and D. Zilberman. “The Agricultural Innovation Process: Research and Technology Adoption
in a Changing Agricultural Sector.” Chapter 4 in Gardner and G. C. Rausser, eds. Handbook of Agricultural
Economics. Vol. 1a, B. L. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001.
Taba, S. (ed). Latin American Maize Germplasm Conservation: Regeneration, In Situ Conservation, Core Subsets,
and Prebreeding: Proceedings of a Workshop held at CIMMYT, April 7-10, 2003. Mexico, D.F.: CIMMYT, 2003.
Tollens, E., M. Demont, and R. Swennen. “Agrobiotechnology in Developing Countries: North-South
Partnerships are the Key.” Outlook on Agriculture 33 (2004): 231-8.
Traxler, G., J. Falck-Zepeda, J.I. Ortiz-Monasterio R., and K. Sayre. “Production Risk and the Evolution of
Varietal Technology.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 77(1) (1995): 1-7.
Villano, R. and E. Fleming. “Technical Inefficiency and Production Risk in Rice Farming: Evidence from Central
Luzon Philippines.” Asian Economic Journal, 20(1)(2006): 29-46.
Van Schoonhoven, A. Personal communication. Cali: CIAT, 2001.
von Hippel, E. Democratizing Innovation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.
U.S. Geological Survey. Nutrients in The Nation’s Waters: Too Much Of A Good Thing? Denver, Colorado: U.S.
Geological Survey, 1996.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Wielinga, H.E. “Intermediate Roles in Privatized Extension Systems: The Dutch Case.” Chapter in Langeveld, H.
and N.G. Roling, eds. Changing European Farming Systems for a Better Future. Proceedings of the European
IFSA Conference, Wageningen. Wageningen: Academic Publishers, 2006.

94

Witcombe, J.R., K.D. Joshi, S. Gyawali, A.M. Musa, C. Johansen, D.S. Virk, and B.R. Sthapit. “Participatory
Plant-Breeding is Better Described as Highly Client-Oriented Plant Breeding; I. Four Indicators of Client
Orientation in Plant Breeding.” Experimental Agriculture 41 (2005): 299-319.
Wood, S., K. Sebastian, and S.J. Scherr. Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems (PAGE): Agroecosystems. International
Food Policy Research Institute and the World Resources Institute: Washington, D.C., 2000.
World Bank. Institutional Innovation in Agricultural Research and Extension Systems in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006.
World Bank. World Development Indicators [CD-ROM] World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2006

Wright, B.D. “The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts.” American
Economic Review 73(4)(1983):691–707.
Wright, B.D. and P.G. Pardey. “The Evolving Rights to Intellectual Property Protection in the Agricultural
Biosciences.” International Journal for Technology and Globalization 2 (1/2) (2006): 12-29.
Wright, B.D. and P.G. Pardey. “Changing Intellectual Property Regimes: Implications for Developing Country
Agriculture.” International Journal for Technology and Globalization 1(1/2) (2006): 93-114.
Wright, B.D., P.G. Pardey, C. Nottenburg, and B. Koo. “Agricultural Innovation: Economic Incentives and
Institutions.” Chapter in R.E. Evenson and P. Pingali, eds. Handbook of Agricultural Economics: Volume 3.
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007.
Wu, F. “Mycotoxin Reduction in Bt Corn: Potential Economic, Health and Regulatory Impacts.” Transgenic
Research 15 (2006): 277-289.

S C I E N C E, T E C H N O LO G Y A N D S K I L L S

Zack, M.H. “Developing a Knowledge Strategy.” California Management Review 41(3) (1999): 125-45.

95

b!J SCIENCE COUNCIL

~~CGIAR

www.instepp.umn.edu
layout by portpholio.com

